Democracy index 2010: Democracy in retreat

Democracy index 2010
Democracy in retreat
A report from the Economist Intelligence Unit
www.eiu.com
Democracy index 2010
Democracy in retreat
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2010
Democracy in retreat
This is the third edition of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s democracy index. It reflects the
situation as of November 2010. The first edition, published in The Economist’s The World in 2007,
measured the state of democracy in September 2006 and the second edition covered the situation
towards the end of 2008. The index provides a snapshot of the state of democracy worldwide for
165 independent states and two territories—this covers almost the entire population of the world
and the vast majority of the world’s independent states (micro states are excluded). The Economist
Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism;
civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture.
Countries are placed within one of four types of regimes: full democracies; flawed democracies;
hybrid regimes; and authoritarian regimes.
Free and fair elections and civil liberties are necessary conditions for democracy, but they are
unlikely to be sufficient for a full and consolidated democracy if unaccompanied by transparent
and at least minimally efficient government, sufficient political participation and a supportive
democratic political culture. It is not easy to build a sturdy democracy. Even in long-established
ones, if not nurtured and protected, democracy can corrode.
Democracy in decline
The global record in democratisation since the start of its so-called third wave in 1974, and
acceleration after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, has been impressive. According to the
Economist Intelligence Unit’s measure of democracy,
one-half of the world’s population now lives
in a democracy of some sort. However, there has been a decline in democracy across the world since
2008. The decades-long global trend in democratisation had previously come to a halt in what
Larry Diamond (2008) called a “democratic recession”. Now democracy is in retreat. The dominant
pattern in all regions over the past two years has been backsliding on previously attained progress
in democratisation. The global financial crisis that started in 2008 accentuated some existing
negative trends in political development.
Table 1
Democracy index, 2010, by regime type
No. of countries % of countries % of world population
Full democracies 26 15.6 12.3
Flawed democracies 53 31.7 37.2
Hybrid regimes 33 19.8 14.0
Authoritarian regimes 55 32.9 36.5
Note. “World” population refers to the total population of the 167 countries covered by the index. Since this
excludes only micro states, this is nearly equal to the entire actual estimated world population in 2010.
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
Democracy index 2010
Democracy in retreat
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Disappointments abound across many of the world’s regions. Authoritarian trends have become
even more entrenched in the Middle East and much of the former Soviet Union. Democratisation
in Sub-Saharan Africa is grinding to a halt, and in some cases is being reversed. A political malaise
in east-central Europe has led to disappointment and questioning of the strength of the region’s
democratic transition. Media freedoms are being eroded across Latin America and populist forces
with dubious democratic credentials have come to the fore in a few countries in the region. In the
developed West, a precipitous decline in political participation, weaknesses in the functioning of
government and security-related curbs on civil liberties are having a corrosive effect on some longestablished
democracies.
Reversals in or erosion of democracy and rising disenchantment with the results of some political
liberalisations appear to have a variety of causes. The pace of democratisation was bound to slow
after the “easy cases”—eager-to-liberalise east-central Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall and
African regimes susceptible to outside pressure for political change. “Hard cases” such as China and
Middle East autocracies were always going to be a more difficult proposition. Autocrats have also
learned how better to protect themselves; many of them preside over energy-rich states and have
been strengthened by sustained high oil prices. A key factor is the delegitimation of much of the
democracy-promotion agenda, which has been associated with military intervention and unpopular
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. A combination of double standards in foreign policy (autocrats can
be good friends as well as foes) and growing infringements of civil liberties has led to charges of
hypocrisy against Western states.
Problems in the functioning of democracy in leading Western states diminish the scope
for credible external democracy promotion. The US and UK are near the bottom of the “full
democracy” category in our index. In the US, there has been an erosion of civil liberties related
to the fight against terrorism. Problems in the functioning of government have also become more
prominent. In the UK, there has also been some erosion of civil liberties, but the main feature
is an exceptionally low level of political participation across all dimensions—voting turnout,
membership of political parties and willingness to engage in and attitudes to political activity.
Although almost one-half of the world’s countries can be considered to be democracies, in
our index the number of “full democracies” is low, at only 26 countries; 53 countries are rated as
“flawed democracies”. Of the remaining 88 countries in our index, 55 are authoritarian and 33 are
considered to be “hybrid regimes”. As could be expected, the developed OECD countries dominate
among full democracies, although there are two Latin American countries, one east European
country and one African country, which suggests that the level of development is not a binding
constraint. Only two Asian countries are represented: Japan and South Korea.
One-half of the world’s population lives in a democracy of some sort, although only 12% reside
in full democracies. Some 2.5bn people, more than one-third of the world’s population, still lives
under authoritarian rule (with a large share being, of course, in China).
Democracy index 2010
Democracy in retreat
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Table 2
Democracy Index 2010
Category scores
Rank
Overall
score
I Electoral process
and pluralism
II Functioning
of government
III Political
participation
IV Political culture V Civil liberties
Full democracies
Norway 1 9.80 10.00 9.64 10.00 9.38 10.00
Iceland 2 9.65 10.00 9.64 8.89 10.00 9.71
Denmark 3 9.52 10.00 9.64 8.89 9.38 9.71
Sweden 4 9.50 9.58 9.64 8.89 9.38 10.00
New Zealand 5 9.26 10.00 9.29 8.89 8.13 10.00
Australia 6 9.22 10.00 8.93 7.78 9.38 10.00
Finland 7 9.19 10.00 9.64 7.22 9.38 9.71
Switzerland 8 9.09 9.58 9.29 7.78 9.38 9.41
Canada 9 9.08 9.58 9.29 7.78 8.75 10.00
Netherlands 10 8.99 9.58 8.93 8.89 8.13 9.41
Luxembourg 11 8.88 10.00 9.29 6.67 8.75 9.71
Ireland 12 8.79 9.58 7.86 7.78 8.75 10.00
Austria 13 8.49 9.58 7.86 7.78 8.13 9.12
Germany 14 8.38 9.58 7.86 7.22 8.13 9.12
Malta 15 8.28 9.17 8.21 5.56 8.75 9.71
Czech Republic 16 8.19 9.58 7.14 6.67 8.13 9.41
US 17 8.18 9.17 7.86 7.22 8.13 8.53
Spain 18 8.16 9.58 8.21 6.11 7.50 9.41
UK 19 8.16 9.58 7.86 6.11 8.13 9.12
South Korea 20 8.11 9.17 7.86 7.22 7.50 8.82
Uruguay 21 8.10 10.00 8.57 4.44 7.50 10.00
Japan 22 8.08 9.17 8.21 6.11 7.50 9.41
Belgium 23 8.05 9.58 8.21 5.56 7.50 9.41
Mauritius 24 8.04 9.17 8.21 5.00 8.13 9.71
Costa Rica =24 8.04 9.58 8.21 6.11 6.88 9.41
Portugal 26 8.02 9.58 7.50 6.11 7.50 9.41
Flawed democracies
Cape Verde 27 7.94 9.17 7.86 6.67 6.88 9.12
Greece 28 7.92 9.58 6.43 6.67 7.50 9.41
Italy 29 7.83 9.58 6.79 6.11 8.13 8.53
South Africa 30 7.79 8.75 8.21 7.22 6.25 8.53
France 31 7.77 9.58 7.14 6.11 7.50 8.53
Slovenia 32 7.69 9.58 7.14 6.67 6.25 8.82
Democracy index 2010
Democracy in retreat
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Table 2
Democracy Index 2010
Category scores
Rank
Overall
score
I Electoral process
and pluralism
II Functioning
of government
III Political
participation
IV Political culture V Civil liberties
Estonia 33 7.68 9.58 7.50 5.00 7.50 8.82
Chile 34 7.67 9.58 8.57 3.89 6.88 9.41
Botswana 35 7.63 9.17 7.14 5.56 6.88 9.41
Taiwan 36 7.52 9.58 7.14 5.56 5.63 9.71
Israel 37 7.48 8.75 7.50 8.33 7.50 5.29
Slovakia 38 7.35 9.58 7.50 5.56 5.00 9.12
Cyprus 39 7.29 9.17 6.43 6.11 5.63 9.12
India 40 7.28 9.58 8.57 4.44 4.38 9.41
Lithuania 41 7.24 9.58 5.71 5.56 6.25 9.12
Timor-Leste 42 7.22 8.67 6.79 5.56 6.88 8.24
Hungary 43 7.21 9.58 6.07 5.00 6.88 8.53
Jamaica =43 7.21 9.17 6.79 5.00 6.25 8.82
Trinidad and Tobago 45 7.16 9.58 7.14 6.11 5.00 7.94
Panama 46 7.15 9.58 6.79 5.56 5.00 8.82
Brazil 47 7.12 9.58 7.50 5.00 4.38 9.12
Poland 48 7.05 9.58 6.07 6.11 4.38 9.12
Latvia =48 7.05 9.58 5.36 5.56 5.63 9.12
Mexico 50 6.93 8.75 7.14 6.11 5.00 7.65
Argentina 51 6.84 8.75 5.71 5.56 6.25 7.94
Bulgaria =51 6.84 9.17 5.71 6.11 4.38 8.82
Croatia 53 6.81 9.17 6.07 5.56 5.00 8.24
Suriname 54 6.65 9.17 6.43 4.44 5.00 8.24
Sri Lanka 55 6.64 7.00 6.07 5.00 6.88 8.24
Romania 56 6.60 9.58 6.43 5.00 3.75 8.24
Colombia 57 6.55 9.17 7.14 3.89 3.75 8.82
Thailand =57 6.55 7.83 6.07 5.56 6.25 7.06
Papua New Guinea 59 6.54 7.33 6.43 4.44 6.25 8.24
Indonesia 60 6.53 6.92 7.50 5.56 5.63 7.06
El Salvador 61 6.47 9.17 6.07 3.89 5.00 8.24
