

On the Philosophy of the Present Globalization

Endre Kiss, Spring-Summer 2012

The globalization applies as an unprecedented new *world state*, a station of the *world history* already presently perceptible, that started ultimately in its *mature* form in 1989 with the retreat of the communism. Since then, attempts have also been made, to also periodize in the largest contours the inner history of the globalization.¹

What is the philosophical question in a periodization of globalization?

Die Periodisierung, eigentlich also die Geschichte der Globalisation scheint auf den ersten Augenblick eine nicht nur banale, sondern auch noch eine *leere* Frage zu sein. Versteht man naemlich unter Globalisation eine Welt oder ein Weltsystem, die (das) im Zustand der Globalisation existiert, so ist es selbstverstaendlich, dass diese Welt verschiedene, sich voneinander unterscheidende Periode erleben und dadurch auch über eine Geschichte verfügen wird. Definiert man jedoch die Globalisation vor allem als einen Weltzustand, der *von den umfassenden funktionalen Systemen entscheidend integriert ist* und dadurch weitgehend, wenn auch nicht ausschliesslich selber dem Modell von funktionalen Systemen nahekommt, so stellt sich die Frage nach den einzelnen kleineren und grösseren historischen Etappen theoretisch durchaus reizvoll, *denn Funktionalismus existiert in der Zeit anders als Gesellschaft und ihre Akteure*.² Wir denken hier generell an die *anders beschaffene Zeitlichkeit* der funktionalen Systeme, die sich dadurch auszeichnet, dass ihre „innere“ Zeitlichkeit unabhængig von der „äusseren, historischen“ Zeitlichkeit funktionieren soll. Luhmann thematisiert etwa dieses Problem dadurch, dass er zwischen jener Zeit, die in Bezug auf das *System-Umwelt-Verhaeltnis* und jener Zeit, die in Bezug auf das *Selbstverhaeltnis von Systemen* definiert werden soll.

¹ Endre Kiss, A XXI. század kihívásai és a globalizáció történelme. in: A huszonegyedik század kihívásai és Magyarország jövőképe. Veszprém, 2011. (VEAB kiadása).47-52. , ferner: Vozmoshnaja isztorija globalizacii i vüzovi XXI béka. in: Vek Globalizacii. 1 (9) / 2012. 58-67. és Die mögliche Geschichte der Globalisation.in:<http://www.schwarz-auf-weiss.org/THEMENLISTE.HT>

² A Philosophy of Globalization. in: *Age of Globalization*. Studies in Contemporary Global Processes. 2/2010. 53-65.

Just because the specific and qualifying fundament of the globalization is its functional character, the whole problem must be put with the history in a perfect new context. The functional character of existence is indeed also historical, *this historicity differs however much from the historical mode of existence of the non-functional dimension*. Only the fact, that the globalization is in its entirety a further not defined *complex of functional and non-functional dimension*, helps us out of this dilemma. So it is likely that this "in each other" *of functional and non-functional dimension* as a whole can have nevertheless an history in a methodologically proper sense.

The emergence of the globalization brought also *the end of an imperial world divided in two parts* with itself. It is therefore understandable to a large extent, that the exact explanation of the imperial problematic seems to be absolutely sinking in the millennial harmony of *new universal freedoms and global self-regulation*. The independent factor of the *relative devaluation of the political subsystem* in the dynamic current of the deploying globalization³ is also joining to this general state to be called spontaneous. The *first* far-reaching articulation of the imperial problematic after 1989, Samuel S. Huntington's theory formulated the imperial problematic also only from a new side of „civilizations“, it's quite difficult to identify here the *new* aspect of civilization and the *traditional* one of politics. Only already from this fact, we can conclude on the strength and vitality of the prevailing not only *anti-*, but also *post-imperial* spirits of that time. For even "imperial" thematics could be accentuated in a *civilisatorian framework* of thinking. He *refused the political mask most clearly and reformulated the imperial conditions under the semi-political mask of the new civilisatorian relations*.⁴

The international politics was continuing, apparently unchanged, with its traditional imperial questionings also in the era of the globalization. It means, that in a clearly recognized era of the globalization, the interpretation of the political system may not be subjected to any fundamentally new norms. The *specific difference* between the experiencing of a new global world and the objective insight, that the political system is what is *not* globalizing on the basis of a quite *abstract* insight, might constitute a difficulty certainly not easy to dispel in this learning process. It means, that the politics, as system and as subsystem, is

³ S. amongst others, the parts of the works quoted under note 1), that are concerned by this problematic.

