The Real Existing Real Reality 2022

The three-quarter time waltz *of self-destructive society, the new social structure of Three Societies and a war, where good can at least fight against evil.*

Based on so many years of globalization research, we attempt here to capture the *true face* of the globalization itself on the one hand and the *distortion* of the process that we call "globalization" on the other. The *first* sentence deals with the problem of the *self-destructive* society, which is a clear consequence of globalization in the general context of indebted states. The *second* movement is a new phenomenon in the social development of global societies (i.e., societies in the age of globalization), which we categorize as the unfolding of the *Three Societies*. The *Three Societies* structure is also a clear consequence of globalization, but not only structurally and therefore objectively, in a Weberian valueless sense, as has been the case with a self-destructive society. The *Three Societies* structure is already *a consequence of the manifest distortion of a possible optimal global development.* From a scientific point of view, the third sentence is the alien and non-legitimated emergence of imperialism in the already prevailing structure of globalization. In other words, this sentence can also be described as a *description of a potential Third World War*.

These three sentences, however, also make up a coherent line, although it cannot be said that the coherent line was lawful and necessary because globalization is also formulated by people and among them there are equals and "more equals". Furthermore, especially from the perspective of globalization research, but also without it, one can see what many interpretations perceive, that the one-pole world that has prevailed since 1989 is coming to an end. The simplest and equally the most complex settings are identical. The replacement of the one-pole world by the multi-pole world is not a metaphysical necessity and this replacement can take place in several ways. However, the ways in which it then takes place depends again on people who, *especially under the circumstances of globalization*, for objective and structural reasons, can ascend to become powerful actors.

FIRST MOVEMENT

(The Self-Destructive Society)

An important element of the new order of international politics (the "new world order") is the actual and therefore fresh interpretation of "identity" and "difference". By 1989, the logic of neoliberal turn exchanged the basic semantics of identity and difference within socialism and Christianity. This means *that neither the solidarity of socialism, nor the brotherly love of Christianity can diminish the harsh power of difference*. Neoliberal identity consists in nothing else but the unconditioned respect and guarantee of the freedom and the rights of the individual

(which rights might, at a certain extent, become merely a formal framework of social differences and social rules). In these cases, *difference is not a mere difference, value, or ideology, but it may become an essential if not an ontological feature of social existence in general.*

The recent view of society was based on good intentions, or at minimum, on trust in the future. A welfare society was raised to the status of an overall political program. By this, of course we do not mean to make the welfare society of the 60's and 70's responsible for the self-destructive society that became more and more defined in the 80's and 90's. Yet one followed right after the other, that is certain.

A fundamental tendency of a self-destructive society is an extensive *state debt* that makes it impossible for the economy to catch up with it, even in the most favorable conditions. *Achilles cannot catch up with the turtle.* A self-destructive society is therefore a society that is unable to maintain (*via* state institutions) the modern, highly developed, *post-welfare* level of civilization that it had once reached. And this is not simply a question of economy. If a coalmine is shut down because of inefficiency, it won't lead to social self-destruction. But if the state is forced to noticeably back out from the fields of education or healthcare, the self-destructive tendencies become immediately clear. Therefore, the fundamental problem of a self-destructive society is not simply economic. The fundamental problem is not just economic recession, as the latter one can only be followed by economic boost when more favorable circumstances arise.

Not only does such a period not improve accumulated human values, but it often can't even ensure the simple subsistence. The self-identity of the state, society and the citizen are questioned, if not challenged from this aspect. Therefore, the state, society, and the citizen either do not have an opportunity to improve all-human values, or they are even bound to expend, or even destroy these values.

This self-destructive society is the new and extensive reality of our decades, and it calls for the reformulation of the fundamental categories of societal life.

Within this framework, it would be in principle necessary to analyze the actual relationship of *globalization and politics* as specific social activities or subsystems. This would follow from the fact that in a strict sense, the *politics of the present is not the same as a few decades ago*. But we are excused from this task by the fact that politics, the political subsystem and political classes slowly seem to find their proper places within the network of the relationships of globalization (and the new world economy). Thus, a closer examination of the sphere of politics slowly becomes possible even without enumerating the totality of these new historical co-ordinates. [1]

The quality of democracy is a fundamental issue for globalization, the new global world economy and the new political system slowly adapts itself to these new coordinates. This is firstly a *functional* and *structural* moment. It can be, and it should be, because global operations can only evolve, and function based on democratic liberalism or liberal democracy. *In this sense, liberal democracy is the "modus vivendi" of globalization.* But its functional and structural traits shall not make us forget the original *value components* of liberal democracy, which are used to ensure the exceptionally strong legitimacy of the political system before the functional and structural dimensions were completely developed.

