Globalisation also entails fragmentation. Cultural uniformity (“Coca-Cola”) has as its flipside also diversity. I shall be interested in this pair – uniformity & diversity – as well as in similar ones, and will call them patterns of the sharing of reason (partage de la raison). Multiculturalism and plurality can be used to enhance real democracy but also to freeze received and closed histories. Too much of “cultural” or “ethnic” particularism can be politically as disastrous as none. Let us not forget that culture is also constantly essentialised, that it can work just like a “nature”. Therefore, the concept of multiculturalism doesn’t guarantee anything, quite apart from the fact that it has sometimes – apparently paradoxically – been associated with communalism or with communitarian theoreticians’ politics. This is why we need to be wary of the self-motivation of reason itself, and recognise that it operates through a dynamics of dichotomy: reason is usually opposed to the irrational, to the animal etc. We may best be guided by moderation, but – and that is what I shall be looking at here - we should pay attention, theoretically, to the partage de la raison, the split/sharing of reason. I insist on the salutary ambiguity of the terms sharing and partage. Our body-and-reason (n_ma-r_pa) is that existential paradox, in that we are traversed by differences many of which appear as binaries (for ex. gender), and that we are at the same time historic and transcendent beings. Historic and limited as individual, and transcendent as humankind. This existential paradox, the fact of the trembling, ever-vacillating and uncertain identity to ourselves, should never be allowed to be reduced to an “essence”: this is where the difference runs between the vital and thought-producing sharing/division of reason (partage de la raison) as a dynamics, a movement, - and the lethal, arresting, clichés of reason irreparably split (raison partagée). Not all partage is life-arresting, or else, it is not to be feared when it means sharing with another, only when it is a definitive division without any flexibility.
Since each of us individually and all of us in common are at stake in this process of sharing or joining up reason, we are necessarily in a permanent process of translation. Not textual translation (only), but contextual: the translator being translated by her own translation. A balance between the extremes of too much and too little cultural diversity means accepting to be put into question oneself by the translation even as we engage it. Reason is best when shared (joined in with others), or, to be more precise, no-one has access to reason as whole: as a matter of fact, there is no such thing as the whole of Reason, or Reason as a whole, or to the Totality of reason. (Though there are cases of such pretence, and we are just now living through one in the American fundamentalist crusade.) Reason is patched up of bits and pieces that may be disconnected and reside at many different addresses. It is always partial, in all senses. It really has to be shared, being shared is its way of being. Trying to isolate, cut or localise it (the other meaning of partage, sharing), to tie it down at a particular spot, limits it necessarily and is therefore violent as a move. But since sharing means both – splitting or separating as well as sharing – there are situations of temporary undecidability which are the possibility though not fatality of extreme brutality or of physical violence. Such situations can be described, at the level of individual or even collective subjectivity - in another sense -, as a void of the subject, an absence of agency, as being de-empowered, or as an impasse, passivity of citizenship. Klaus Theweleit describes them as situations of the Noch-nicht-geborene, the violent individual who hasn’t been constructed as a responsible and sharing subject (who, in our terms, would be rather splitting than sharing), and takes them to be emblematic of fascism. (1) The would-be subject then “compensates” for the lack of subjectivity through violence to others. True – this happens “in another sense” when it comes to collectivity – because the non-emergence of individual subjectivity or agency may be due to the communalist, communitarian subjugation of the individual. At the social level, such ambiguous situations are described