Paraguay 62 6.40 8.33 6.07 5.00 4.38 8.24
Peru =62 6.40 8.75 5.00 5.00 5.00 8.24
Mongolia 64 6.36 8.33 5.71 3.89 5.63 8.24
Serbia 65 6.33 9.17 4.64 6.11 4.38 7.35
Democracy index 2010
Democracy in retreat
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Table 2
Democracy Index 2010
Category scores
Rank
Overall
score
I Electoral process
and pluralism
II Functioning
of government
III Political
participation
IV Political culture V Civil liberties
Moldova =65 6.33 8.75 5.71 6.11 3.13 7.94
Ukraine 67 6.30 9.17 5.00 5.00 4.38 7.94
Montenegro 68 6.27 8.75 5.00 5.56 5.00 7.06
Namibia 69 6.23 5.25 5.36 6.67 5.63 8.24
Dominican Republic 70 6.20 8.75 5.00 2.78 6.25 8.24
Malaysia 71 6.19 6.50 6.79 5.56 6.25 5.88
Benin 72 6.17 7.33 6.43 5.00 5.63 6.47
Macedonia 73 6.16 7.75 4.64 6.11 4.38 7.94
Philippines 74 6.12 8.33 5.00 5.00 3.13 9.12
Guyana 75 6.05 7.92 5.36 5.56 4.38 7.06
Guatemala =75 6.05 8.75 6.43 3.33 4.38 7.35
Lesotho 77 6.02 7.42 6.07 6.11 3.75 6.76
Ghana =77 6.02 8.33 5.00 5.00 5.00 6.76
Mali 79 6.01 8.25 6.43 3.89 5.63 5.88
Hybrid regimes
Hong Kong 80 5.92 3.50 5.36 4.44 6.88 9.41
Bolivia =80 5.92 7.92 5.00 5.56 3.75 7.35
Singapore 82 5.89 4.33 7.50 2.78 7.50 7.35
Bangladesh 83 5.87 7.42 5.43 4.44 5.00 7.06
Albania 84 5.86 7.42 5.07 4.44 5.00 7.35
Malawi 85 5.84 7.00 5.71 5.00 5.63 5.88
Lebanon 86 5.82 7.92 3.93 6.67 5.00 5.59
Ecuador 87 5.77 7.83 4.64 5.00 3.75 7.65
Honduras 88 5.76 7.50 5.71 4.44 4.38 6.76
Turkey 89 5.73 7.92 7.14 3.89 5.00 4.71
Nicaragua =89 5.73 7.42 4.36 3.89 5.63 7.35
Zambia 91 5.68 6.17 5.36 3.89 5.63 7.35
Tanzania 92 5.64 7.42 4.29 5.56 5.63 5.29
Palestine 93 5.44 7.83 2.86 8.33 4.38 3.82
Bosnia and Hercegovina 94 5.32 7.33 3.29 3.33 5.00 7.65
Senegal 95 5.27 7.00 4.29 3.89 5.00 6.18
Venezuela 96 5.18 6.17 3.93 5.56 4.38 5.88
Liberia 97 5.07 7.83 0.79 5.56 5.00 6.18
Democracy index 2010
Democracy in retreat
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Table 2
Democracy Index 2010
Category scores
Rank
Overall
score
I Electoral process
and pluralism
II Functioning
of government
III Political
participation
IV Political culture V Civil liberties
Uganda 98 5.05 5.25 3.21 5.00 5.63 6.18
Mozambique 99 4.90 4.83 4.64 5.56 5.63 3.82
Cambodia 100 4.87 6.08 6.07 2.78 5.00 4.41
Kenya 101 4.71 3.92 4.29 4.44 5.63 5.29
Bhutan 102 4.68 6.25 5.36 3.89 4.38 3.53
Georgia 103 4.59 7.00 2.14 3.89 3.75 6.18
Pakistan 104 4.55 5.17 5.71 2.22 4.38 5.29
Sierra Leone 105 4.51 7.00 1.86 2.78 5.63 5.29
Kyrgyz Republic 106 4.31 5.75 1.14 5.00 4.38 5.29
Russia 107 4.26 5.25 3.21 5.00 3.13 4.71
Nepal 108 4.24 1.83 4.29 3.89 5.63 5.59
Armenia 109 4.09 4.33 3.21 3.89 3.13 5.88
Burundi 110 4.01 3.42 3.29 3.89 5.63 3.82
Haiti 111 4.00 5.17 1.86 2.78 3.75 6.47
Iraq =111 4.00 4.33 0.79 6.11 3.75 5.00
Authoritarian regimes
Madagascar 113 3.94 2.17 2.14 4.44 6.25 4.71
Kuwait 114 3.88 3.58 4.29 3.33 4.38 3.82
Mauritania 115 3.86 3.00 4.29 3.89 3.13 5.00
Morocco 116 3.79 3.50 4.64 1.67 5.00 4.12
Jordan 117 3.74 3.17 4.64 3.33 3.75 3.82
Ethiopia 118 3.68 0.00 3.93 4.44 5.63 4.41
Fiji 119 3.62 0.42 2.86 3.33 5.00 6.47
Burkina Faso 120 3.59 4.00 3.57 2.22 3.75 4.41
Cuba 121 3.52 1.75 4.64 3.89 4.38 2.94
Bahrain 122 3.49 2.58 3.57 2.78 5.00 3.53
Nigeria 123 3.47 3.83 3.21 3.33 3.13 3.82
Togo 124 3.45 4.00 0.79 3.33 5.00 4.12
Algeria 125 3.44 2.17 2.21 2.78 5.63 4.41
Cameroon 126 3.41 1.17 4.29 2.78 5.00 3.82
Comoros =126 3.41 3.92 2.21 3.33 3.75 3.82
Niger 128 3.38 5.25 0.43 2.78 3.75 4.71
Gambia =128 3.38 2.17 4.29 2.22 5.00 3.24
Democracy index 2010
Democracy in retreat
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Table 2
Democracy Index 2010
Category scores
Rank
Overall
score
I Electoral process
and pluralism
II Functioning
of government
III Political
participation
IV Political culture V Civil liberties
Belarus 130 3.34 2.58 2.86 3.33 4.38 3.53
Angola 131 3.32 1.33 3.21 4.44 4.38 3.24
Kazakhstan 132 3.30 1.33 2.14 3.33 4.38 5.29
Gabon 133 3.29 2.17 2.21 3.89 4.38 3.82
Rwanda 134 3.25 0.83 4.64 1.67 5.00 4.12
Azerbaijan 135 3.15 2.17 1.79 3.33 3.75 4.71
China 136 3.14 0.00 5.00 3.89 5.63 1.18
Qatar 137 3.09 0.00 3.21 2.22 5.63 4.41
Egypt 138 3.07 0.83 3.21 2.78 5.00 3.53
Côte d’Ivoire 139 3.02 0.33 2.86 2.78 5.63 3.53
Vietnam 140 2.94 0.00 4.29 3.33 5.63 1.47
Swaziland 141 2.90 0.92 2.86 2.22 4.38 4.12
Congo (Brazzaville) 142 2.89 1.25 2.86 3.33 3.75 3.24
Oman 143 2.86 0.00 3.57 2.22 4.38 4.12
Guinea 144 2.79 3.50 0.43 3.33 3.75 2.94
Tunisia =144 2.79 0.00 2.86 2.22 5.63 3.24
Zimbabwe 146 2.64 0.00 1.29 3.33 5.63 2.94
Yemen =146 2.64 1.33 1.79 3.89 5.00 1.18
UAE 148 2.52 0.00 3.57 1.11 5.00 2.94
Tajikistan 149 2.51 1.83 0.79 2.22 6.25 1.47
Afghanistan 150 2.48 2.50 0.79 2.78 2.50 3.82
Sudan 151 2.42 0.00 1.43 3.33 5.00 2.35
Eritrea 152 2.31 0.00 2.14 1.11 6.25 2.06
Syria =152 2.31 0.00 2.50 1.67 5.63 1.76
Djibouti 154 2.20 0.83 1.43 1.11 5.00 2.65
Dem Rep of Congo 155 2.15 2.58 1.07 2.22 3.13 1.76
Laos 156 2.10 0.00 3.21 1.11 5.00 1.18
Guinea-Bissau 157 1.99 2.08 0.00 2.78 1.88 3.24
Libya 158 1.94 0.00 2.14 1.11 5.00 1.47
Iran =158 1.94 0.00 3.21 2.22 2.50 1.76
Equatorial Guinea 160 1.84 0.00 0.79 1.67 5.00 1.76
Saudi Arabia =160 1.84 0.00 2.86 1.11 3.75 1.47
Central African Republic 162 1.82 1.75 1.07 1.11 2.50 2.65
Democracy index 2010
Democracy in retreat
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Looking at the regional distribution of regime types, flawed democracies are concentrated in
Latin America and eastern Europe, and to a lesser extent in Asia. Despite progress in Latin American
democratisation in recent decades, many countries in the region remain fragile democracies. Levels
of political participation are generally low and democratic cultures are weak. There has also been
significant backsliding in recent years in some areas such as media freedoms.
Much of eastern Europe illustrates the difference between formal and substantive democracy.
The new EU members from the region have pretty much equal levels of political freedoms and civil
liberties as the old developed EU, but lag significantly in political participation and political culture—a
reflection of widespread anomie and weaknesses of democratic development. Only one country from
the region, the Czech Republic, is rated a full democracy.
Changes between 2008 and 2010
Many of the world’s authoritarian regimes are in the Middle East and North Africa (although there is
also a fair number in Asia, the former Soviet Union and Sub-Saharan Africa). The dearth of democratic
regimes in the Middle East and North Africa is a well-known phenomenon, with much debate about
the causes. In the statistical relationship between democracy and income discussed below, a dummy
variable for the Middle East and North Africa is negative and highly significant statistically even when
oil wealth is included in our 167-country sample—that is, the Middle East and North Africa has much
lower levels of democratisation than could be inferred on the basis of income levels.
The rollback in democracy is also part of an underlying trend that has been evident for some time,
but has strengthened. Between 2006 (the year of the first issue of the index) and 2008 there was
stagnation; over the past two years, between 2008 and 2010, there has been outright decline. In all
regions, the average democracy score for 2010 is lower than in 2008. The democracy score was lower
in 2010 than in 2008 in 91 countries out of the 167 covered by the Index, although in the majority of
these the deterioration was modest. The score increased, at least marginally, in 48 countries, and it
stayed the same in 28 countries over this period. The most pronounced decline was in eastern Europe.
In 19 countries of eastern Europe, the democracy score declined between 2008 and 2010.
Table 2
Democracy Index 2010
Category scores
Rank
Overall
score
I Electoral process
and pluralism
II Functioning
of government
III Political
participation
IV Political culture V Civil liberties
Myanmar 163 1.77 0.00 1.79 0.56 5.63 0.88
Uzbekistan 164 1.74 0.08 0.79 2.22 5.00 0.59
Turkmenistan 165 1.72 0.00 0.79 2.22 5.00 0.59
Chad 166 1.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.38 3.24
North Korea 167 1.08 0.00 2.50 1.67 1.25 0.00
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit
Democracy index 2010
Democracy in retreat
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Table 3
Democracy across the regions
No. of
countries
Democracy index
average
Full
democracies
Flawed
democracies
Hybrid
regimes
Authoritarian
regimes
North America
2010 2 8.63 2 0 0 0
2008 2 8.64 2 0 0 0
Western Europe
2010 21 8.45 16 4 1 0
2008 21 8.61 19 1 1 0
Eastern Europe
2010 28 5.55 1 15 6 6
2008 28 5.67 2 14 6 6
Latin America & the Caribbean
2010 24 6.37 2 15 6 1
2008 24 6.43 2 18 3 1
Asia & Australasia
2010 28 5.53 4 10 7 7
2008 28 5.58 4 10 8 6
Middle East & North Africa
2010 20 3.43 0 1 3 16
2008 20 3.54 0 1 3 16
Sub-Saharan Africa
2010 44 4.23 1 8 10 25
2008 44 4.28 1 6 15 22
Total
2010 167 5.46 26 53 33 55
2008 167 5.55 30 50 36 51
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
In 13 countries there was a change in regime type between 2008 and 2010; in 11 of these
there was regression. France, Italy, Greece and Slovenia dropped from the category of full
democracies to flawed democracies. In addition to these four European countries that
regressed from full to flawed democracies, three countries moved from flawed to hybrid
regimes and four from hybrid to authoritarian regimes. Only in two cases, both in Sub-
Saharan Africa, was there an advance—Ghana and Mali moved from hybrid regimes to flawed
democracies.