The bias of self-destruction

The end of the Soviet World Regime and Gorbachev's destruction of the Soviet Union as a superpower and its magnificent ideology, became not only a *decisive*, but also an *irrevocable fact* of today's universal history. As *ultima ratio,* it might appear differently with each different interpretation of historical eras. However, it is self-evident that the final world historical value could hardly be traced back to any other process. Although this concrete fact of the 'end of history' has not yet lost its universal quality, it seems this Gorbachevian 'end of history' itself is a part of a higher, universal transformation process. In the blink of an eye all ideological basis disappeared with the end of the divided world. At the same time, a new reality emerged: *the reality of a self-destructive society.*

The Gorbachevian 'end of history' exploded the 'moment of truth' in the social order of the prevailing Socialism. But it is also a cosmic and colossally ironic gesture, a *ruse of reason*, that this moment of truth has also become a reality for Western societies. As the Great Enemy said farewell, the self-image of Western society was also removed from its overall determining framework of *bipolarity,* which had previously provided the Western part of the world with a position of comfortable and unchallenged superiority.

A bankruptcy in the economy is therefore not necessarily self-destructive, but a bankruptcy of institutions that used to be supported by the state is, of necessity, self-destructive. Therefore, the fundamental problem of a self-destructive society is not simply an economic one. *The state debt does not equal economic recession*. The latter can only be followed by an economic boost. From this perspective, the self-identity of the state, society and the citizen are seriously questioned. *A certain level of state debt makes all societies self-destructive*.

The self-destructive society is the new and extensive reality. The 'West', the developed world, should be considered the winner of Gorbachev's farewell and it has profited from the global transformation of the world economy. On the other hand, even the 'West' *itself* had to struggle

against the consequences of this self-destructive society due to the growing importance of the debt challenge. At the same historical moment, the former 'second' world did not get the financial support it needed to establish its new political democracy and competitive market economy. The old or new 'third' world arrived and reached the nethermost point resulting in mass poverty and migration. In this 'post-historical' history, a new question has now arisen: can the politically hegemonious liberalism break away from the downward spiral of a self-destructive society?

SECOND MOVEMENT

Three Societies within Politics of Self-Destructive Societies

In our time the various modifications of political identity, in the midst of globalization, resulted in numerous new phenomena. It is quite a new progression that harks back to the abruptly changing arena of communication and networking. The changes within the individual states, or societies can, at the same time, almost completely become international. The structure of a state is quite similar to that of many other states and equally to a *virtually* assumed structure of a world society. *This is because, at times, functioning democracies in some respects are also reminiscent of dictatorships.*

The gradual heterogenization and fragmentation of the identity problem with the same importance of the same, made it almost surprising that in his 2018 book *Francis Fukuyama* so directly and unambiguously put the identity problem back in the center. Purely theoretically/historically, this attempt was delayed, the extensive differentiation of identities exceeded the earlier stage for which this approach would still have been adequate. Fukuyama's understandable mistake, however, was not only a fundamentally theoretical matter, but it was also a delayed *political* step to understand the intense and, increasingly widespread, inadequacy of the individual states and societies and the practical US international politics in its logic, i.e., the intellectual apparatus behind it. For this reason, we must see this approach as one that is characteristic of the 2020s.

While Fukuyama is presenting the then current reality through a characteristic of earlier arenas, the lines of a newer type of group formation in the universe of the identity problem becomes visible. This new group formation is already empirically tangible, although neither the press (acting as a representative of public communication) nor the publicly conducted empirical-sociological research (that is not publicly researched and that we can never know) takes little notice of it. However, correspondingly for this reason, they have not yet entered the phase of empirical experience, because the individual groups that could be called types here are still fluid. But since they are no longer fluent, they are not identical with the sociological types we are

aiming for. It is about a new typology, but this in no way means that the earlier description would necessarily lose its meaning and legitimacy.

At this point, confronted with a generous social transformation, we cannot help but point out the fate of the empirical social sciences in neo-liberal science policy. Because this science policy does not primarily favor empirical social research, it is becoming increasingly difficult to come across correct research results, even with the most striking new empirical phenomena.