as profound political and social crises that threaten with always possible yet not fatal civil war, riots etc. In such a crisis situation, called palanka by the philosopher Radomir Konstantinovic, violence is possible and virtual, though not necessarily actual, yet it really threatens: translated by “bourg” in French, palanka is the term used by Konstantinovic (2) to denote a state of mind and a social, historic situation that is an in-between, a period of an indefinable crisis (of modernity), an immaterialisable (“irréalisable”) state (hence the violence) that is the possibility of all possibilities. A limbo of bottomless inscrutable danger. It may explode as violence, but needn’t. It is the state of mind where life comes short of life itself, where one is no master of one’s destiny. The author makes a concept and a philosophical term out of it. In ordinary language, palanka denotes however a mentally provincial (sub-)urban agglomeration, neither town nor village. While reading Konstantinovic, the historian Daho Djerbal recognised in the palanka the mental horizon of contemporary Algeria torn by the failure of its transition to modernity, and he quotes him in the issue on the “aesthetics of crisis” of the journal Naqd: " […] C’est là que l’on peut vérifier le besoin d’un théâtre comme distraction. Mais ce théâtre-ci est érigé dans la vie elle-même, n’est pas séparé d’elle, même pas par le métier d’un commédien: chacun est l’acteur de son propre théâtre alégorique, chacun est une alégorie vivante, et personne ne peut échapper à ce destin. Mais, en plus de ce besoin d’un théâtre vivant ou, plus exactement et de manière plus fatalement tragique, de cette nécessité de montrer la vie, sans jeu, comme théâtre, et d’introduire dans le funeste esprit de bourg au moins un peu de simulation de la vie sinon la vie elle même… " (3)
Avoiding such possible & threatening brutality implies a reshuffling of the hitherto dominant concept of universal and of its relationship to the particular. Within a configuration of the universal seen as a rapport rather than as the supreme office, the autonomy of the subject is complex, relational and relative, and regularly double-bound or tied from several sides. Even as a relationship, the universal rewards by confirming the like as the majority or as the prevailing group. The “minority” (the “particular”) then has little autonomy besides the purely formal one, though it may give some hint at de-identification. But clearly, it is now the leading subject that will have to de-identify for the move to be really effective. In other words, it has to give up some of its authority and normativity in order to share it. I am here pleading for de-identification, as the too oft neglected complementary side to any identification.
Another way of putting it is this: there are no cultural differences, no sexes or genders outside the community, or apart from/without language. And there is also no violence outside (the constitution of) the community and communicating through language. Differences, violence, take place in community and language. In the refusal of jouissance, however, dictated by the community, (4) which describes the situation of palanka (a depoliticised society), brutality and indifference unveil an incapacity for desire and a failed, profoundly divided subject. The universe of a general de-investment of citizenship is also one of a terrible demobilisation of desire. Here, the ever new forms of partition, of political and emotional demobilisation, and of division are projected on, identified with, and made to be supported by the founding rift of reason (which they reinforce), from which they gather their further divisive, normative and excluding efficiency. This is why it is also absolutely crucial to be thinking the new political subjects, those that outgrow both the reductive language of citizenship, as well as the depoliticised conceptualisation of governmentality. (5) We must rethink the theory-praxis gap (another example of reason split) and go, today more than ever, since we are at the turning point of the geopolitical face of the planet being redrawn, towards political, cultural and social movements. And towards identifying new agencies. The patient construction of a new epistemological apparatus should give us instruments to understand and accompany new political subjectivity.