⁴ The civilisatory components of the post-socialist system change. In : Peter Gerlich - Krzysztof Glass - Endre Kiss, *From the Center towards Europe and back*. Vienna - Poznan, 1997. 117-125. and A civilizációs összetevő a posztoszocialista rendszerváltásban. In : *Konfliktus, konszenzus, kooperáció*. Tanulmánykötet. II. Országos Politológus Vándorgyűlés. Szerkesztett : Horváth Csaba. Pécs, 1996-1997.. 228 – 230

persisting without any problem and on the long term on its systemic difference vis-à-vis the functional world of the globalization. The political just as subsystem was not globalizing, for the simple reason, that it is not functionally determined and led and could not also be so determined and led functionally.

The increase of the importance of the imperial discourse applies as integrant part of the history of the globalization. Can this question however also be reversed? *Can it be possible, that we reinterpret the former history of the globalization in the medium of the imperial discourse?* For us, the history of the globalization can be positively shaped in the medium of the imperial discourse.

The imperial questioning appears in the *first* period of the globalization *hardly in an explicit way*. The time of the world divided in two parts preceding this period has drastically improved the validity of the imperial reflections. Seeing that, it is anything but surprising, if in Francis *Fukuyama's* theory of the end of the history – maybe even against the own will of the author – it is envisaged as the vision of a *universal post-imperial democracy*. *Exclusively* in this context the entrance of Samuel S. *Huntington* wanted to cool down the optimistic expectations towards a post-imperial new world order. Even this *Huntington* does not want to call this new imperial start by its name. He formulates this new message not in the medium of the politics, but in the half-political medium of the "civilization". *In the medium of the "civilization", the international politics will be then recalled the realism of the Kissinger rehabilitating openly Metternich.* The attention had just seen the only adequate *enemy* of this very confident era in the *fundamentalism*.

The *second* era of the globalization, reproducing in the medium of the imperial discourse, has again thematized the international politics. In this phase of the post-communist democracy and of the neo-liberal politics, a possible international conflict *can be only morally legitimized*. The practice of imperial motives and causes was in public only legitimate, if it could be designed as an *answer to a qualified violation of the human rights*.⁵ The typical event of this second period was the Kuwait's war against Saddam Hussein. This crude discourse guided also already wars and made also serious international conflicts possible again.

The *third* period of the history of the globalization, reproducing in the medium of the imperial discourse, started on the 11th of September 2001. From this time,

⁵ Human rights and Man in the current of the globalization. In : *Völkerrecht und Rechtsbewusstsein für eine globale Friedensordnung*. Szerk. Ernst Woit und Joachim Klopfer. Dresden, 2000. 55-64.

the contours of a new bipolarity become visible. In the still unipolar global world, the so concrete and so vague phenomenon of the *terrorism* took possession of the structural enemy position of the injured of the human rights. The Irak war of the year 2004 fell on this new period. Osama bin Laden's death in 2011, brought with itself also *the natural end* of this period of the globalization (in the medium of the imperial questioning).

Osama's death became also a symbol. It incarnates the change between the great and historical periods of the new globalization. On this way, a combination of a new virtual and a real bipolar world occurred.

The Galactical Distance between Big and Small

The monetarism of the real global world economy manifests almost totally an in principle complete theoretical model in the reality. Then, a sensitive proximity emerges between model and reality. This proximity creates a lot of new problems, essentially those, which increasingly conceal the effective difference between *model* and *reality*. In the case of a crisis, it will be more difficult to categorize this crisis as a more or less simple realization of the model or somewhat as a traditional cyclic destabilization of the real economy.

The most determinant train of the global world economy is however only *in an indirect way economical*! This train is the *indebtedness of the state*, after that the globalization had relatively (or also absolutely?) devalued the states under all circumstances. *A state being in debt has however also the own logic of its functioning and with this logic, it determines the economical life and generally the social existence*, its *double face* defines the global world economy also backwards and reflexively.

The immediate near past of the selfdestructive society was determined by the general good intention and by a confidence spread in the future, farther also from elements of a *consensual humanism*, which was partly composed of the communicative essence of the coming out welfare society, and partly of the general optimism, with regard to the overall solutions of the human rights neoliberalism.

It becomes a very difficult exercise of interpretation to separate the *dynamic-structural* moments of the globalization from the *cyclic* and *conjunctural* changes in the explanation of a crisis.

The true definition of a modern or post-modern self-destructive society consists of a *critical proportion of indebtedness of the state*. This proportion keeps the economy from being able to pay the debts of the state itself even in the most optimal "normal" conjunctural situation. *Achill does not catch up the turtle*. This basic criterion constitutes the self-destructive society taken in the true sense of the term.⁶

An economical crisis, which breaks out at the world level aggravates again dramatically the global problematic of the state, or *the permanent reproduction of national indebtedness*.