The new social structures are global in two ways. Their structures stand out with visible similarity in most countries of the global world.

These structures exist in every state. Nonetheless they also have another mode of existence, which is not constituted by existence in the individual states; they also exist as an unmediable global entity. It is not a mechanical addition of this phenomenon in the individual states, it also exists in these homogeneous and uniform forms globally, both empirically (because of the strong networking of global living environments and states) as well as virtually and conceptually. In categorizing this new grouping, the individual differences between states and societies are step by step, more and more irrelevant. Therefore, they have two modes of existence, one separated in each state and then one hourly direct.

The contours of the three social structures are thus global in *a doubled* way. Their outlines can be empirically perceived in most states of the global world, but they also lead to a self-sufficient global "cross-existence" among the individual states. If one tries to imagine a global world society concretely, one will have to see that *the structure of these structures, this trinity,* can also clearly be read in this one virtual world society. This common existence in all global states, and this is the decisive factor here, is of course *anything but a mechanical addition* of what is going on in the individual global states. The new structure with this twofold global mode of existence, we would call the "Three-societies" structure.

The *first* group (also called "the first society) we would call the *society of goodwill*. Its most important purpose is the strong longing for a value-oriented life, which this society sees anchored in the splendor of the turn of the years 1989-1990, which was celebrated by the victory of human rights and the voluntary self-reduction of real socialism.

The *second* large group (also called "the second society") includes those on whom the concrete and specific value orientation of the first group is not characteristic at all. This group generally rejects the current elite and has no coherent integrative ideology. Publicly, practicable Marxism

has perished; the right, especially to the right of the so-called middle right, is marginalized beyond populism. This second group is not necessarily the numerical majority. However, it represents the majority that is not abolished in identifiable social groups and is therefore just able to help break through new social structures. The later sociological composition of this second society could also be methodically determined.

The *third* large group (also called "third society") is what is colloquially called "the elites". This group could only be reconstructed at the price of extreme difficulty. It is a very fortunate moment that this circumstance does not decisively hinder our theoretical reconstruction, because we can proceed in the same way as *Galileo Galilei* did with the celestial bodies at that time. He did not know some satellites that revolved around the Earth, but he was still able to hypothetically envision these celestial bodies with mathematical and physical methodologies, even calculating their orbit exactly. *In the following, we reconstruct the nature of these new elites using Galileo's methodology.*

We anticipate not only the theses of our work, but also later empirical research, if we already recall at this point those semantic developments that in our time were related to the designation of the elite or the *general power culture*. It is striking that a term such as "background power" from the dictionary of populism, if not from the same as extremism, has gradually migrated into the linguistic *mainstream* of every medium. A remarkable counterpart to this process concerns the semantics of the "*deep state*", which once appeared for the first time in the context of the *Watergate* process. This term also lost its critical-populist and, above all, revealing potency, and has become practically harmless, "descriptive", i.e., a self-evident part of public language.

The currently ruling elite drew its political and originally also almost all-round legitimacy from the equally unique world-historical turn, where the Soviet Union *radically* overturned its hitherto decisive and prevailing political attitudes into the opposite on a world-historical scale through "*perestroika*". In short, we must object that the former Soviet Union actually had many difficulties (they are also everywhere today) and that by abolishing modern politics due to Brezhnev's long illness, it also collected many opponents against itself. We do not think, of course, that the turn of *perestroika* would have been a matter of course or a simple consequence of these difficulties. In this context, too, the *realpolitik* level must be detached from the theoretical level. *Perestroika* remains a world-historical event, which, among other things, has also strongly affected the constitution of the later *three-societies* structure. Later generations will not necessarily be able to truly understand the former *status quo*, i.e., spiritually the situation before *perestroika*. For it was precisely those attitudes that the Soviet Union not only changed through *perestroika*, not only reformed, but radically transformed *into their opposite*, which were not simply arbitrary positions. They were just those *turtle knots* that the world, literally the whole world order after 1945, carried on its back. Such a world-historical turn is unprecedented in world history. There is no change at all in the fact that this turn of events, as indicated,