Globalisation is advancing while one state, the US, have kept their sovereignty far greater than any other, if not absolute. The same is not true of any other state, though there is a scale with degrees. The world has been tremendously reshaped, and we have not developed conceptual instruments to understand it fully yet, because our cognitive apparatus was shaped over the 20th century. For the same reason, we don’t have proper instruments of resistance, and don’t know yet exactly who the agents of this resistance to the new liberal totalitarian system we are in will be. (6) With the end of the cold war, the partition of the world has come to an end by a completely one-sided closure which allows for decisive international action only to the one world agency. This is an example of reason split, reason all lumped on one side: only we have truth, and therefore we rightly fight the Evil (Saddam Hussein and the rest of the world), and in that we are self-legitimated (or legitimated by the UN when needed, however reluctantly and nostalgically of non-aligned memories). This situation has imposed a complete separation between popular will and leadership, or elsewhere hypnotising disoriented people. A world-wide one-party system is being imposed. The “axes of Evil”, if anything, is a religious and an aggressive fundamentalist idea, and religion is actually part of the American state-building and power history from the very beginning. (7) Evil is of course identified as irrationality, and in the one-dimensionality of the new construction it is forgotten that Reason produces its own flip-side as constitutive of itself. Only, the two are not representable together any more, so any sharing of the same scene is out of the question. Off goes the irrational, or Evil, or Iraq, into disappearance. One-sidedness of Reason, the impossibility to evaluate it because only one partner “is right” (a case of what the philosopher Jean-François Lyotard called the différend), pre-emptive war, are reason split and not shared. Jean Baudrillard warns : " Cette dissuasion sans guerre froide, cette terreur sans équilibre, cette prévention implacable sous le signe de la sécurité va devenir une stratégie planétaire." (8) He calls “contraception” the pre-emptive character of the war, which is anticipated to the extent that it need not happen and which ousts the original event. Yes we have entered a contraceptive era in several regards, not only the one Baudrillard describes, but also in the sense of emotions, judgement and enjoyment being sterilized through pre-emptive treatment and neutralisation of differences (which amounts to terror), since the other is no longer imaginable. It is an illusion that the other can be relegated outside the system: the system will still be built on an exclusion, though forbidden or unmentionable. During cold war we at least had a representation of the dichotomy (and thus of a principled plurality), although it was made much too rigid and didn’t develop at the international level – into softer relations. But when there is no possible representation of anything any more due to the “one truth” dogma, then, Baudrillard says rightly, sovereignty can’t be based on it any more. The regime then turns against its own population, and eventually becomes suicidal. Since it decides about Truth, it needn’t heed of anything, and it may not only bomb civilians, but also burn libraries. Indeed, the Baghdad library was bombed and burned, and the museum allowed to be looted.
The split of reason is dangerous in this abrupt coming to a stop of any movement, disappearance of any ambiguity, of plurality of meaning. In that sense, yes, the Cold war was practically better as a state of possibilities (however meagre) – it need not have ended like this. The cold war was itself a world-wide state of palanka of sorts. Sharing reason here (and keeping it as a constant dynamics) would have meant (but this is not happening), on the contrary, that no-one is completely right or completely wrong, and that the two sides have to cooperate, share, de—identify and give in to the other in a delicate and intelligent equilibrium. But it is true that the Cold War had in itself developed not features of flexibility or sharing, only two rigid blocs where one side in the game “represented” plurality and democracy (capitalism), while the other side (communism), was roughly in charge of totalitarianism and of a one-party system. Well, the one party system, totalitarianism, have been “universalised” and passed on the other side, this other side is now the absolute, last truth. No democracy is likely to come out of this any time soon, either in the chosen country, or in any other: democracy under condition (under the condition of liberalism, of factual inequality and principled equality of chances based on individual & private economic motives) is no democracy.
At the same time as this happens, the European Union is being reshuffled, and the 15 meet in Athens on April 16th, 2003, to become 25. This geopolitical reconstitution and refoundation is not at all sure where it heads, because the world-map is being redrawn by the US and the Iraq war. Which will come first, the announced doom of the world master, or the construction of the EU, and where will the latter – which is also a violent process - end? The French president Chirac has said himself, in his public speech on TV about the 2nd Iraq war, that Europe is being constructed through its crises, that it has come out of each crisis strengthened by its remorse for not having been united! (9) Will there be a new division of the world? Will the UN survive, and if so, with how much autonomy?
In his Dreams of the Colonised, Ranabir Samaddar analyses very subtly the cleavage between political dreams and their realisation. The latter usually limit the political imagination from the first. “Dreams” are indeed those desires which is neither expressed nor taken into account in conclusive Realpolitk as well as in movements studied by and also in the approach of some of the “Subaltern” scholars, his colleagues he sometimes quotes. The split runs really between dreams of freedom and independence realised. But this finding doesn’t compel Samaddar to a purely meditative dimension (although…). On the contrary, it makes him expose the involvement of the historian, of the philosopher, of the scholar, as well as the partiality of the method and instruments in following the studied event, and reminds of the responsibility in reading. It is indeed here that the possible political imagination is situated, the one of which the future will be made. This political imagination stems from an open reading of the past event, of alternative histories, open for and towards the future (which means: with multiple and alternative scenarios as much for the past as for the future). Such reading is necessary, we deduce from Samaddar, in order to understand new hybridities and alternative modernities, or non-Western (for Gramsci, referring to Italy: southern) modernities. It is necessary to have some political imagination in order to “translate” from one episteme, or from one jargon, into another, from Indian to Western philosophy for example, or from “meditative” to political philosophy.