A noticeable decline in media freedoms in recent years, affecting all regions to some extent,
has accelerated since 2008. This has affected mainly electronic media, which is often under
Democracy index 2010
Democracy in retreat
10 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Table 4
Democracy Index 2008 and 2010
2010 Overall
score Rank
2008 Overall
score Rank
Difference in scores
between 2010 and
2008
North America
US 8.18 17 8.22 18 -0.04
Canada 9.08 9 9.07 11 0.01
Western Europe
Austria 8.49 13 8.49 14 0.00
Belgium 8.05 23 8.16 20 -0.11
Cyprus 7.29 39 7.70 36 -0.41
Denmark 9.52 3 9.52 5 0.00
Finland 9.19 7 9.25 6 -0.06
France 7.77 31 8.07 24 -0.30
Germany 8.38 14 8.82 13 -0.44
Greece 7.92 28 8.13 22 -0.21
state control or heavy state influence—although repression and infringements of the freedom of
expression have also extended to the print media and, most recently, the Internet.
In 36 countries there was a deterioration in scores for media freedom between 2008 and 2010.
This included three countries in western Europe (France, Italy, Turkey), eight in eastern Europe
(Albania, Azerbaijan, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Russia and Serbia), nine in Latin
America (Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru),
four in the Middle East and North Africa (Iran, Egypt, Palestinian Territories and Saudi Arabia),
four in Asia &Australasia (Fiji, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Thailand), and eight in Sub-Saharan Africa
(Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
Madagascar and Rwanda).
The reasons for this decline are complex and varied. Underlying negative trends appear to have
been exacerbated by the post-2008 economic crisis. Many governments have felt increasingly
vulnerable and threatened and have reacted by intensifying their efforts to control the media and
impede free expression. Increasing unemployment and job insecurity have fostered a climate of fear
and self-censorship among journalists in many countries. The concentration of media ownership
has tended to increase, which has had a negative impact on the diversity of views and the freedom
of expression. Advanced nations have become more inward-looking and hence less interested and
capable of monitoring and pressurising emerging market governments to ensure freedom of the
press. In authoritarian regimes, which have often become stronger and more confident, state control
and repression of any independent media is a given and has if anything tended to get worse, with
increasing attacks on independent journalists.
Democracy index 2010
Democracy in retreat
11 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Table 4
Democracy Index 2008 and 2010
2010 Overall
score Rank
2008 Overall
score Rank
Difference in scores
between 2010 and
2008
Iceland 9.65 2 9.65 3 0.00
Ireland 8.79 12 9.01 12 -0.21
Italy 7.83 29 7.98 29 -0.16
Luxembourg 8.88 11 9.10 9 -0.22
Malta 8.28 15 8.39 16 -0.11
Netherlands 8.99 10 9.53 4 -0.54
Norway 9.80 1 9.68 2 0.13
Portugal 8.02 26 8.05 25 -0.03
Spain 8.16 18 8.45 15 -0.29
Sweden 9.50 4 9.88 1 -0.38
Switzerland 9.09 8 9.15 8 -0.06
Turkey 5.73 89 5.69 87 0.04
United Kingdom 8.16 19 8.15 21 0.01
Eastern Europe
Albania 5.86 84 5.91 81 -0.05
Armenia 4.09 109 4.09 113 0.00
Azerbaijan 3.15 135 3.19 135 -0.04
Belarus 3.34 130 3.34 132 0.00
Bosnia and Hercegovina 5.32 94 5.70 86 -0.38
Bulgaria 6.84 51 7.02 52 -0.18
Croatia 6.81 53 7.04 51 -0.24
Czech Republic 8.19 16 8.19 19 0.00
Estonia 7.68 33 7.68 37 0.00
Georgia 4.59 103 4.62 104 -0.02
Hungary 7.21 43 7.44 40 -0.23
Kazakhstan 3.30 132 3.45 127 -0.16
Kyrgyz Republic 4.31 106 4.05 114 0.26
Latvia 7.05 48 7.23 46 -0.18
Lithuania 7.24 41 7.36 42 -0.11
Macedonia 6.16 73 6.21 72 -0.04
Moldova 6.33 65 6.50 62 -0.17
Montenegro 6.27 68 6.43 65 -0.16
Poland 7.05 48 7.30 45 -0.25
Romania 6.60 56 7.06 50 -0.46
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12 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Table 4
Democracy Index 2008 and 2010
2010 Overall
score Rank
2008 Overall
score Rank
Difference in scores
between 2010 and
2008
Russia 4.26 107 4.48 107 -0.22
Serbia 6.33 65 6.49 63 -0.16
Slovakia 7.35 38 7.33 44 0.02
Slovenia 7.69 32 7.96 30 -0.27
Tajikistan 2.51 149 2.45 150 0.06
Turkmenistan 1.72 165 1.72 165 0.00
Ukraine 6.30 67 6.94 53 -0.64
Uzbekistan 1.74 164 1.74 164 0.00
Latin America
Argentina 6.84 51 6.63 56 0.21
Bolivia 5.92 80 6.15 75 -0.23
Brazil 7.12 47 7.38 41 -0.27
Chile 7.67 34 7.89 32 -0.23
Colombia 6.55 57 6.54 60 0.01
Costa Rica 8.04 24 8.04 27 0.00
Cuba 3.52 121 3.52 125 0.00
Dominican Republic 6.20 70 6.20 73 0.00
Ecuador 5.77 87 5.64 88 0.14
El Salvador 6.47 61 6.40 67 0.07
Guatemala 6.05 75 6.07 79 -0.02
Guyana 6.05 75 6.12 76 -0.07
Haiti 4.00 111 4.19 110 -0.19
Honduras 5.76 88 6.18 74 -0.42
Jamaica 7.21 43 7.21 49 0.00
Mexico 6.93 50 6.78 55 0.15
Nicaragua 5.73 89 6.07 78 -0.34
Panama 7.15 46 7.35 43 -0.20
Paraguay 6.40 62 6.40 66 0.00
Peru 6.40 62 6.31 70 0.09
Suriname 6.65 54 6.58 59 0.07
Trinidad and Tobago 7.16 45 7.21 48 -0.05
Uruguay 8.10 21 8.08 23 0.02
Venezuela 5.18 96 5.34 95 -0.15
Democracy index 2010
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13 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Table 4
Democracy Index 2008 and 2010
2010 Overall
score Rank
2008 Overall
score Rank
Difference in scores
between 2010 and
2008
Asia and Australasia
Afghanistan 2.48 150 3.02 138 -0.54
Australia 9.22 6 9.09 10 0.13
Bangladesh 5.87 83 5.52 91 0.35
Bhutan 4.68 102 4.30 109 0.38
Cambodia 4.87 100 4.87 102 0.00
China 3.14 136 3.04 136 0.10
Fiji 3.62 119 5.11 100 -1.50
Hong Kong 5.92 80 5.85 84 0.07
India 7.28 40 7.80 35 -0.53
Indonesia 6.53 60 6.34 69 0.19
Japan 8.08 22 8.25 17 -0.17
Laos 2.10 156 2.10 157 0.00
Malaysia 6.19 71 6.36 68 -0.17
Mongolia 6.36 64 6.60 58 -0.24
Myanmar 1.77 163 1.77 163 0.00
Nepal 4.24 108 4.05 115 0.20
New Zealand 9.26 5 9.19 7 0.07
North Korea 1.08 167 0.86 167 0.22
Pakistan 4.55 104 4.46 108 0.10
Papua New Guinea 6.54 59 6.54 61 0.00
Philippines 6.12 74 6.12 77 0.00
Singapore 5.89 82 5.89 82 0.00
South Korea 8.11 20 8.01 28 0.11
Sri Lanka 6.64 55 6.61 57 0.03
Taiwan 7.52 36 7.82 33 -0.29
Thailand 6.55 57 6.81 54 -0.25
Timor-Leste 7.22 42 7.22 47 0.00
Vietnam 2.94 140 2.53 149 0.42
Middle East & North Africa
Algeria 3.44 125 3.32 133 0.12
Bahrain 3.49 122 3.38 130 0.11
Egypt 3.07 138 3.89 119 -0.82
Democracy index 2010
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14 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Table 4
Democracy Index 2008 and 2010
2010 Overall
score Rank
2008 Overall
score Rank
Difference in scores
between 2010 and
2008
Iran 1.94 158 2.83 145 -0.89
Iraq 4.00 111 4.00 116 0.00
Israel 7.48 37 7.48 38 0.00
Jordan 3.74 117 3.93 117 -0.19
Kuwait 3.88 114 3.39 129 0.49
Lebanon 5.82 86 5.62 89 0.20
Libya 1.94 158 2.00 159 -0.06
Morocco 3.79 116 3.88 120 -0.09
Oman 2.86 143 2.98 140 -0.13
Palestine 5.44 93 5.83 85 -0.38
Qatar 3.09 137 2.92 144 0.18
Saudi Arabia 1.84 160 1.90 161 -0.06
Sudan 2.42 151 2.81 146 -0.38
Syria 2.31 152 2.18 156 0.13
Tunisia 2.79 144 2.96 141 -0.17
United Arab Emirates 2.52 148 2.60 147 -0.07
Yemen 2.64 146 2.95 142 -0.32
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola 3.32 131 3.35 131 -0.03
Benin 6.17 72 6.06 80 0.11
Botswana 7.63 35 7.47 39 0.16
Burkina Faso 3.59 120 3.60 122 0.00
Burundi 4.01 110 4.51 106 -0.50
Cameroon 3.41 126 3.46 126 -0.05
Cape Verde 7.94 27 7.81 34 0.13
Central African Republic 1.82 162 1.86 162 -0.04
Chad 1.52 166 1.52 166 0.00
Comoros 3.41 126 3.58 123 -0.17
Congo (Brazzaville) 2.89 142 2.94 143 -0.06
Democratic Republic of Congo 2.15 155 2.28 154 -0.13
Côte d’Ivoire 3.02 139 3.27 134 -0.24
Djibouti 2.20 154 2.37 152 -0.16
Equatorial Guinea 1.84 160 2.19 155 -0.35
Democracy index 2010
Democracy in retreat
15 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Table 4
Democracy Index 2008 and 2010
2010 Overall
score Rank
2008 Overall
score Rank
Difference in scores
between 2010 and
2008
Eritrea 2.31 152 2.31 153 0.00
Ethiopia 3.68 118 4.52 105 -0.84
Gabon 3.29 133 3.00 139 0.29
Gambia 3.38 128 4.19 111 -0.81
Ghana 6.02 77 5.35 94 0.67
Guinea 2.79 144 2.09 158 0.70
Guinea-Bissau 1.99 157 1.99 160 0.00
Kenya 4.71 101 4.79 103 -0.08
Lesotho 6.02 77 6.29 71 -0.26
Liberia 5.07 97 5.25 98 -0.18
Madagascar 3.94 113 5.57 90 -1.63
Malawi 5.84 85 5.13 99 0.72
Mali 6.01 79 5.87 83 0.14
Mauritania 3.86 115 3.91 118 -0.05
Mauritius 8.04 24 8.04 26 0.00
Mozambique 4.90 99 5.49 92 -0.59
Namibia 6.23 69 6.48 64 -0.25
Niger 3.38 128 3.41 128 -0.03
Nigeria 3.47 123 3.53 124 -0.07
Rwanda 3.25 134 3.71 121 -0.45
Senegal 5.27 95 5.37 93 -0.10
Sierra Leone 4.51 105 4.11 112 0.40
South Africa 7.79 30 7.91 31 -0.11
Swaziland 2.90 141 3.04 137 -0.14
Tanzania 5.64 92 5.28 96 0.35
Togo 3.45 124 2.43 151 1.01
Uganda 5.05 98 5.03 101 0.02
Zambia 5.68 91 5.25 97 0.43
Zimbabwe 2.64 146 2.53 148 0.11
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit
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16 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Shifts in regime type
Downgrades
France—full democracy to flawed democracy
Various negative political trends in France in
recent years have resulted in the country being
downgraded to the flawed democracy category.