The long-term historical processes and the actual elements of the present analysis grow diversely into each other. So, we might say that the current worldwide economical crisis breaking out in 2007-2008 has only increased the inside tension of the global world with the indebted states. As it is generally just the case in the real processes, *the crisis grows up from the same economical and financial processes, which have carried out the real history of the world becoming global*. Considering the real processes, the crisis isn't an independent phenomenon, rather a *provisory end* of a relatively unambiguous and rectilinear development. The current economical crisis raises that the economy, after a long galactical trip in the virtuality on the ways of the divine money currents, lowered itself again on the earth.

After their world-historical victory, the neoliberalism stood as a *regulator* and *moviens* of the global development only on the ideological-political world stage. *As a hegemony, it embodies the mutation of the earlier liberalism and the dialectic of the earlier modernity*. Straight as a hegemony, it cannot however also go pass the necessity and responsibility of emphasizing the new forms of emancipation.

In the everyday language, the designation "crisis" is not inappropriate. Generally, however also theoretically, it is assumed that, in the globalization the border between "normality" and "crisis" is much too fluenter than in every earlier period. Purely theoretically, *the global imbricated worldwide economy is*

⁶ It may at no moment be forgotten, how this proportion of the state indebtedness has also *specifically* something to do with the globalisation. Both phenomena are not identical. *There is state debt without globalisation, there might also be globalisation without any national debt*. The globalisation brought however with itself, that the action field of the economy (above all, the one of the multinational groups) has hugely increased and put on its feet the specifically monetary concretisation of the global deep structures of an economy, in which the money itself could also function as the most important wares.

never in the crisis: for what appears here as a crisis, appears on the other side as a normal redispatching of resources. We must of course make a distinction from the theoretical model and the social reality. We must however never forget, that even the semantics of the crisis became different in the globalization. *For the world-political and world-economical reality, it is not certainly without interest, that in the USA today banks also get help from the government. This can however not be also considered as a theoretical criterion of the worldwide economical crisis*, since also in this context "crisis" and "normality" stand in another relation than in the preglobal world.

Certainly, we could even still *reverse* this logic of crisis. Instead of as a "crisis", we could just put the current situation as a "normality", while we clearly underline, that it is possibly just the *"normality of the specific global relations"*, that the self-regulating power of the markets can no longer realize its huge capacity.

Hollywood and Greek Myths

The everyday thinking of our days may have the feeling, that a colossally conceived *Hollywood* production is running around it, in which one wants to drag it „interactively“, and indeed to all appearances with the intention to make with it an inscrutable joke. On the *one* side, this current global everyday consciousness experiences the dynamics, the tremendous success stories of the globalization, everything *positive*, what this conscience experiences already now in its daily life, enjoys and uses. On the *other* side, the same global everyday consciousness sees itself confronted with a disintegrating, fragmenting political and social reality, that it can finally not escape. It can thus also not be different to experience this new reality as a new *condition humaine*. The more the everyday consciousness experiences the substantial efforts to survive, the more is also forced to also think of the fact, that such efforts, in the interest of a simple *survival*, *no longer constitute only the others' worries*, but increasingly *also significantly its own ones*.

The *homo globalicus* experiences himself *one day as the central point* of the civilization and target group of numerous networks competing with each other, that all fear for his grace and recognition. *Another day*, the same *homo globalicus* appears as a *pariah*, whose rich formal and individual liberties cannot change any iota to his social downfall, if not social death. *Between both these limits, is living a society* that sees itself confronted with the problems of perception and possibilities of interpretation of the globalization.

Globalization in Mind

The phenomena of the globalization can be investigated in several systems of reference. That we *exactly* define them is of the highest importance both for methodological and material reasons, because the exceptional *wealth of phenomena*, but also the just as exceptional *complexity* of the global relations could easily lead to the fact, that even the most conscious investigation can fall into the arbitrariness.

The world of the phenomena of the *everyday consciousness*, of the *ideology*, of the *mentality* shows within the globalization an astonishing stability of the characteristics. We would almost be obliged to say, that these firm attitudes of the everyday consciousness have hardly be modified during the two decades of the globalization.

As far as the fundamental principles of the modern everyday consciousness are concerned in the treatment of the reality, the basic orientations of the *individualism*, *antitotalitarianism*, *consumer-orientation* and the *post-modern* basic orientations have hardly changed. It is all the more striking, because in a period, when neither the magnitude nor the qualitative differentiation, also nor the social dissemination of the consumation approaches the *real* consumer society, a *firm hegemony of the consumerism* can no longer hardly be confirmed and legitimized by the reality.