The question is also what should be the praxis to improve freedom in the contemporary context, knowing that it consists of both an individual and a collective component, and that these two have to be mutually articulated in such a way that collective interests do not erase individual ones, but that individual ones do not lead to solipsism? This is of course the question of democracy which has always been only a project (never an accomplished or a satisfactorily accomplished fact), and which even as such has never been meant to apply to all: “democracy” is itself flawed and constructed on a system of exceptions. Philosophically speaking, this is again a case of the split of reason, of which the gender divide is only one example, though fundamental. Practically speaking, and here comes only the beginning of an answer to that question, it is a matter of reciprocity, of de-identification (with one's group), of empathy, of accepting the fact that we are born(e) of/by others.
There is no difference of principle between gender and other similar divides, as all inequalities are historically constructed. But gender takes the pretext of “sexual difference” claiming nature or an essence to justify by analogy to an imaginary “natural” inequality - social, political, economic, cultural inequalities, especially in anything having to do with most aspects of public power. Gender (sexual inequality) is the first and the most explicit expression of the "sharing/splitting of reason" (partage de la raison). The latter lies at the bottom of any other dichotomy (and hierarchy, inequality etc.) as a general mechanism and as "primordial", not just of the sexual one. Sexual inequality comes in as instrumental to all other forms of discrimination, as the most widely accepted one that works "by analogy" in all other matters too, and that gives its image to all cases. Splitting (with the possibility of sharing) [of reason] comes first as the mere logic, way of functioning of reason, and it is not sexually defined in the first place. Rather, sexuating everything else is essentially instrumental in achieving sameness, and therefore the sex/gender inequality is so important and civilisationally widespread - beyond the scope itself of subduing women. “The distance from the beginning is a distance from birth, an effort to efface it by monadic foundationalism, to claim it through paternity and nationalism, or to violently control it through fundamentalism. The violence of foundation and the violence that the desire for foundation evinces is a violence that is necessarily animated by sexual energies, but more profoundly, by the energy of the dynamic dichotomy itself. The violence is then the desperate inverted mime of that foundational power - two foundations, two origins, one the violence of creative difference, the other the violence of destructive sameness.” (Roger Friedland (10))
“Nation”, claiming a common origin in an imaginary common birth, resorts to constructing a posteriori this origin as as real as if it had always been. For this, it needs the previous general acceptance of the inferiority of women (and the complicity of patriarchy). But both the gender divide, as well as the exclusion on which the nation is established, though mutually and causally intertwined, are expressions of the same and universal "sharing/splitting of reason" (partage de la raison). Both claim “nature” and essentialise the inequality as natural.
We may well continue to be surprised by the perseverance of the sex/gender discrimination throughout the world, unless we analyse its link to other types of inequality and injustice among humans: this is because the real inequality of sexes, first “naturalised” in order to be globally accepted within a patriarchal regime to start with, is subsequently made into a complicit instrument of the maintenance of all other known hierarchies. It is inbuilt in them. This happens through the symbolic regime which “feminises” in each of them the weaker term.