Public confidence in political parties and the
government is extremely low. Surveys also
show that citizens’ engagement with politics
has declined. The degree of popular support for
democracy is among the lowest in the developed
world. One in seven do not agree that democracy
is better than any other form of government.
The chasm between the country’s citizens and its
political elites has widened. Outbreaks of violent
rioting in recent years are another symptom of
the country’s political malaise. Under the French
political system, the president wields huge
power. The autocratic and domineering style of
the current president, Nicolas Sarkozy, threatens
to undermine democratic traditions. There has
been increasing anti-Muslim sentiment and
emphasis on the country’s Christian roots during
the Sarkozy presidency. Pressure on journalists
and the electronic media have led to a decline in
media freedoms.
Italy—full democracy to flawed democracy
Since the prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi,
returned to power in 2008, the media situation has
deteriorated significantly. In addition to owning
and controlling Mediaset, which comprises three
national television channels, Mr Berlusconi also
has indirect control over RAI, the state broadcaster.
RAI 1, the state channel with the largest audience,
has repeatedly chosen to limit coverage of, or
completely ignore, negative news about Mr
Berlusconi or his close associates. There has also
been political pressure on RAI to cancel or curtail
several popular left-leaning programmes for their
criticism of Mr Berlusconi and his government.
Greece—full democracy to flawed democracy
Greece already had low scores for the categories
of government functioning and political culture.
For some years there has been a high level of
perceived corruption, causing public confidence
in the country’s institutions to decline. The Greek
Democracy and development
The relationship between the level of development (income per head) and democracy is not clear
cut. There is an apparent association: the simple correlation between our democracy index for
2010 and the logarithm of GDP per head (at PPP US$) in 2010 is just under 0.6. This may look
even surprisingly low—it implies that in a simple two-variable regression of the democracy index
on income per head, just one-third of the inter-country variation in democracy is explained by
income levels. If we also include a measure of oil wealth (with a so-called dummy variable that
takes a value of 1 for major oil-exporting countries and 0 otherwise), the explanatory power of
the regression increases sharply to some 60% of the inter-country variation in the democracy
index. Although this still leaves almost 40% of the variation unexplained, it illustrates the oftenobserved
strong negative impact on democratic development of a reliance on oil wealth.
However, the direction of causality between democracy and income is also debatable. The
standard modernisation hypothesis that economic development leads to, and/or is a necessary
pre-condition for democracy, is no longer universally accepted. Instead, it has been argued that
the primary direction of causation runs from democracy to income (Rigobon and Rodrik 2005;
Acemoglu et al 2005).
Democracy index 2010
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17 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
economic crisis has revealed that the flaws in the
transparency and accountability of government
in Greece are even deeper than had been
previously supposed. A significant deterioration
in the functioning of government category has
led Greece to being downgraded to the flawed
democracy category.
Slovenia—full democracy to flawed democracy
Slovenia was previously one of only two countries in
eastern Europe that was considered a full democracy
(in addition to the Czech Republic). In 2008
Slovenia ranked 30th out of 167 countries, putting
it at the bottom of the list of full democracies.
Slovenia’s relatively strong position owes much
to its high scores in the electoral process and civil
liberties categories. In these areas it compares
well with some long-established democracies.
However, political participation in Slovenia has
been declining and there is widespread popular
apathy and disaffection with the political elite.
In recent years, there has been an extraordinary
deterioration in a range of attitudes associated
with democracy, In particular, surveys show a
sharp decline in public confidence and trust in
political institutions (political parties, government
and parliament). Scarcely more than one-third
of Slovenes are satisfied with the way democracy
functions in their country—a significantly lower
proportion than in any west European state.
Fiji—hybrid to authoritarian regime
Fiji turned further from democracy in April 2009
when the then president, Ratu Josefa Iloilo,
abrogated the constitution and reappointed the
country’s military commander, Commodore Voreqe
(Frank) Bainimarama, as prime minister for another
term (Mr Bainimarama had been forced to resign
as prime minister less than 24 hours earlier).
At the same time restrictions were placed on
media reporting. Since then Mr Bainimarama has
withstood international pressure to bring forward
the next parliamentary elections, which he has
insisted will not take place until 2014.
Honduras—flawed democracy to hybrid
The most significant reason for Honduras’s
downgrade to a hybrid regime was the coup d’état in
June 2009 that toppled the government of Manuel
Zelaya following a constitutional crisis. This led to
a significant deterioration in the electoral process
score, which now ranks among the lowest in Latin
America, only ahead of Cuba, Venezuela and Haiti.
Although elections were subsequently held in
November 2009 and the outcome was not disputed,
the political scene has been marred by frequent
labour unrest and the emergence of a resistance
movement sympathetic to Mr Zelaya, which,
although non-violent, could become radicalised.
Bolivia—flawed democracy to hybrid
The central government has assumed a growing
range of powers since 2008, under the presidency of
a radical left-winger, Evo Morales. The legislature,
in which the ruling party, Movimiento al Socialismo
(MAS), has a two-thirds majority, generally
serves as a rubber stamp to government policies.
The Morales government been using state funds
to promote the MAS party. It has been using
judicial bodies to carry out investigations against
opposition members that have been forced out of
local government positions.
Nicaragua—flawed democracy to hybrid
Although the constitution prohibited consecutive
re-election, the president, Daniel Ortega, used his
political clout to pressure the Supreme Court into
overturning the ban. A weakening of the country’s
check and balances has led to rising political
tensions. The 2008 municipal elections were marred
by accusations of fraud and irregularities were
reported in local elections in the Atlantic region in
early 2010.
Madagascar—hybrid to authoritarian
The ousting of the last elected president, Marc
Ravalomanana, in early 2009, by a militaryled
coup, was a severe setback. The unelected
administration that took over, Haute autorité pour
la transition (HAT), has repeatedly reneged on its
promises to share power with the opposition. The
HAT held a referendum on constitutional reforms in
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18 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Democracy after the financial crisis
There are a number of ways in which democracy has been adversely affected by the economic and
financial crisis.There has been a decline in some aspects of governance, political participation
and media freedoms, and a clear deterioration in attitudes associated with, or are conducive to,
democracy in many countries, including in Europe. The financial and economic crisis has increased
the attractiveness of the Chinese model of authoritarian capitalism for some emerging markets.
Democracy promotion by the Western world was already discredited by the experience in the
Middle East in recent years. The economic crisis has undermined further the credibility of efforts
by developed nations to promote their values abroad.
Nations with a weak democratic tradition are by default vulnerable to setbacks. Many nonconsolidated
democracies are fragile and socioeconomic stress has led to backsliding on
democracy in many countries. The underlying shallowness
of democratic cultures—as revealed
by disturbingly low scores for many countries in our index for political participation and political
culture—has come to the fore.
The impact of the economic and financial crisis on political trends has been most marked in
Europe, both east and west. Although extremist political forces in Europe have not profited from
November 2010, ostensibly with a view to holding
fresh presidential and parliamentary elections in
early 2011. However, the main opposition groups
boycotted this process and international mediators
have refused to acknowledge its legitimacy.
The Gambia—hybrid to authoritarian
In The Gambia, the regime’s intolerance of dissent
has worsened since 2008. Examples include
the arrests of a leading opposition politician
and the editors of two local newspapers, on
dubious grounds, in early 2009. The judiciary’s
independence has been curtailed further, as
illustrated most vividly by the sacking of the chief
justice, by the president, without explanation, in
mid-2009, despite objections that this violated
the constitution. Power has become increasingly
concentrated in the office of the president.
Ethiopia—hybrid to authoritarian
Ethiopia dropped by 13 places to 118th rank,
reflecting the regime’s crackdown on opposition
activities, media and civil society. The passage
of restrictive laws governing media, civil society
and political funding was a main driver behind
the landslide election in May 2010. The landslide
election victory for the ruling party in May 2010 has
made Ethiopia a de facto one-party state.
Upgrades
Ghana—from hybrid to flawed democracy
Ghana has one of the most successful democracies
in Sub-Saharan Africa. This was emphasised by the
presidential election in December 2008, which was
one of the closest in African history but was quickly
accepted by the losing candidate, whose party had
been in power. This was the second time that the
party in power had been unseated by the opposition
at a national election since the establishment
of multi-party politics in 1992. There is a vibrant
private press, which has continued to expand over
the past two years.
Mali—from hybrid to flawed democracy
In Mali, the popular independent president,
Amadou Toumani Toure, is committed to stepping
down at the end of his term in 2012. Ahead of the
elections, he is embarking on a constitutional
reform programme that will further strengthen
Mali’s democratic framework. The reforms include
the creation of an upper house, independent media
and election watchdogs, and a new code of conduct
for politicians. The security situation has improved
markedly, as have media freedoms.
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19 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
the economic crisis as much as might have been feared, populism and anti-immigrant sentiment
has nevertheless been on the rise. This trend has interacted with concerns about terrorism and
led to some further erosion of civil liberties.
Drawing on the results of worldwide Gallup polls, the International Labour Organisation (ILO)
recently noted that since the start of the crisis in 2008 confidence in government has declined
perceptibly in many countries, as have perceptions that policies are fair or lead to a better future
(ILO, 2010). These trends are most common among advanced economies. Among west European
countries, there is a perception of growing political extremism and social discontent. Perceptions
of unfairness have increased in Latin America and remain high in Asia and, to a lesser extent, in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Among advanced countries, confidence in government declined from 52% in
2006 to 41% in 2009. In countries of eastern Europe, confidence in government was down to 38%
in 2009 from 43% in 2006 (ILO op cit, page 33).
The results of the Gallup polls are largely mirrored by the findings of Eurobarometer surveys.
Confidence in national pubic institutions in western Europe—already low before 2008 in many
countries—has declined further since the onset of the crisis. Less than one fifth of west Europeans
trust political parties and only about one third trust their governments and parliaments. Levels
of public trust are exceptionally low in the eastern Europe-12 (the 10 new EU member states
and EU candidate countries Croatia and Macedonia). Less than 10% of people in this subregion
trust political parties and less than one fifth trust their governments and their parliaments. The
proportion that is satisfied with the way democracy functions in their countries fell from 40% in
2007 to only 33% in 2009.