It is then no exaggeration and no ironic gesture, if we describe the everyday consciousness working in the globalization as a consciousness, which represents a *consumer's consciousness without any real consuming*. This is no single example for the phenomenon, that will come back often in our essay: in the world of phenomena, we can always again observe, that the consciousness does not correspond to the being, concretely, *the consciousness of an object does not correspond to this real object*. Similarly, the same relation of the non-correspondence, can be noticed also in the „*post-material*“ world of values applying to the reality. These post-material values go on living also unchanged in the first two decades of the globalization (the nineties, or the first decade of the new millennium).

It is the same also for the moments of the *post-modern* thinking.

Besides the phenomena of *value relativism* and of virtuality, the *post-modern difference thinking* rules also over the presence of the globalization, as well as the

post-modern vision of the *other* and the *otherness*. The presence of a system of post-modern values in the global everyday consciousness is of a comprehensive importance both for *methodological* and *substantive* reasons again. For methodological reasons, because the post-modern thinking is deploying in quite new structures of the thinking (difference-logic, deconstructivism), in structures, *in which already the single fact requires further and fundamental explanations*, why these structures could gain a foot-hold in the domains of control of the everyday consciousness with their new logic and new orientation of the reality processing. The everyday thinking *as thinking* must solve the function to enable man *to eliminate the everyday problems*. It is clear, that the arrangement of the new post-modern thinking and the necessity to enable the everyday consciousness to eliminate the everyday problems, *do not precisely support each other* and have no positive effect on each other.

It is a new *fundamental* question issued from the basic problematic, of how it was quite possible, that these post-modern structures of thinking could be viable in their difference logic and in their inability to admit and articulate the usual questions of the social reproduction, precisely at the time of the globalization, for – simply said – a post-modern value orientation can *expressly prevent* the everyday consciousness from recognizing the global world of life in its abstractions and fragmentation.

In addition to the long-term hegemony and validity of the basic forms of the *everyday consciousness*, of the *post-material values* and/or of the new *post-modern structures* of thinking, the comprehensive „*soft*“ interpretation of the most important relations, the enthusiasm of the happiness, the *leisure* propaganda or the new „*californism*“ with its *eternal sunshine*, sex and body-building are considered as astonishing like strong and uninterrupted.

The „*soft*“-„*hard*“ relation applies now already as already the *fourth* dimension of the current global everyday consciousness (in addition to the *principles of the everyday consciousness*, of the *post-material values* and of the specifically *post-modern structures of thinking of the difference logic*).

The predominance of the „*soft*“, „*tender*“ interpretations of the reality forms a construction of the reality and a constitution of the world of relative independence.⁷

⁷These forms of thinking do not appear directly in the immediate articulation of judgments, they are however also not directly „*contents*“, but principles, methods and procedures, in which

If we try now to understand *sociologically* these orientations and types of thinking according to their own temporal circumstances (not yet according to the circumstances of the globalization), it seems to be clear, that they can be interpreted, above all, if also not exclusively, as products of the slow and constantly repressed *retreat of the modern industrial society*. Under this aspect, it is noticeable, that the concerned modes of thinking thematize only rarely explicitly the *real processes* of this withdrawal. Anyway, it is however understandable in this light, why the fundamentally „soft“, i.e. „tender“ trains of character are dominating in them. The advent of the „soft“ trains of character as *sociological genesis* corresponds to this context, that has just been marked as real event by the withdrawal of the „hard“ social relations.

This basic explanation, although not decisive, is however essentially modified by the problem circle of the neo-Marxism. For, the neo-Marxism keeps the conviction of the relevance and of the survival of the industrial society (it means, that he represented so unchanged the „hard“ elements of the former industrial society). On the other side, the neo-Marxism revealed, *compared to the former Marxisms* (mainly of course to the Stalinist and post-Stalinist Marxism), precisely in every respect as *clearly „soft“*. So, we can see how an orientation of thinking in the field of the *whole* social-philosophical complexity can show, in miscellaneous comparisons, always a *different* face.

We can accept with a quiet conscience, that amongst the actual relationships of the globalization, the *hard* and *soft* components are both represented in a large number. *The almost exclusive dominance of the „soft“ dimension in the milieu of the new forms of thinking applies therefore as a hair-raising disproportion.*

The gathering of the *soft* varieties of interpretation and of processing of the reality rised only after the comprehensive *hard* processes of the overwhelming historical *caesura* of the year 1945, of the *reconstruction* and of the *Cold War*. This corresponded also to the need to legitimize both the *political consolidation* and also the *economical miracle*, but also that of the *consumer society* and of the *democratic system*. All these moments of the new world order were effectively „softer“ than their predecessors.