The “sex war” (or “gender war”) should not be understood as primordial or paradigmatic for other conflicts. But it is true that in any conflict and violence, we find the analogy of sexes as supporting them. In a general way, it is all about the " partage de la raison " (11) which, rather than being itself " sexuated " (or gendered) – manages on the contrary to " sexuate " (to gender) any difference that it is about to transform into a hierarchy. In this sense, the “sexuation”, which is also a naturalisation or an essentialisation, is principally an instrumentalisation for the purpose of appropriation and of the reproduction of the identical. This instrumentalisation explains the perseverance with which the inequality of the sexes is maintained although it is only one of the expressions of the splitting and possible sharing of reason. It is fundamental only inasmuch it is instrumental in maintaining other inequalities and injustices, but it is then also in its turn re-enforced through this instrumentality. Sexuality traverses of course the construction of any type of identity, in the sense that indeed the distance from the claimed " origin " is necessarily the distance from birth (which is so explicit in the term " nation " itself). But this distancing from an origin is also (patriarchal) culture itself (12), followed in and by culture through the endeavour to erase alterity in oneself (or: to erase what we owe the other in our own constitution) through a self-asserting “fundamentalism” at the exclusion of others.
Therefore, violence would somehow have its origin in the cultural gesture of refusing the fact that life itself is always owed to the other, and it would be a desperate attempt to re-establish the auto-foundation of the self (l’auto-fondation du propre) and to self-generation. (13) In this sense generation, which is at the basis of the idea of nation, conceived only as self-generation, is also potentially (virtually) violent to others and derivatively suicidal. A striking example in international politics, in the era of the principle of state-sovereignty generally shattered to the advantage (but also: “advantage”) of the one strong state, is the United States of America’s self (re)foundation: murderous to others through the concept of pre-emptive wars, it may well turn up to be self-suicidal in the longer run unless it is curbed. Which, by the way, necessarily means also – self-curbed. (14) Roberto Esposito writes the following about this mechanism, and the “medical” languages makes it even more striking: “Un impulso autodissolutivo che sembra trovare riscontro piú che metaforico in quelle malattie, dette appunto autoimmuni, in cui il potenziale bellico del sistema immunitario è talmente elevato da rivolgersi ad un certo punto contro se stesso in una catastrofe, simbolica e reale, che determina l’implosione dell’intero mecanismo.” (15)
It is this deep role of sexuality in the constitution of identities that strikes back at us nowadays. At the time when redefinitions of the nation and of the nation-state are assailing us at the end of an era and the beginning of another one of which we can yet hardly discern the contours in international politics, it is necessary to re-examine the national difference where it intersects with the gender one, because we can clearly see that a crucial knot is there. The deconstruction of sexuated identities (and all are sexuated, but the nation is so even explicitly and maybe even more rigidly than any other) is doubly important, not only with a view to deconstructing the mechanisms of sexism, but moreover with a view to undoing the exclusions and inequalities in all other cases too. Here, like elsewhere, it is salutary to " de-identify” rather than to maintain rigid identity roles. The role played by gender in the construction of other identities but also, by extension, in the setting up of all institutions (from language to the state), is incalculable. Yet it is generally acknowledged only as potentially subversive, as that which opposes institutionalisation through the state, the establishment, the army, through recognised movements or winning historic action. Its positive and inevitable contribution to constructing institutions is not generally considered. Through its marking the nation and the state – a main feature in the organisation of international relations – gender clearly traverses, informs, organises and shapes all activity, institutions, relations as well as minds. The tangle of gender and nation projects its shade onto all other organisational forms, hence its importance. Gender is and will be a living and constant constituting power in shaping anything human, and this role may not be dismissed. It has been used as an instrument, and can be used as an instrument, for the better or the worse. This is why it is invited to play a role in reshaping our future too. Yet it doesn’t do so in the manner of a sealed destiny, and here lies a possibility for action, as well as a chance for theory. When ignored as a constituting cultural and symbolic element, the component of gender works for inequality, hierarchy, exclusion, violence and discrimination in all other matters too, not only against women and children. But when used with an understanding critical approach (by which it is clear that nothing human is neutral, and nothing is sexually (genderwise) neutral), gender becomes a precious arm to fight all sorts of repression. Feminist theory is here at the centre of all theory as that which can offer solutions to a major epistemological problem: how to improve and develop a conceptual framework, an episteme or a paradigm, or how to work out a new epistemological paradigm since the old one has proved incapable of both - grasping the world as well as avoiding war, brutality and exploitation and supporting resistance.