Economic crises can threaten democracy, usually with a lag, through increased social unrest.
So far, social unrest related to the financial and economic crisis has affected about two dozen
countries, mostly in Europe. These cases have taken the form of protest against governments’
crisis responses and austerity measures aimed at improving fiscal balances, and violent clashes
between the government and demonstrators. Historically, economic crises and difficulties
have been associated with democratic breakthroughs, such as the sudden collapse of seemingly
stable autocratic regimes, as much as with the opposite outcome of increasing authoritarianism.
However, in the current circumstances, and given the combination of other factors at work, it
seems much more likely that the negative impact on democratisation would predominate.
Table 5
Confidence indicators (% surveyed)
Trust political parties Trust government Trust parliament Satisfied with democracy
2007 2009 2007 2009 2007 2009 2007 2009
EU27 18 16 34 29 35 30 58 53
EU-15 21 18 38 31 40 35 59 58
Austria 30 36 53 54 54 55 80 76
Belgium 29 21 43 36 49 38 66 62
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20 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Table 5
Confidence indicators (% surveyed)
Trust political parties Trust government Trust parliament Satisfied with democracy
2007 2009 2007 2009 2007 2009 2007 2009
Denmark 40 50 57 57 74 74 94 91
Finland 26 25 58 48 68 53 77 69
France 17 9 42 22 40 28 65 51
Germany 18 20 40 40 41 45 66 68
Greece 21 19 46 44 52 47 63 49
Ireland 22 13 32 15 33 19 69 56
Italy 16 17 23 26 25 27 40 44
Luxembourg 30 41 65 68 56 59 73 90
Netherlands 35 37 49 49 54 52 80 72
Portugal 15 21 36 32 34 41 36 40
Spain 32 18 49 29 47 29 77 58
Sweden 25 32 41 55 57 63 80 81
UK 15 9 30 19 34 19 62 58
East Europe-12 9 9 21 21 16 16 40 33
Bulgaria 7 12 16 44 11 27 26 21
Croatia 8 4 20 12 20 12 32 14
Czech Republic 11 12 21 37 16 15 51 48
Estonia 22 17 62 47 46 38 53 41
Hungary 8 9 21 14 21 15 24 23
Latvia 7 2 19 9 16 6 43 21
Lithuania 7 5 24 15 13 7 24 18
Macedonia 13 14 36 31 23 25 53 52
Poland 8 7 17 16 10 11 48 44
Romania 11 11 21 17 18 17 36 18
Slovakia 13 18 40 36 37 35 35 40
Slovenia 13 9 32 29 31 19 48 37
Note. Polls taken in October-November 2007 and October-November 2009. East Europe-12 comprises the ten EU members from eastern Europe
and the two candidate countries (Croatia and Macedonia). Satisfaction with democracy based on the question: Are you satisfied with the way
democracy functions in your country?
Source: Eurobarometer surveys.
When economic liberalism is curtailed, as it has been since the crisis broke out, social and
political liberalism also tend to be affected. There is a well-known association between economic
freedom and political freedom, and more broadly democracy. There are 152 countries for which
data are available for both our democracy index and the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic
Democracy index 2010
Democracy in retreat
21 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Freedom (IEF). The simple correlation between the two measures is almost 0.7. The component
indexes of the IEF are highly inter-correlated. Thus the scope for drawing reliable inferences
about the separate effects of particular subcomponents of economic freedom may be limited.
Nevertheless, several component indicators of the IEF are of special interest in the present
context—that of the government’s role in the economy as measured by the share of public
spending in GDP and indicators of government regulation.
As expected, the size of government is positively associated with democracy, even when we
control for the level of income per head. Popular demand for more public services is more likely
to be satisfied in democracies. Thus there may not be any reason for concern because of bigger
government or higher state spending levels. However, democracy is negatively associated with
levels of government regulation in various fields, including, interestingly, the degree of financial
sector regulation—also when income levels are controlled for. The same applies to an even
greater extent to regulation of business, trade and capital flows (although not to labour market
regulation, in which democracies appear likely to engage). A rise in economic nationalism, in
particular, clearly seems to be associated with less democracy.
Major reversals have taken place before—a democratisation wave after the second world war
ended with more than 20 countries subsequently sliding back to authoritarianism. That sort
of rollback is not currently evident, but the threat of backsliding now greatly outweighs the
possibility of further gains. Democracy as a value retains strong universal appeal worldwide.
Despite setbacks and overall stagnation, surveys show that most people in most places still want
democracy. Creating democracy by external intervention is being discredited. But trends such as
globalisation, increasing education and expanding
middle classes would have tended to favour the
organic development of democracy. These underlying forces, even if developing at a slower pace
than in the recent past, suggest that the retreat from democracy will not be permanent.
Democracy index 2010
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22 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Regional patterns
Western Europe
Seven out of the top ten countries in our index are in western Europe. However, there has been
a significant erosion in democracy in the region in recent years. A total of 15 countries out of 21
experienced a decline in their overall score in 2010 compared with 2008, in large part related to
the various effects of the economic crisis. Three countries (Greece, Italy and France) dropped
out of the category of full democracies. The strengthening of right-wing and anti-immigrant
political forces contributed to the deterioration in the scores of several west European countries.
Disaffection with the political system is widespread in western Europe, as reflected in many
countries by declining levels of trust and confidence in political institutions.
Populist anti-Islamic forces have made an advance in the former liberal bastions of northern
Europe such as Denmark and Sweden. Sweden drops from 1st position in 2008 to 4th position in
2010, owing mainly to a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment, the entry of the Sweden Democrats into
the Swedish parliament after the elections of September 2010, and problems in transparency and
party financing.
In many Western democracies, lack of public participation in the political process is a cause for
concern, leading to a s0-called democratic deficit. In Germany, membership of the major parties
is in decline and election turnout is decreasing at all levels. The UK’s political participation score
is among the worst in the developed world. Problems are reflected across many elements—voter
turnout, political party membership, the willingness of citizens to engage in, and their attitudes
towards, politics. As in the US, there has also been a perceptible erosion of civil liberties in
recent years, primarily linked to the fight against international terrorism. The issue is gaining
prominence, amid growing concerns about the erosion of civil liberties in areas ranging from
expanding police powers to official surveillance.
Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe was the region with the largest decline in its average score between 2008 and
2010, although in only one country was the difference large enough to precipitate a change
in the regime type categorisation. Out of the 28 countries in eastern Europe, 19 recorded a
decline in their democracy scores between 2008 and 2010. The deterioration has affected all
subregions. The most significant decline in scores took place in Ukraine, where some of the
democratic gains stemming from the “Orange Revolution” of several years ago are under threat,
and in the Balkan countries.
Authoritarian trends have become entrenched in most members of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). But the setbacks to democracy are by no means only limited to that
subregion. Democracy is also being eroded across east-central Europe. A common explanation
for the emergence of political difficulties in this subregion is that the EU accession process had
previously held together the fractious party-political systems of these countries, as mainstream
parties united behind the reforms that were needed to gain EU membership. But once accession
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23 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
was achieved, and politics reverted to “natural” antagonistic patterns, the underlying fragility of
east-central European political systems was exposed.
There are a number of possible reasons for this fragility. Most important is that although
democratic forms are in place in the region, much of the substance of democracy, including a
political culture based on trust, is absent. This is manifested in low levels of political participation
beyond voting (and even turnout at elections is low in many countries), and very low levels of
public confidence in institutions. A key underlying factor is that transition has resulted in a large
stratum of discontented voters who feel that they have lost out during the transition. Another
problem in the region is that party politics often remains fragmented, primarily reflecting the
shallow roots of many parties and low voter identification with parties.
Some negative trends have recently got worse. Hungary is perhaps the prime example among
the EU’s new member states in the region. In the April 2010 election, an extreme nationalist
party, Jobbik, gathered almost as many votes as the former ruling Socialists. Since winning a two
thirds parliamentary majority in the election, the centre-right Fidesz party has systematically
been taking over the country’s previously independent institutions: the presidency, the state
audit office and the media council are now all run by party placemen. Parliament recently voted to
severely restrict the constitutional court’s right to adjudicate on budgetary matters (“Has Orban
over-reached?”, The Guardian, November 25th 2010).
In Russia, the one positive development (the fact that the constitution was respected and that
Vladimir Putin stepped down from the presidency in 2008) was offset by a number of negative
developments. Although the formal trappings of democracy remain in place, today’s Russia has
been called a “managed” (or “stage managed”) democracy. All the main decisions are made by
a small group of insiders. The Duma is now little more than a rubber-stamp parliament; regional
governors are appointed directly; the main media are state-controlled; civil society organisations
have come under pressure; and the state has increased its hold over the economy. Even though
Dmitry Medvedev, Mr Putin’s successor, has adopted a softer style, and has instituted some
liberalising changes around the edges of the system, there have been no fundamental reforms
during his presidency so far.
Most Russians appear unperturbed by the trend towards authoritarianism. During the
presidency of Boris Yeltsin, many Russians came to associate the term democracy with chaos, and
“capitalism” was synonymous with rigged privatisations, the rise of the oligarchs and widespread
poverty. For now, however, the Russian middle class appears content with growing incomes and
increased personal freedom, including opportunities to travel.
Many countries in the region have experienced a decline in media freedoms in recent years.
In the CIS there is growing incidence of intimidation and attacks against journalists. There are
few genuinely independent media outlets. For example, in Kazakhstan media outlets are entirely
under the control of major financial groups affiliated with the regime.
Over the past few years, the countries of south-east Europe in particular have suffered declines
in media freedoms. Intimidation of journalists, political pressure and illegal state subsidies for
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government-controlled media are common in most Balkan countries. In Albania, journalists
continue to be attacked and there is political pressure on the media. A campaign is being led in
Macedonia against the media and journalists who are critical of the government. Police and public
officials have failed to intervene over incitement to violence against journalists. In Serbia, media
ownership patterns are opaque. In 2009 controversial new media laws and amendments were
hastily adopted without public debate. Many cases of violence against journalists have not been
properly investigated. The media in Serbia is under pressure, with the direct participation of state
officials in governing bodies and through political appointments of chief editors. In Montenegro,
free expression is “patchy”, according to the European Commission. In Croatia, concerns persist
regarding the safety of journalists who write about corruption and organised crime. In Romania,
the government even identified the media as a potential threat to national security.
Problems have been exacerbated by the financial and economic crisis, which has also hit the
media in the region and led to a further increase in the concentration of ownership, usually
by groups with close links to governments. Fear of unemployment has increased pressure on
journalists and self-censorship.
The trend has not bypassed central Europe, either. For example, in Poland, the government
has made efforts to subjugate public broadcasters directly to the minister of finance and to limit
their market share for the benefit of government-friendly private media corporations. There have
been controversial court decisions infringing on the freedom of expression as well as ongoing
harassment of investigative journalists by the Internal Security Agency.