If not without any crises and conflicts, this trend was followed by a whole range of new phenomena and attitudes, such as the ever wider and denser

medium the effective elaboration of the reality happens. A „soft“ treatment of the reality means then no exclusively „soft“ judgments, but the „soft“ medium of the construction.

consummation, the *design* defining the external image of the society, the new *subculture* of the fashion, the always softer and more intimate (and more *naked*) world of the social communication, the growing *recognition* of the individuals and of the personal happiness, the modified relation towards the *minorities* of any colour, the democratic and *consensually* accentuated treatment of social conflicts, the conscious struggle of social mechanisms of exclusion, the growing recognition of *women* and the increasing number of social opportunities, during which men and women could transmit further courteous phrases, and also the increasing liberation of the superficiality of the interpersonal relations in the schools, the democratization of the army and generally the comprehensive wave against authorities and authoritarianism.

The softness, the growing „soft“ interpretation of the events constituted step by step a composite field, a new *ether* of the historical and social existence, that radiated as determining trend from the sixties slowly also a *normative* force. In this respect, the USA Vietnam war of the sixties and seventies is also a significant example, for such a „hard“ reality might no longer be admitted and could not be treated in such a „tender“ social and political universe.

In a stricter sense, the circumstances and relations were and are certainly not „hard“ or „soft“, but this functioning *convention*, through which we experience social relations and phenomena as „hard“ or „soft“.

Under a stricter aspect from the *sociology of knowledge* (Wissenssoziologie), decisive aspects of the social perception appear already in a clear light. This shows, that the type of *perception* is also one of the *value estimation*, and as such also one of the *categorization* and of the *qualification*. This means, that a society judged in a „hard“ or „soft“ way is not necessarily utilizing its sociological of knowledge perspective, but is also disposing of previous preferences, in any case however of previous value estimations. This is also then equivalent with a *new form* of the sociology of knowledge, if – as it seems to us – the *actual existential fixation* (Seinsgebundenheit) remains certainly still determining in some generality in the prevailing constitution of the thinking. This however means also, that the previously analyzed ways of thinking (*principles of the everyday consciousness, post-material values, post-modern structures, the „soft“ dimension*) are also disposing on their part of new, partly not yet exploited ideological potentials.

The Peculiar Approach of Post-Modern Way of Thinking

The forms of consciousness prevailing in the globalization are, partially until now, in their nature, not yet exploited ideological forms. In their „new“ way they are dissociating from the classical definition of the „*existential fixation*“ (Seinsgebundenheit) of thinking. As structures of thinking they do not correspond to the „reality“ and that this difference, with the necessary simplifications, can be paraphrased with the duality of the *dichotomy of the „hard“ and the „soft“*.

While the *post-modern difference thinking*, sociologically considered, because of the political claim of an intellectual movement, dissociated the thinking from the reality (from the reference to a provable objectivity), the post-modern everyday thinking is not following exactly the same way. While the post-modern *difference thinking* is also able to exercise the „hard“ mode of processing, the post-modern *everyday thinking* defends itself, through its „soft“ attitude, against the absurdities of seriously taken difference thinking. *A „soft“ difference thinking can namely never become so quite absurd as a „hard“ one.*

Based on the „soft“ attitudes, it seems that in this differentiation, the soft processing of the current (global) reality leads in the philosophical difference thinking to the *phenomenon of the manipulation* („hard“ relations are „softly“ treated). This soft processing of the current (global) reality appears in the post-modern everyday thinking as a *safe defence reaction* against the absurdity of a radical difference thinking very seriously taken. The outlines of *symmetrical opposite worlds* take shape, that sometimes also design the reverse contours of each other.⁸

The philosophical difference logic of the Post-Modernism shows the reality, through its own way of perception, radically „more evil“ than it is, while the „soft“ breathed in difference thinking of the everyday consciousness lets appear the same reality much „more harmonious“ and „more balanced“.

Periods and Crisis of the Globalization

As demonstrated, the globalization has its (inner) history, along with all the methodological problems of this fact. The inner variations amongst the diverse periods of the globalization have not changed anything to the fact, that the globalization is identical to the rule of the huge functional systems expanding onto the whole earth, that the weight of the individual freedom, somewhat

⁸ Such a reversal is simultaneously *real* (politically and sociologically) and *logical*.