Political and economic institutions in backward countries, says Gramsci, are not conceived like historic categories, but rather like “natural, perpetual and irreducible”. (16) In this they are naturalised and essentialised, and made into instruments of domination, let’s add, comparable to patriarchy. " E lo stato moderno ne ha rispettato l’essenza feodale ", says Gramsci : indeed, this is how modernity, just as in colonised countries, produces " tradition " and fertile soil for conflict. It is important to grasp the usage of the division of reason here: modernity for us, tradition for you or, as Samaddar says, “the nation for us, ethnicity for you”. And as also Subaltern scholars notice too, but here according to Gramsci, " il contadino è vissuto sempre fuori dal dominio della legge, senza personalità giuridica, senza individualità morale : è rimasto un elemento anarchico, l’atomo indipendente di un tumulto caotico, infrenato solo dalla paura del carabiniere e del diavolo." (17)
In order to be able to avoid the split in yet another important field, it is necessary to recognise the link between religion and politics, and particularly the theological origin of state secularism (and of laïcité) inasmuch they are the secularisation of a divine concept sovereignty itself (18): “Sovereignty as the creation of law, i.e. its non-legal origin, and the law as a legitimating a posteriori of the illegality that constituted it: the law of exception.” (19) This analysis allows us to better understand why " laicisation” doesn’t always give the expected results: whereas universal projects (such as the “republic”, “democracy”) have been delegitimised with utopias (generally speaking, it is thought that the “end of master discourses”, the end of hope in a transcendence or of awaiting a universal solution /or one through the universal/ is also the end of utopia), particularistic (communitarian) claims are more and more insistent and are supported by the general condescendence to cultural, religious etc. essentialisms. It is here that identitarian excesses and misunderstandings arise such as the one regarding the “Islamic veil” arise. This is because “long live the difference!” is a slogan that can be pressed both by racists and antiracists, for opposed reasons. The origin of the misunderstanding lies in a bad negotiation of the relationship between the universal and the particular, and not at all in the particular (culture, religion) itself. The revival of the religion or the appearance of fundamentalist orientations today has nothing to do with religion itself, but constitute an attempt to conquer a protagonist position in political or social matters for the young and for populations that are generally deprived and excluded from active political agency and from effective, meaningful citizenship. This is true of Europe, where active citizenship is fading away and where an important part of the economically active population is more and more often without political rights because it is foreign. But it is true of other parts of the world too, where war, hunger, big migrations and the new general geopolitical international configuration is such that not only individual autonomy, but also state sovereignty of individual states is rapidly loosing meaning.
Some expressions of particularism take the shape or pretext of religion and exasperate religious " identitarianism ". The latter is particularly easy to mobilise in a crisis, and thus particularly worrying. This is true of the mentioned fundamentalisms (which are perceptible in all religions), though their nature is not different from that of other particularistic expressions with a universalising aspiration. The war declared to terrorism on the part of all states since September 2001 makes this point particularly sensitive. The analysis shows how Third World fundamentalisms are usually an extension of a historic reaction to colonial and imperialistic humiliation as well as to post-colonial failures. But it also shows, on the other side and under other historical circumstances, since the Christian Crusaders, how fundamentalism can itself also be a conquering movement. That which then opposes institutionalisation through the state, armed forces, recognised movements or appropriating action will be disqualified as terrorism and countered at the level of state(s) and, today, by the international community. (Terrorism is always defined by a state.) It is good to know, however, that each mono-cultural, mono-religious identification consists in a complementary quantity of salutary de-identifications, those that belong to alternative (hi)stories as opposed to received and official history (and to received truth). Those alternative histories (20) should be liberated, liberating thereby political imagination.
1. Männerphantasien 1-2, Verlag Roter Stern, Frankfurt am Main 1977, 1978. See also Julia Kristeva, Pouvoirs de l’horreur. Essai sur l’abjection, Seuil, Paris 1981, for the comparable concept of abjet.
