Global Governance

In the 1990s, the concept of ‘global governance’ acquired its importance with the increase in discussion of ‘globalisation’. However it had already been employed previously in the social sciences field (Ruggie 1975, Cleveland 1988, Myers 1988). The reference for the academic debate is James Rosenau (1992), who employs ‘global governance’ as an analytical concept, with which he analyses the political and not the economic dimensions of globalisation. In addition to Nation States and inter-governmental organisations, other players, such as the multinationals, NGOs, social movements, some regional institutions and even transnational criminal organisations are integrated into his analysis, as well as the interactions between these groups. ‘Global governance’ thus becomes a ‘system of rule’ without a central executive power. Governance therefore goes beyond governmental regulation.

In addition to the scientific/analytic concept of ‘global governance’, another of its uses, essentially political and strategic, has really made its fortune. Its principal international distributors are the United Nations Commission on global governance (‘Our Global Neighbourhood’ 1995), the Groupe de Lisbonne (‘Frontieres de la concurrence’, 1997), the PNUD (Human Development Report 2000), the Rome Club (‘The First Global Revolution’, 1992) and various think tanks (for example the German INEF), often linked to the social-democrats’ sphere. An important precursor was the United Nations Commission on The Environment and Development, whose report ‘Our Shared Future’ (1987) became the basis for the Rio Conference. As it spread, the concept also made its appearance in the contributions of WTO and World Bank officials.

The following characteristics are found in all developments of the concept:

Firstly, as a starting point for the argument, you find the statement that the globalisation process escapes political regulation. Neoliberalism dominant since the 1970s, which would stake everything on self-regulation of the markets and thus impardonnably neglect the political organisation of the world market (regulation deficit hypothesis), is held responsible for this.

Secondly, new forms of political regulation by economic players operating transnationally are asserted. A political regulation at world level should lead to a more efficient modernised ‘sustainable’ development. The socialisation set up by the capitalist market and its requirements are not questioned. On the contrary, they are attributed a positive role in principal, provided that it be ‘framed’ by political and social regulatory processes (‘re-embedding’ theory). A new policy would also allow the restauration of political regulatory power thanks to modernisaion, reform and refounding of international institutions – which means by transferring political power upward. In other respects, numerous responsibilities and decisions should be moved to local/regional level, or downwards.

Thirdly, ‘global governance’ presupposes a new type of collaboration amongst the present world political players (governments and international institutions), as well as an economic integration and strengthening of new players in civil society. The Nation-State remains the starting point for political regulation, but its power is strengthened by delegating its aims and power to global, regional and local players, as well as those in civil society. For one, by the tax relief that results and for another by the fact that it can concentrate on well-defined political issues. An important role is allocated to the NGOs and their transnational networks, which are delegated diagnostic capacities and the development of solutions which would surpass those of states or complement them.

Fourthly, the legitimisation of global regulation relies heavily on the evolution of a global ethos (humaniste) – supposed to make realisable an ensemble of values and universal principles. This is why the universality of human rights takes a central place in this ‘global ethic’, for which the driving force is the paradigm of ‘sustainable development’.

Thus the politico-strategic concept of ‘global governance’ is an attempt to find an answer to the important and restricting questions of ‘globalisation’, being presented as a progressive alternative to Neoliberalism. It is however possible to cast doubts as to whether it represents a real alternative, for the following reasons:

1. It does not allow for satisfactorily taking into account the economic resolves and social interests that affect the globalisation process. Thus it ignores the fact that ‘globalisation’ also represents a new stage in the development of capitalism.
2. The hypothesis of the loss of State regulation does not take into account the fact that the governments of the industrialised countries have actively and consciously supported globalisation. The state is not the victim of the unleashed markets. On the contrary, it has incited a metamorphosis, in shape as well as in function, state providence and Keynesian redistribution to a ‘competitive state’ which tries to mobilise all of societies potential to become ‘competitive’.
3. It leads to the overestimation of forms of political ‘cooperation’, oriented towards dialogue and consensus. The hope of integrating powerful interests in a system of ‘global governance’ tends to move towards a technocratic reform, guided by the only efficiency, which generates a strong democratic deficit. He role of NGOs is also overestimated, whilst otherplayers in civil and society and from the social movement- in particular the anti-establishment movement critical of ‘globalisation’, from Seattle to Genes, are not taken into account.
4. Finally, ‘global governance’ is blind to sexes. So it does not take into account the feminist criticism of Neoliberal globalisation.


Problems linked to the construction and realisation of a global ethos remain undiscussed, but also as the ideal of ‘sustainable development’ does not seem to be able to be criticised, the foundations of ‘global governance’ do not seem to be satisfactorily legitimised.