differently formulated, of the actorial element, has become decisively bigger, that a permanent struggle is led for the sources on the meso-level of the globalization, which is necessary for the supply of the work of the diverse states organizing the state and the society (which last element is practically identical to the whole complex of questions of the structural state supply). That attempt has also hardly changed, that the international right is extended for the purpose of neoliberal-human rights interventions, as well as also that the philosophical distance between the abstract order of the globalization and the elimination of the concrete tasks of the social being is not diminished. Half a century ago, the critics of the real socialism experimented with the thesis, that the real socialism is a world of „the collective irresponsibility” for, who may have been responsible for that in the huge apparatus of the collective decisions is no longer ascertainable. *Numerous new variants of the same collective irresponsibility are however also reproducing in the distribution of responsibilities, competences and authorizations at the miscellaneous levels of the global structures.*

In the basic definitions of the globalization, that circle of phenomena, which we colloquially call *crisis*, is also built organically. We have often pointed out, that it is one of the most striking and most unprecedented characteristics of the globalization, that they coincide in their „*crisis*” and „*normality*” in a new way.

This new leading characteristic can take back to certain historical antecedents, for *precisely the setting of a local crisis on the higher, global level can be comprehended, on this new, global level as part of a normal process. Such a local crisis raised at the global level can also be interpreted as an advantage of the globalization, because precisely as crisis, it can however in an indirect way favour the regrouping of the resources in a more optimal direction.* The phenomenon „globalization” could stylize itself not only as a new, but also as a new and „positive” phenomenon, because it represented a field, in which the even „*crises*” could led to positive and universal consequences.⁹

The new relation between „normality” and „crisis” was in fact already admitted before 2007-2008 in the basic relations of the globalization. However, the 2007-2008 crisis means, in this context, a *new era*.

This crisis produced also in the behaviour of the global actors new and decisive changes. Up to 2007-2008, the rules of interpretation and action started from the fact, that the globalization works perfectly as „system”. To criticize, to relativize

⁹ We do not think that this type "ruse of the reason" followed a conscious effort of global forces, as historical fact it is however certainly worth to keep it stored in our memory.

this system and act against its spirit might only appear as *an exceptional phenomenon*.¹⁰ *After the crisis, this attitude changed fundamentally!*

The crisis is however by no means the only comprehensive moment, that can play a crucial role in the configuration of the global future. The other equal phenomenon, itself in its dimension of the global crisis, is the *transformation of the imperial structure of the globalization*. At the end of the first decade of the globalization, the big transformation becomes very clearly apparent. In the first half of this decade, it was the period of the so-called „unipolar” world, followed by a new structure, that carries then in itself several structure approaches, anyhow it is about simultaneous structure formations, in which already *several poles* are to be perceived *in a global architecture*.

The current presence applies as starting point of any prognosis.¹¹

This presence is currently determined by three comprehensive elements: (1) the crisis of the years 2007-2008, (2) the new definitions of a new „multipolar” world, and finally (3) the new mutations and interactions of the aforementioned moments (crisis and new multipolarity).

For the system of the basic conditions of the globalization is always based on an everyday struggle to be fought in the *mesosphere* of the globalization. This struggle is disputed between the *functional-monetarist* basic attributes of the globalization and the global *meso-level*, in other words, of the *political sphere*.¹² Like already often thematized, this struggle of the relative and structural *indebtedness of the state* (every state!) occurs, that reaches, in the form of a peculiar negative spiral, the etatic, democratic, social and every other representative sphere and thus perfectly turns the social existence upside down, and in addition also so that this transformation runs out democratically correct!

¹⁰ This formulation contains obviously an exaggeration, without it, it would be however impossible to demonstrate this particularly important trend of the global world of phenomena.

¹¹ It goes without saying, that the huge rapidity of the global processes makes very difficult to define exactly the „current” state of the globalization, because it happens frequently, that an exactly performed analysis of a state does no longer correspond fully, at the moment of its publication, to the „current” conditions. Nevertheless, this difficulty cannot prevent us from investigating in detail the diverse current phases of the globalization.

¹² Ld. Jövőkutatás és globalizáció. Új szempontok a két terület áthatásainak kutatásában. in: Jövő.

MTA IX. Osztály Jövőkutatási Bizottságának hivatalos lapja. 2006. 3. szám.

www.jovo.jovokutatas.hu/3/kiss-jovokutglob.rtf.glob und About Meso-Level Dimensions of Globalization. in: The Europe of Regions: Literature, Media, Culture. Ed. by. Glavanovics Andrea. Székesfehérvár, 2007. (Kodolányi János University College). 131-137.

The fears and hopes of the society are also articulated and realized in the meso-dimension. The specific basic attributes of the meso-level revealed previously as relevant are also very clearly present in the globalization of our days. So, it is about the functional change of the politics, the one-person group, the natural residuals, the element of the self-destruction in the tissue of the society, the paradoxical phenomenon of the revolt of the rich people, the present-future continuity and the (already mentioned new) provisions of the alternation between „crisis“ and „normality“.