2. «Sur le style du bourg », from the book Filozofija palanke (The philosophy of the palanka), Nolit, Belgrade 1981 (first ed. 1969), in Transeuropéennes 21, 2001, pp. 129-139. « Sur le nazisme serbe », from the same book, in Lignes 06, 2001, pp. 53-75. See also R. Ivekovic, « La mort de Descartes et la désolation du bourg (R. Konstantinovic) » in Transeuropéennes 21, 2001, pp. 174-178.
3. Daho Djerbal et Nadira Laggoune-Alkouche, « Présentation », Naqd. Revue d’études et de critique sociale, n. 17, automne/hiver 2002, p. 8.
4. Fabio Ciaramelli, La distruzione del desiderio. Il narcisismo nell’epoca del consumo di massa, Dedalo, Bari 2000 ; Radomir Konstantinovic, Filozofija palanke, cit. ; Mehdi Belhaj Kacem, De la communauté virtuelle, sense & tonka, Paris 2002.
5. Ranabir Samaddar, “Dreams of the Colonised”, manuscript; by the same author: “The Last Hurrah that Continues”, in Transeuropéennes 19/20, 2001, pp. 31-49; “The Destiny of a Translated Constitutional Culture”, in Transeuropéennes 22, 2002, pp. 75-87; “Utopia and Politics in Muslim Bengal”, in Transeuropéennes 23, 2003, pp. 193-219.
6. The « multitudes », according to M. Hadrt/T. Negri, Empire, Ed. Exils, Paris 2000.
7. Martin Amis, «Bush contre Saddam : le choc des délires», le Monde 8 mars 2003, p.14 ; Peter Sloterdijk, Si l’Europe s’éveille, Mille et une nuits , Paris 2003.
8. «Le masque de la guerre», Libération, lundi 10 mars 2003.
9. In his speech on March 10, 2003, «Chirac clame son non devant les Français. Pour la première fois, le chef de l'Etat a expliqué à la télévision pourquoi Paris votera contre la guerre », par Antoine GUIRAL, Libération, mardi 11 mars 2003.
10. I owe to Roger Friedland the last three sentences, in an e-mail where he summed-up my own argument better than I could in English. See: Roger Friedland, « Money, Sex and God. The Erotic Logic of Religious Nationalism”, in Sociological Theory 20:3 November 2002, pp. 203, p. 418, 419.
11. Rada Ivekovic, Le sexe de la nation (Léo Scheer, Paris 2003, forthcoming).
12. Fethi Benslama, Une fiction troublante. De l’origine en partage, eds. de l’aube 1994 ; La psychanalyse à l'épreuve de l'Islam, Ed. Aubier, Coll. la psychanalyse prise au mot, Paris, 2002.
13. Rada Ivekovic, Le sexe de la nation.
14. In « Civilisation de la mort », in Migrations littéraires 21, été 1992, pp. 42-60 , I wrote about civilisations established upon life-sacrifice : « le sacrifice sera (…) toujours présenté symboliquement comme le sacrifice de nous-même, dans lequel se cachera le sacrifice réel de l’Autre, des autres ». Roberto Esposito, Immunitas. Protezione e negazione della vita, Einaudi, Torino 2002.
15. Immunitas, p. 21.
16. La questione meridionale. Alcuni temi sulla questione merridionale, 1926, ER, Roma 1972, p. 73 p. 64.
17. ibid, p. 64-65.
18. Roberto Esposito, Communitas. Origine e destino della comunità, Einaudi, Torino 1998 ; Immunitas, cit.; Rajeev Bhargava (ed.), Secularism and Its Critics, OUP India, Delhi 1998; Carl Schmitt, Le Léviathan dans la doctrine de l’Etat de Thomas Hobbes. Sens et échec d’un symbole politique, traduit de l’allemand par Denis Tirerweiler, préface d’Etienne Balibar, Seuil, 2002 ; Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer, traduit par Marlène Raiola, Seuil, Paris 2002.
19. Roberto Esposito, Immunitas, p. 86.
20. Walter Benjamin ; Ranabir Samaddar
(On the same problem or on connected issues we recommend the following article by the same author in the Critical Dictionary : Sex and Gender)