Asia and Australasia
The wide disparities in democratic development across Asia are captured in the results of our
democracy index. The picture is exemplified by the Korean peninsula: South Korea is a full
democracy, ranked 20th. By contrast, North Korea props up the global listings, coming last of the
167 countries covered by the index. Although the average score for the region was lower in 2010
than in 2008, this was one of the few regions in the world that had more countries with a higher
overall score in 2010 than in 2008 (13 countries); eight countries had a lower score and in seven
countries the score stayed the same. Only one country underwent a change in regime type—Fiji
moved from a hybrid regime to the authoritarian category.
Although parts of the region—from Myanmar and North Korea to Laos, Vietnam and China—
are still entrenched authoritarian regimes, the past couple of decades have seen the spread
of democracy in the region overall. Over the past decade, some 20 Asian countries have held
elections, and many have undergone peaceful transitions in government. India remains the
world’s most populous democracy, despite the efforts of insurgents and religious extremists
to derail it. Yet even in the democratic countries, there are often significant problems in the
functioning of political systems. India’s rank, for example, has declined by five places compared
with 2008, pulled down by a deterioration in its political participation and political culture scores.
Democratic political cultures in Asia are often underdeveloped and shallow, even in the countries
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that have democratised. In only nine countries in the region do we rate elections as being both free and
fair. Even in parts of the region that are not authoritarian there is often pressure on the independent
media. In many countries, Asian Barometer polls show that more citizens believe that the nations’
recent democratic transitions had brought no improvement to their lives than believe the changes have
been positive. Nostalgia for overthrown dictators is widespread. Some in the region are calling for a
resurgence of so-called “Asian values”. Although the Asian Barometer Project found that the majority
of Asians say they support democratic ideals, their commitment to limits on a leader’s power is far lower
than in most other regions. (“Asia’s dithering democracies”, Time, January 1st, 2010).
Latin America
The average score for the region declined slightly between 2008 and 2010. There was an erosion in
some areas, such as media freedoms, reflecting a trend towards tighter government control of, and
state participation in, the media in a number of countries. Rampant crime in some countries—in
particular, violence and drug-trafficking—has also had a negative impact. However, in most countries
free and fair elections are now well established. The recent evidence from surveys on attitudes towards
democracy is mixed. In some countries, surveys indicate a slow shift in public attitudes on many issues
in a direction that is conducive to democracy.
While most Latin American countries (15 out of 24) fall within the flawed democracy category, there is
wide diversity across the region. For example, Uruguay is a full democracy with an index score of 8.1 (out
of 10) and a global ranking of 21st, while Cuba, an authoritarian regime, ranks 121st.
Although the region was affected by the 2008-09 recession—with the US-dependent Central
American and Caribbean subregions hit particularly badly—most countries avoided social unrest and
a significant rolling back of democracy. However, a key issue that is undermining democracy in much
of the region is an upsurge in violent crime. With rebel insurgencies largely defeated, the illegal drug
trade is the main cause of violence in Latin America and is particularly affecting the trafficking corridor
from the producing countries in South America through to the transport countries in Central America,
the Caribbean and Mexico. The corrupting influence of organised crime and its ability to undermine the
effectiveness of the security forces and the judicial authorities are a serious problem.
Electoral democracy, for the most part, remains firmly entrenched in Latin America, but media
freedoms have been eroded significantly in several countries. Most visibly, there have been a number
of attempts by governments to intimidate or block certain private media outlets since 2008. Aside from
Cuba (the only state in the region without any independent media), Venezuela is the worst offender.
Alongside a crackdown on the traditional media (including efforts to revoke the licence of the only
remaining television channel that is critical of the administration), there are rising concerns about
a crackdown on non-traditional web media. Similar trends have been evident in Argentina, where
the government is battling against Grupo Clarín, a major media group that runs a newspaper and two
television channels. However, this trend is not limited to the more radical left-wing governments. In
Panama, the pro-business administration of Ricardo Martinelli has also come under fire for its hostility
towards journalists and newspapers that are critical of its policy stance.
The failure to uphold press freedom partly reflects inadequate oversight bodies—a symptom of
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broader institutional weaknesses in Latin America. The executive remains very strong in many
countries, which is evident from a growing trend towards increasing presidential term limits.
Venezuela was one of the first countries in the region to extend term limits, and it has served as a
template for a number of Andean and Central American countries. The legislature is comparatively
weak in many cases and most judiciaries suffer from some degree of politicisation. Supporting
regulatory bodies are often overstretched and frequently lack adequate enforcement powers.
Given that tackling these structural problems often requires controversial reforms, the lack of
progress in this area has been a notable factor hampering the deepening of democratic processes
in Latin America.
The Middle East and North Africa
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remains the most repressive region in the world—16 out
of 20 countries in the region are categorised as authoritarian. There are only four exceptions:
Israel is the only democracy in the region, albeit a flawed democracy; and there are three hybrid
regimes (Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories).
Almost all governments in the region continue to restrict political freedoms. All the Gulf states
except Bahrain, for instance, ban political organisations. There have been some political reforms
in the region in recent years, including the establishment of representative assemblies in Oman,
Qatar and the UAE, and the return of an elected parliament in Bahrain. But these reforms have
certainly not changed fundamentally the political system in these states, in which the executive
branch still dominates and is unaccountable.
Egypt amended its constitution to permit multiple candidates in presidential elections but
followed with a law limiting this right to existing parties. Algeria’s Charter for Peace and National
Reconciliation was quickly followed by an extension of the presidential term in office, the removal
of term limits and the continuation of the ban on the Islamic Salvation Front. Similar patterns are
evident in other states in the region (UN Human Development Report 2010, page 69).
Enormous oil rents are the means by which governments in the region can entrench autocratic
rule. Rulers can finance far-reaching patronage networks and security apparatuses. Oil revenue
removes the need to levy taxes, thereby reducing accountability. Civil society is very weak
throughout the region.
The average score of countries in the region declined from an already very low 3.54 in 2008 to
3.43 in 2010, almost a point below the next lowest-scoring region, Sub-Saharan Africa. The only
improvement of any note between 2008 and 2010 occurred in Kuwait, which rose by 15 places in
the global rankings to 114th. Kuwait improved as its parliamentary system—the most advanced
in the Gulf, although still not able to check seriously the emir’s executive power—continued to
mature and press freedoms also strengthened.
Two of the largest authoritarian countries in the region, Iran and Egypt, suffered declines from
already low bases, as the ruling regimes tightened their control further. In Egypt, the approach
to the presidential election in 2011 has made it clear that changes to the constitution in 2007
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effectively lock out any serious opposition presidential candidates, such as Mohamed ElBaradei,
the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).Iran’s global rank declined by 13
places to 158th between 2008 and 2010 as the regime cracked down violently on opposition following
the flawed presidential election in June 2009. The growing power of the Revolutionary Guards Corp,
which is close to the president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has contributed, in the context of economic
sanctions, to an increase in corruption and cronyism. The democracy index scores and ranks of the
Palestinian Territories, Sudan and Yemen—all countries that have been suffering internal conflict and
serious political instability—also declined.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Elections have become a normal occurrence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since the late 1990s the number of
coups has fallen sharply, whereas the number of elections has increased. However, many elections are
rigged and defeated incumbents often still refuse to accept defeat. Only in five countries in the region
are the elections judged to be both free and fair (Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mauritius and South
Africa). Sub-Saharan Africa continued to score poorly in the latest democracy index. As elsewhere in
the world, there was also a decline in democracy in this region in 2010 compared with 2008, although
the difference between 2008 and 2010 is small: the region’s average score fell fractionally.
Only one state in the region (of the 44 assessed) remains a full democracy: the Indian Ocean
island of Mauritius, which has maintained a strong democratic tradition since the country gained
independence in 1968. The region has several flawed democracies, headed by South Africa, which
just falls short of being a full democracy because of weaknesses in political participation and political
culture. The other flawed democracies are Cape Verde, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, Ghana, Mali and
Benin. However, hybrid regimes (ten countries) and authoritarian regimes (25; over one-half of the
total assessed) continue to predominate.
There are a large number of hybrid regimes in the region that are close to being flawed democracies.
These include Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania, Senegal, Liberia, Uganda, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Kenya
and Burundi. However, although some are getting closer to the threshold, others are slipping back.
Three countries—Madagascar, Ethiopia and The Gambia—dropped from being a hybrid regime to
authoritarian.
Two countries—Ghana and Mali—improved their ratings from hybrid regime to flawed democracies.
Ghana enjoys one of the most successful democracies in the region. In Mali, the popular independent
president, Amadou Toumani Touré, is committed to stepping down at the end of his term in 2012.
Ahead of the elections, he is embanking on a significant constitutional reform programme.
A large number of African countries continue to suffer from fragile and weak democratic processes.
There is a tight election timetable in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2011, which will significantly test the
evolution of democracy in a number of countries, starting with what could turn out to be highly
controversial polls in Nigeria in April. As indicated by our index, democracy means more than the
holding of elections: the worse slippage in our scores between 2008 and 2010 came in the Political
culture category.
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Defining and measuring democracy
There is no consensus on how to measure democracy, definitions of democracy are contested and
there is an ongoing lively debate on the subject. The issue is not only of academic interest. For
example, although democracy-promotion is high on the list of US foreign policy priorities, there
is no consensus within the US government on what constitutes a democracy. As one observer
recently put it, “the world’s only superpower is rhetorically and militarily promoting a political
system that remains undefined--and it is staking its credibility and treasure on that pursuit”
(Horowitz, 2006, p 114).
Although the terms freedom and democracy are often used interchangeably, the two are not
synonymous. Democracy can be seen as a set of practices and principles that institutionalise and
thus ultimately protect freedom. Even if a consensus on precise definitions has proved elusive,
most observers today would agree that, at a minimum, the fundamental features of a democracy
include government based on majority rule and the consent of the governed, the existence of free
and fair elections, the protection of minority rights and respect for basic human rights. Democracy
presupposes equality before the law, due process and political pluralism. A question arises whether
reference to these basic features is sufficient for a satisfactory concept of democracy. As discussed
below, there is a question of how far the definition may need to be widened.
Some insist that democracy is necessarily a dichotomous concept—a state is either democratic
or not. But most measures now appear to adhere to a continuous concept, with the possibility of
varying degrees of democracy. At present, the best-known measure is produced by the US-based
Freedom House organisation. The average of their indexes, on a 1 to 7 scale, of political freedom
(based on 10 indicators) and of civil liberties (based on 15 indicators) is often taken to be a
measure of democracy.
The index is available for all countries, and stretches back to the early 1970s. It has been used
heavily in empirical investigations of the relationship between democracy and various economic
and social variables. The so-called Polity Project provides, for a smaller number of countries,
measures of democracy and regime types, based on rather minimalist definitions, stretching back
to the 19th century. These have also been used in empirical work.
Freedom House also measures a narrower concept, that of “electoral democracy”. Democracies
in this minimal sense share at least one common, essential characteristic. Positions of political
power are filled through regular, free, and fair elections between competing parties, and it is
possible for an incumbent government to be turned out of office through elections. Freedom House
criteria for an electoral democracy include:
1) A competitive, multiparty political system
2) Universal adult suffrage
3) Regularly contested elections conducted on the basis of secret ballots, reasonable ballot
security and the absence of massive voter fraud
4) Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and
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through generally open political campaigning
The Freedom House definition of political freedom is somewhat (though not much) more
demanding than its criteria for electoral democracy—that is, it classifies more countries as
electoral democracies than as “free” (some “partly free” countries are also categorised as
“electoral democracies”). At the end of 2007, 121 out of 193 states were classified as “electoral
democracies; of these, on a more stringent criterion, 90 states were classified as “free”. The
Freedom House political freedom measure covers the electoral process and political pluralism and,
to a lesser extent the functioning of government and a few aspects of participation.