The crisis altered fundamentally the orientations of the action and of the motivations. The leading orientations of action were arranged, up to this crisis, to interpret the processes of the globalization without any particular differentiation as *organic development*, as *free game of free forces*, under which the diverse concrete objectives of the individuals could be realized. After the crisis, the doubt, the criticism, often even the suspicion towards the foundations and the legitimations of the same processes appear already as leading orientation of action. While these processes appeared, up to the crisis, as „natural“, now as other pole, almost nothing applied as „natural“ or „obvious“. *Whilst yesterday the „action“ was predominant, it is today the „reaction“ that prevails.*

In this new attitude, the *original* paradoxes and ambivalences of the globalization are obviously manifesting also quite stronger. A sociological dimension is thus opened, if we realize now the first, spontaneous processing. Would it have been effectively the fact, it would be then simultaneously also an explanation for the fact of how it was possible, that the prevailing currents and methods of thinking of the seventies and eighties remained, practically unchanged, prevalent also in almost both decades of the globalization. And since this concordance was, at the same time, also characteristic for the *four* comprehensive currents of thinking, this trend might not have been such a total coincidence.

The situation of our days could inasmuch also be *dramatized* by the fact, that now all those paradoxes and contradictions of the globalization fall in the everyday consciousness, which have not yet perceived this everyday consciousness in these characteristics, and that are indeed by no means all „negative“, however on their part built up a without parallel and unprecedented reality. While we have precisely exaggerated up to the end of the first half of the first decade the vision of the „global“ relations as „normal“, actually the same everyday consciousness considers the globalization, with the same element of the exaggeration, as arbitrary, incalculable, here and there even also as hostile.

In this frame, it appears soon comprehensible, that the greatest extremities of the phenomenology of the globalization consist in that *distance* and in that *contradiction*, that exist between the richness and the universality of the globalization and also growing social problems of many individuals, groups and societies. Before the crisis in 2007-2008, a part of the opinion-forming industry did also everything to stop the interpretation of the real processes as organic and spontaneous events. This intention and its successful admission are now shaken. *The emergence of the decisive and reactive thinking has become an accomplished fact.*

Already before the crisis, that is to say in the previous historical part of time, it was considered as clear, that the globalization exercises a double effect on the society. As one of the most important impacts on the lifeworld, it divides the individual in his quality of *individual person* and the individual in his quality of *member of a social formation*. Like any such fundamental opposition, it is at the same time also very abstract and very concrete. The same person can, as individual, experience the globalization positively and at the same time become, as member of a concrete social formation, the victim of the globalization. And the same can also apply in reverse.

The revolutionary mutation of the actorial freedom delivers that frame, within which the deployment of the individual can magnify positively also in a historical proportion. The same frame is however also the one, that relatively depreciates the individuals accepted in the social formations (church, trade union, political parties, family, etc.), for the bigger formations, *as actors*, cannot carry out successfully the same deployment *in the same extent*, like it is the case for the individual as actor. It results, that these formations – in comparison to the individual possibilities for the individuals – can become structural losers in the globalization, as it has been the case with the state.

As if really, according to the script of a Hollywood superfilm, the world society now effectively expanding on the whole globe would be the supernumeraries of an ironical story. While the globalization was creating its huge possibilities and freedoms, a great part of the world society was experiencing it as a *restriction* in general, if not as a challenge, in which already the pure *survival* becomes even more clearly the task of the very first order. The colossal irony of this virtual script appears also in the fact, that the unique *constructive* side of the globalization is exploited and enjoyed by the consciously organized individual, while the *destructive* side of the same globalization becomes the fate of the individuals

organized in the diverse formations, and the destruction can go to the total disappearance of the jobs or of the residential possibilities.

The double anthropological consequence of the globalization consists therefore in the fact, that it favours and supports the individual capable of competition better than the individual organized in formations.

The tempo shift between global realities and their belated notice leads to a new *asymmetry*. The societal standings, or the ranking of a whole society will not see and treat quite balanced, very likely, the constructive and destructive sides of the globalization. And it is all the more the case, because the representatives of the *constructive* opinion formation are „*individuals*“, whose estimations of the overall standing will by no mean determine to the same extent in which the real „*masses*“, arising from the decay of previous big organization, feel themselves marginalized, but still live in their mentality in the former big organizations.

This evolution leads to a deployment of the political and social problematic, that remind of the questionings of *the pre-global* period. An „appearance“ (Schein), as well theoretically as practically determining, occurs. This appearance means, that the social and political problematic corresponds on the surface to that of the pre-global period, represents somewhat a „*continuation*“ of *the old realities*. The „appearance“ (Schein) updates the phenomena of crisis, that remind of the crises of the former periods. This „appearance“ is indeed in the life of many people a „*reality*“, it is however in its essence not convincing, because the problems seeming identical represent *phenomena, not of an international industrial society, but of an also already post-industrial global world society*.

This creates philosophical problems. The status of the reality itself is doubling. The crisis experienced at the meso-level reminds effectively of the cyclical economic crises of the pre-global industrial society, while the same crisis is „in truth“ already a consequence of the globalization.

System Changes Within the Structure of Globalization

It depends also partly from the actors, how they qualify the overall situation through their behaviour. If populist or extremist concepts appear on the scene as „*solution*“ of these new political and social problems, it also means indirectly, that these actors (does not want to) experience the whole situation as a „*global*“, but as a „*traditional-national etatic*“ reality. *Through the simple categorization of the situation, they make politics, through their politics they categorize the situation.*

That they let revive the language and the conceptuality of the populism and of the extremism of the thirties with an astonishing fidelity, provides only a further proof for the thesis stated at the beginning of this work, thesis of *how the today prevailing currents of thinking can position themselves infinitely far away from the present real historical situation*. This questioning touches indeed the problematic, whether the terms „left” and „right” could be still legitimately applied or not for the present-global relations, it is exhausted in them but not to a great extent.

The political and social questions lead back again to the *system-theoretical* dimensions of the globalization. The fundamental functional characteristics depreciated systematically the basic dimensions of the political (as non-functional). Concerning the *social* basic problematic, it has been admitted and articulated, *for historical reasons*, in the system of the modern society through the mediation of the *political* basic problematic. *Through the depreciation of the political system, the depreciation of the social system also occurs*. If political currents of thinking arise, that want to evoke through their categorization a pre-global political situation, the importance of the political system and of the social system is again somewhat reinforced, what however cannot lead to the fact, that so the globalization already disappears and the pre-global reality can become true.

In this *global reality doubling* also *structurally*, the key to the constructive solution of the political and social problems is not in the hands of the politicians, while the crisis gives always again the impression („the appearance”), that the new social and political problems would let them solve in the frame of the old, pre-global structures. Therefore, *the global crisis* at the *meso-level* of the societies becomes also already again political. Added to this the misfortune, that on the national-etatic meso-level of the globalization this phenomenon also outdated and contributed to the action of the yesterday’s concepts, even more, that also the political plausibility can come up, that such outdated and yesterday’s concepts of the national-etatic level could be successfully put forward now against the negative effects of the globalization. *The negative development is thus also doubled*. Not only outdated concepts can emerge, they boast even about the fact, that they could have been applied successfully against the destructive consequences of the globalization.

The search for new responses to the crisis gets out of hand in the societies and the mass communication. The whole activity of this search is however severely *limited* from two sides. First, it is about the *intellectual* limitation. Here, the comprehensive *lack of utopia* and *utopia’s hostility* become rapidly visible,

furthermore the already analyzed deep fixation of the everyday consciousness on the forms of thinking of the seventies and eighties, the belief in the former truth of the thesis of the „end of the history“ (today, we think already wrongly, that no new theories are possible), this also includes the consequence of the year 1989, according to which the neo-liberalism marginalized, if not compromised, all other major structures of thinking, while these other great directions could not properly react up today to this degradation (the so-called „third way“ delivers for that an example of the social democracy, with which we can exemplarily study, how the neo-liberalism moved the social democracy away from its own gravitation directions).

This search for new responses is also complicated by the fact, that the different levels of action are however not all in the hands of those, who want to react. This includes even, that a strong intellectual background is already necessary, how we identify the level of action, on which a concrete problem has to be put, without speaking on the fact, that we can always react only precisely on a *concrete* level of action, for which we would need always quite specific tools.

In this current phase of the globalization, only such economic and social solutions are coming into question, that can be classified, in their spirit, now organically in the fundamental relation system of the globalization. This means, *above all*, that they are not separated „system-theoretically“ from the determining structural and functional relations of the globalization.

In our days, the structural loser,¹³ the political subsystem, are again revalued by the detours of the social problematic. Here, a new confrontation simultaneous of a new type is emerging .

Social and political questions should be solved, but this cannot take place in the *immediacy* of a pre-global view of the political and of the social. For, we can also not exclude, that the sudden revaluation of the political leads, in the public consciousness, to the repression and diminution of the globalization. The sudden revaluation of the political can bring back to life political ghosts that we believed dead.

¹³ It must also be emphasized in this concrete case, that the structural and functional relations (in) the globalization may not be confused, under any circumstances, with immediate real relations. A structural loser can, for example, appear in other contexts as a clear winner!

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