A key difference in measures is between “thin”, or minimalist, and “thick”, or wider concepts of
democracy (Coppedge, 2005). The thin concepts correspond closely to an immensely influential
academic definition of democracy, that of Dahl’s concept of polyarchy (Dahl, 1070). Polyarchy has
eight components, or institutional requirements: almost all adult citizens have the right to vote;
almost all adult citizens are eligible for public office; political leaders have the right to compete
for votes; elections are free and fair; all citizens are free to form and join political parties and other
organisations; all citizens are free to express themselves on all political issues; diverse sources
of information about politics exist and are protected by law; and government policies depend on
votes and other expressions of preference.
The Freedom House electoral democracy measure is a thin concept. Their measure of democracy
based on political rights and civil liberties is “thicker” than the measure of “electoral democracy”.
Other definitions of democracy have broadened to include aspects of society and political culture
in democratic societies.
The Economist Intelligence Unit measure
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s index is based on the view that measures of democracy that
reflect the state of political freedoms and civil liberties are not “thick” enough. They do not
encompass sufficiently or at all some features that determine how substantive democracy is
or its quality. Freedom is an essential component of democracy, but not sufficient. In existing
measures, the elements of political participation and functioning of government are taken into
account only in a marginal and formal way.
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s democracy index is based on five categories: electoral
process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and
political culture. The five categories are inter-related and form a coherent conceptual whole. The
condition of having free and fair competitive elections, and satisfying related aspects of political
freedom, is clearly the sine quo none of all definitions.
All modern definitions, except the most minimalist, also consider civil liberties to be a vital
component of what is often called “liberal democracy”. The principle of the protection of basic
human rights is widely accepted. It is embodied in constitutions throughout the world as well as
in the UN Charter and international agreements such as the Helsinki Final Act (the Conference
on Security and Co-operation in Europe). Basic human rights include the freedom of speech,
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expression and the press; freedom of religion; freedom of assembly and association; and the
right to due judicial process. All democracies are systems in which citizens freely make political
decisions by majority rule. But rule by the majority is not necessarily democratic. In a democracy
majority rule must be combined with guarantees of individual human rights and the rights of
minorities.
Most measures also include aspects of the minimum quality of functioning of government. If
democratically-based decisions cannot or are not implemented then the concept of democracy is
not very meaningful or it becomes an empty shell.
Democracy is more than the sum of its institutions. A democratic political culture is also crucial
for the legitimacy, smooth functioning and ultimately the sustainability of democracy. A culture
of passivity and apathy, an obedient and docile citizenry, are not consistent with democracy.
The electoral process periodically divides the population into winners and losers. A successful
democratic political culture implies that the losing parties and their supporters accept the
judgment of the voters, and allow for the peaceful transfer of power.
Participation is also a necessary component, as apathy and abstention are enemies of
democracy. Even measures that focus predominantly on the processes of representative, liberal
democracy include (although inadequately or insufficiently) some aspects of participation. In
a democracy, government is only one element in a social fabric of many and varied institutions,
political organisations, and associations. Citizens cannot be required to take part in the political
process, and they are free to express their dissatisfaction by not participating. However, a healthy
democracy requires the active, freely chosen participation of citizens in public life. Democracies
flourish when citizens are willing to participate in public debate, elect representatives and join
political parties. Without this broad, sustaining participation, democracy begins to wither and
become the preserve of small, select groups.
At the same time, even our “thicker”, more inclusive and wider measure of democracy does not
include other aspects--which some authors argue are also crucial components of democracy--
such as levels of economic and social well being. Thus our Index respects the dominant tradition
that holds that a variety of social and economic outcomes can be consistent with political
democracy, which is a separate concept.
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Methodology
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s index of democracy, on a 0 to 10 scale, is based on the ratings
for 60 indicators grouped in five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the
functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Each category has a
rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the overall index of democracy is the simple average of the five
category indexes.
The category indexes are based on the sum of the indicator scores in the category, converted
to a 0 to 10 scale. Adjustments to the category scores are made if countries do not score a 1 in
the following critical areas for democracy:
1. whether national elections are free and fair
2. the security of voters
3. the influence of foreign powers on government
4. the capability of the civil service to implement policies.
If the scores for the first three questions are 0 (or 0.5), one point (0.5 point) is deducted from
the index in the relevant category (either the electoral process and pluralism or the functioning
of government). If the score for 4 is 0, one point is deducted from the functioning of government
category index.
The index values are used to place countries within one of four types of regimes:
1. Full democracies--scores of 8-10
2. Flawed democracies--score of 6 to 7.9
3. Hybrid regimes--scores of 4 to 5.9
4 Authoritarian regimes--scores below 4
Threshold points for regime types depend on overall scores that are rounded to one decimal
point.
Full democracies: Countries in which not only basic political freedoms and civil liberties are
respected, but these will also tend to be underpinned by a political culture conducive to the
flourishing of democracy. The functioning of government is satisfactory. Media are independent
and diverse. There is an effective system of checks and balances. The judiciary is independent
and judicial decisions are enforced. There are only limited problems in the functioning of
democracy.
Flawed democracies: These countries also have free and fair elections and even if there are
problems (such as infringements on media freedom), basic civil liberties will be respected.
However, there are significant weaknesses in other aspects of democracy, including problems in
governance, an underdeveloped political culture and low levels of political participation.
Hybrid regimes: Elections have substantial irregularities that often prevent them from being
both free and fair. Government pressure on opposition parties and candidates may be common.
Serious weaknesses are more prevalent than in flawed democracies--in political culture,
functioning of government and political participation. Corruption tends to be widespread and
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the rule of law is weak. Civil society is weak. Typically there is harassment of and pressure on
journalists, and the judiciary is not independent.
Authoritarian regimes: In these states political pluralism is absent or heavily circumscribed.
Many countries in this category are outright dictatorships. Some formal institutions of democracy
may exist, but these have little substance. Elections, if they do occur, are not free and fair. There
is disregard for abuses and infringements of civil liberties. Media are typically state-owned
or controlled by groups connected to the ruling regime. There is repression of criticism of the
government and pervasive censorship. There is no independent judiciary.
The scoring system
We use a combination of a dichotomous and a three-point scoring system for the 60 indicators. A
dichotomous 1-0 scoring system (1 for a yes and 0 for a no answer) is not without problems, but
it has several distinct advantages over more refined scoring scales (such as the often-used 1-5
or 1-7). For many indicators, the possibility of a 0.5 score is introduced, to capture ‘grey areas’
where a simple yes (1) of no (0) is problematic, with guidelines as to when that should be used.
Thus for many indicators there is a three-point scoring system, which represents a compromise
between simple dichotomous scoring and the use of finer scales.
The problems of 1-5 or 1-7 scoring scales are numerous. For most indicators under such a
system, it is extremely difficult to define meaningful and comparable criteria or guidelines for
each score. This can lead to arbitrary, spurious and non-comparable scorings. For example, a
score of 2 for one country may be scored a 3 in another and so on. Or one expert might score an
indicator for a particular country in a different way to another expert. This contravenes a basic
principle of measurement, that of so-called reliability—the degree to which a measurement
procedure produces the same measurements every time, regardless of who is performing it. Twoand
three-point systems do not guarantee reliability, but make it more likely.
Second, comparability between indicator scores and aggregation into a multi-dimensional
index appears more valid with a two or three-point scale for each indicator (the dimensions
being aggregated are similar across indicators). By contrast, with a 1-5 system, the scores are
more likely to mean different things across the indicators (for example a 2 for one indicator may
be more comparable to a 3 or 4 for another indicator, rather than a 2 for that indicator). The
problems of a 1-5 or 1-7 system are magnified when attempting to extend the index to many
regions and countries.
Features of the Economist Intelligence Unit index
Public opinion surveys
A crucial, differentiating aspect of our measure is that in addition to experts’ assessments we
use, where available, public opinion surveys—mainly the World Values Survey. Indicators based on
the surveys predominate heavily in the political participation and political culture categories, and
a few are used in the civil liberties and functioning of government categories.
In addition to the World Values Survey, other sources that can be leveraged include the
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Eurobarometer surveys, Gallup polls, Asian Barometer, Latin American Barometer, Afrobarometer
and national surveys. In the case of countries for which survey results are missing, survey results
for similar countries and expert assessment are used to fill in gaps.
Participation and voter turnout
After increasing for many decades, there has been a trend of decreasing voter turnout in most
established democracies since the 1960s. Low turnout may be due to disenchantment, but it can
also be a sign of contentment. Many, however, see low turnout as undesirable, and there is much
debate over the factors that affect turnout and how to increase it.
A high turnout is generally seen as evidence of the legitimacy of the current system. Contrary
to widespread belief, there is in fact a close correlation between turnout and overall measures of
democracy—that is, developed, consolidated democracies have, with very few exceptions, higher
turnout (generally above 70%) than less established democracies.
The legislative and executive branches
The appropriate balance between these is much-disputed in political theory. In our model
the clear predominance of the legislature is rated positively as there is a very strong correlation
between legislative dominance and measures of overall democracy.
The model
I Electoral process and pluralism
1. Are elections for the national legislature and head of government free?
Consider whether elections are competitive in that electors are free to vote and are offered a range
of choices.
1: Essentially unrestricted conditions for the presentation of candidates (for example, no bans
on major parties)
0.5: There are some restrictions on the electoral process
0: A single-party system or major impediments exist (for example, bans on a major party or
candidate)
2. Are elections for the national legislature and head of government fair?
1: No major irregularities in the voting process
0.5: Significant irregularities occur (intimidation, fraud), but do not affect significantly the
overall outcome
0: Major irregularities occur and affect the outcome
Score 0 if score for question 1 is 0.
3. Are municipal elections both free and fair?
1: Are free and fair
0.5: Are free but not fair
0: Are neither free nor fair
4. Is there universal suffrage for all adults?
Bar generally accepted exclusions (for example, non-nationals; criminals; members of armed
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forces in some countries)
1: Yes
0: No
5. Can citizens cast their vote free of significant threats to their security from state or non-state
bodies?
1: Yes
0: No
6. Do laws provide for broadly equal campaigning opportunities?
1: Yes
0.5: Yes formally, but in practice opportunities are limited for some candidates
0: No
7. Is the process of financing political parties transparent and generally accepted?
1: Yes
0.5: Not fully transparent
0: No
8. Following elections, are the constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from
one government to another clear, established and accepted?
1: All three criteria are fulfilled
0.5: Two of the three criteria are fulfilled
0: Only one or none of the criteria is satisfied
9. Are citizens free to form political parties that are independent of the government?
1. Yes
0.5: There are some restrictions
0: No
10. Do opposition parties have a realistic prospect of achieving government?
1: Yes
0.5: There is a dominant two-party system in which other political forces never have any
effective chance of taking part in national government
0: No
11. Is potential access to public office open to all citizens?
1: Yes
0.5: Formally unrestricted, but in practice restricted for some groups, or for citizens from some
parts of the country
0: No
12. Are citizens free to form political and civic organisations, free of state interference and
surveillance?
1: Yes
0.5: Officially free, but subject to some restrictions or interference
0: No
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II Functioning of government
13. Do freely elected representatives determine government policy?
1: Yes
0.5: Exercise some meaningful influence
0: No
14. Is the legislature the supreme political body, with a clear supremacy over other branches of
government?
1: Yes
0: No
15. Is there an effective system of checks and balances on the exercise of government authority?
1: Yes
0.5: Yes, but there are some serious flaws
0: No
16. Government is free of undue influence by the military or the security services
1: Yes
0.5: Influence is low, but the defence minister is not a civilian. If the current risk of a military
coup is extremely low, but the country has a recent history of military rule or coups
0: No
17. Foreign powers do not determine important government functions or policies
1: Yes
0.5: Some features of a protectorate
0: No (significant presence of foreign troops; important decisions taken by foreign power;
country is a protectorate)
18. Special economic, religious or other powerful domestic groups do not exercise significant
political power, parallel to democratic institutions?
1: Yes
0.5: Exercise some meaningful influence
0: No
19. Are sufficient mechanisms and institutions in place for assuring government accountability to
the electorate in between elections?
1: Yes
0.5. Yes, but serious flaws exist
0: No
20. Does the government’s authority extend over the full territory of the country?
1: Yes
0: No
21. Is the functioning of government open and transparent, with sufficient public access to
information?
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1: Yes
0.5: Yes, but serious flaws exist
0: No
22. How pervasive is corruption?
1: Corruption is not a major problem
0.5: Corruption is a significant issue
0: Pervasive corruption exists
23. Is the civil service willing and capable of implementing government policy?
1: Yes
0.5. Yes, but serious flaws exist
0: No
24. Popular perceptions of the extent to which they have free choice and control over their lives
1: High
0.5: Moderate
0: Low
If available, from World Values Survey
% of people who think that they have a great deal of choice/control
1 if more than 70%
0.5 if 50-70%
0 if less than 50%
25. Public confidence in government
1: High
0.5: Moderate
0: Low
If available, from World Values Survey
% of people who have a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in government
1 if more than 40%
0.5 if 25-40%
0 if less than 25%
26. Public confidence in political parties
1: High
0.5: Moderate
0: Low
If available, from World Values Survey
% of people who have a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence
1 if more than 40%
0.5 if 25-40%
0 if less than 25%
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37 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
III Political participation
27. Voter participation/turn-out for national elections.
(average turnout in parliamentary elections since 2000. Turnout as proportion of population of
voting age).
1 if consistently above 70%
0.5 if between 50% and 70%
0 if below 50%
If voting is obligatory, score 0. Score 0 if scores for questions 1 or 2 is 0.
28. Do ethnic, religious and other minorities have a reasonable degree of autonomy and voice in
the political process?
1: Yes
0.5: Yes, but serious flaws exist
0: No
29. Women in parliament
% of members of parliament who are women
1 if more than 20% of seats
0.5 if 10-20%
0 if less than 10%
30. Extent of political participation. Membership of political parties and political nongovernmental
organisations.
Score 1 if over 7% of population for either
Score 0.5 if 4% to 7%
Score 0 if under 4%.
If participation is forced, score 0.
31. Citizens’ engagement with politics
1: High
0.5: Moderate
0: Low
If available, from World Values Survey
% of people who are very or somewhat interested in politics
1 if over 60%
0.5 if 40% to 60%
0 if less than 40%
32. The preparedness of population to take part in lawful demonstrations.
1: High
0.5: Moderate
0: Low
If available, from World Values Survey
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38 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
% of people who have taken part in or would consider attending lawful demonstrations
1 if over 40%
0.5 if 30% to 40%
0 if less than 30%
33. Adult literacy
1 if over 90%
0.5 if 70% to 90%
0 if less than 70%
34. Extent to which adult population shows an interest in and follows politics in the news.
1: High
0.5: Moderate
0: Low
If available, from World Values Survey
% of population that follows politics in the news media (print, TV or radio) every day
1 if over 50%
0.5 if 30% to 50%
0 if less than 30%
35. The authorities make a serious effort to promote political participation.
1: Yes
0.5: Some attempts
0: No
Consider the role of the education system, and other promotional efforts Consider measures to
facilitate voting by members of the diaspora.
If participation is forced, score 0.
IV Democratic political culture
36. Is there a sufficient degree of societal consensus and cohesion to underpin a stable,
functioning democracy?
1: Yes
0.5: Yes, but some serious doubts and risks
0: No
37. Perceptions of leadership; proportion of the population that desires a strong leader who
bypasses parliament and elections.
1: Low
0.5: Moderate
0: High
If available, from World Values Survey
% of people who think it would be good or fairly good to have a strong leader who does not bother
with parliament and elections
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39 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
1 if less than 30%
0.5 if 30% to 50%
0 if more than 50%
38. Perceptions of military rule; proportion of the population that would prefer military
1: Low
0.5: Moderate
0: High
If available, from World Values Survey
% of people who think it would be very or fairly good to have army rule
1 if less than 10%
0.5 if 10% to 30%
0 if more than 30%
39. Perceptions of rule by experts or technocratic government; proportion of the population that
would prefer rule by experts or technocrats.
1: Low
0.5: Moderate
0: High
If available, from World Values Survey
% of people who think it would be very or fairly good to have experts, not government, make
decisions for the country
1 if less than 50%
0.5 if 50% to 70%
0 if more than 70%
40. Perception of democracy and public order; proportion of the population that believes that
democracies are not good at maintaining public order.
1: Low
0.5: Moderate
0: High
If available, from World Values Survey
% of people who disagree with the view that democracies are not good at maintaining order
1 if more than 70%
0.5 if 50% to 70%
0 if less than 50%
Alternatively, % of people who think that punishing criminals is an essential characteristic of
democracy
1 if more than 80%
0.5 if 60% to 80%
0 if less than 60%
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40 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
41. Perception of democracy and the economic system; proportion of the population that believes
that democracy benefits economic performance
If available, from World Values Survey
% of people who disagree with the view that the economic system runs badly in democracies
1 if more than 80%
0.5 if 60% to 80%
0 if less than 60%
42. Degree of popular support for democracy
1: High
0.5: Moderate
0: Low
If available, from World Values Survey
% of people who agree or strongly agree that democracy is better than any other form of
government
1 if more than 90%
0.5 if 75% to 90%
0 if less than 75%
43. There is a strong tradition of the separation of church and state
1: Yes
0.5: Some residual influence of church on state
0: No
V Civil liberties
44. Is there a free electronic media?
1: Yes
0.5: Pluralistic, but state-controlled media are heavily favoured. One or two private owners
dominate the media
0: No
45. Is there a free print media?
1: Yes
0.5: Pluralistic, but state-controlled media are heavily favoured. There is high degree of
concentration of private ownership of national newspapers
0: No
46. Is there freedom of expression and protest (bar only generally accepted restrictions such as
banning advocacy of violence)?
1: Yes
0.5: Minority view points are subject to some official harassment. Libel laws restrict heavily
scope for free expression
0: No
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41 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
47. Is media coverage robust? Is there open and free discussion of public issues, with a reasonable
diversity of opinions?
1: Yes
0.5: There is formal freedom, but high degree of conformity of opinion, including through selfcensorship,
or discouragement of minority or marginal views
0: No
48. Are there political restrictions on access to the Internet?
1: No
0.5: Some moderate restrictions
0: Yes
49. Are citizens free to form professional organisations and trade unions?
1: Yes
0.5: Officially free, but subject to some restrictions
0: No
50. Do institutions provide citizens with the opportunity to successfully petition government to
redress grievances?
1: Yes
0.5: Some opportunities
0: No
51. The use of torture by the state
1: Torture is not used
0: Torture is used
52. The degree to which the judiciary is independent of government influence.
Consider the views of international legal and judicial watchdogs. Have the courts ever issued an
important judgement against the government, or a senior government official?
1: High
0.5: Moderate
0: Low
53. The degree of religious tolerance and freedom of religious expression.
Are all religions permitted to operate freely, or are some restricted? Is the right to worship
permitted both publicly and privately? Do some religious groups feel intimidated by others, even
if the law requires equality and protection?
1: High
0.5: Moderate
0: Low
54. The degree to which citizens are treated equally under the law.
Consider whether favoured members of groups are spared prosecution under the law.
1: High
0.5: Moderate
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42 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
0: Low
55. Do citizens enjoy basic security?
1: Yes
0.5: Crime is so pervasive as to endanger security for large segments
0: No
56. Extent to which private property rights protected and private business is free from undue
government influence
1: High
0.5: Moderate
0: Low
57. Extent to which citizens enjoy personal freedoms
Consider gender equality, right to travel, choice of work and study.
1: High
0.5: Moderate
0: Low
58. Popular perceptions on human rights protection; proportion of the population that think that
basic human rights are well-protected.
1: High
0.5: Moderate
0: Low
If available, from World Values Survey:
% of people who think that human rights are respected in their country
1 if more than 70%
0.5 if 50% to 70%
0 if less than 50%
59. There is no significant discrimination on the basis of people’s race, colour or creed.
1: Yes
0.5: Yes, but some significant exceptions
0: No
60. Extent to which the government invokes new risks and threats as an excuse for curbing civil
liberties
1: Low
0.5: Moderate
0: High
References
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared, (2005), “Income and
Democracy”, NBER Working Paper No. 11205, March.
Coppedge, Michael, (2005), “Defining and measuring democracy”, Working paper, International
Democracy index 2010
Democracy in retreat
43 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Political Science Association, April.
Dahl, Robert A, (1970), “Polyarchy”, New Haven, Yale University Press.
Diamond, Larry, (2008), “The Democratic Rollback”, Foreign Affairs, March-April.
Freedom House, various, www.freedomhouse.org.
Heritage Foundation, various years, Index of Economic Freedom.
Hoey, Joan, (2005), “Eastern Europe’s democratic transition: the stillbirth of politics”, Economies in
Transition Regional Overview, Economist Intelligence Unit, March.
Horowitz, Irving Louis, (2006), “The struggle for democracy”, National Interest, spring.
ILO, World of Work Report, (2010), From one crisis to the next?, November.
Kekic, Laza (2006), “A pause in democracy’s march”, The World in 2007, Economist.
Reporters Without Borders, (2010), World Press Freedom Index.
Rigobon, Roberto and Dani Rodrik, (2005), “Rule of law, democracy, openness, and income: estimating
the interrelationships”, Economics of Transition, Volume 13 (3).
UN (2010), Human Development Report.
While every effort has been taken to verify the accuracy
of this information, The Economist Intelligence Unit
Ltd. can not accept any responsibility or liability for
reliance by any person on this white paper or any of
the information, opinions or conclusions set out in this
white paper.
Cover image - © Darren Whitt/Shutterstock
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