undoubtedly had its many causes at the purely political level, because for the same reasons it would not at all have to follow that the Soviet Union would actually carry out this turn *in this concrete form*. That it was for us, is a clear *historical/theoretical*, i.e., also *historical/philosophical* fact, which by no means has to be assigned only to political science or history. But it also means that the roots of the *three-societies* structure go directly back to this world-historical turn. The elite targeted in this structure, both in its nation-state and in its direct-global (or global-immediate) form of existence, drew its legitimacy in the exercise of power from the world-historical turn of 1989. The unprecedented success of this turnaround, the unlimited possibilities of the legitimate consolidation of the exercise of power under immaculately democratic conditions, cemented the corpus of this elite, which, in its permanent popularity, was able to successfully exclude any other political alternative, as totalitarian or at least populist. Over time, it was able to stylize itself classically "organically". The "organic" view or ideology is more than suspect and ideologically burdened in critical historical science. This elite quite easily has the attribute of the "organic" that is not challenged by anyone. It was able to transform itself into the *establishment* with which the "first" society, that of "good people", of "do-gooders", could voluntarily, happily and intensively identify. With or without reason, this "first" society sees in this elite, a mythological world-historical hero who defeated communism and helped human rights liberalism to deserved power on its own. At the same time, however, it is also the elite that the "second" society (the impoverished and partly already marginalized majority) defines itself as the "normal" and legitimate society and struggles according to its rights and legitimations.

Very complex and heuristically very rich relationships develop between these three societies.

The *third* society is the ideal of self-determination and the longed-for identity of the *first* society. The *first* society is the product of the year 1989. The individual elements of the *second* society exist after 1989 without distinctive self-determinations, even without a determined will to self-determination. This distinguishes the *second* society from the first. It waited a long time and had hopes in the post 1989 world. For a long time, it did not revolt either against 1989, or against the elite of 1989. It lived in an increasingly eroding expectation and represented the previous provisions continuing unaltered in politics, culture, religion and society. These elements, also as individual components, now appeared as the *second society* after the global economic crisis of 2007-2008. At that time, the second society, which had now matured, also appeared in the *twofold* way mentioned earlier. First of all, it articulated itself in each state as a new society, it had already articulated itself at that time as a cohesive global phenomenon that *will perhaps also form a unified group in this global horizontality.*

The Global Economic Crisis 2007-2008 is a boundary between two ages, even though we know that in the development of global processes, each time limit is likely to be only a relative one. For the moment that was so decisive in the constitution of the second society and qualified the

whole development to such an extent, that it was precisely that this large part of society *in* this crisis, and *because* of this crisis, finally lost its trust in the third society, which (trust) the first society still has today and apparently also wants to muster.

The crucial question of the present and history is currently before our eyes. What will be the historical fate of the second society, if it is already on the way to representing the majority? For countless reasons, however, it is still the case that neither adequate scientific nor political instruments are available to record this second society.

At this point, this problem does not necessarily touch on the widespread and extremely intensively articulated assumption that today one can no longer do anything essential with the categories of "left" and "right". In general, we are convinced that a world of thought that has dominated political structures for centuries cannot proceed in such a way that, at a given time, one simply declares that one can no longer do anything with this distinction. I would like to talk in more detail later about the reasons for this position, which we do not share. However, our train of thought also follows that this changed attitude that one can only use these categories from a careful distance. Because the three societies theory is a very interesting demonstration, if not already a proof for both sides of this fact.

On the one hand, the contrast between the Second and the First Society appears, at least in an *isomorphic* position, to the classical left-right polarity, even if the arguments are not only not identical with the earlier arguments but are also largely not yet fully formulated. So, there are gaps in the reasoning. *On the other hand*, even in this initial phase, it is still the case that in the Second Society both groups or remnants of the left and the right parts of society can be found. This thesis shows for us almost paradigmatically that the left/right division is right in one dimension and wrong in the other, but at least one can say that the division as such, still exists for this reason. After all, our example shows that this division is no longer constitutive in the one important context of the description of the present reality, while in another equally important context of the description of the same reality is no longer constitutive. An exact examination of this fact is critical because one of the most characteristic features of our time is that the wrong interpretation and inadequate terms can critically weaken social orientation, often even in a non-trivial way. Many language strategies emerge that try not only to initiate the current theoretical language, but also to figure as the most up-to-date theoretical language with new normative demands. *Not only is reality becoming step by step more complex, but also the artificially circulated new confusion can make this complexity even more opaque*. And so far, we haven't talked about the primitively instrumental, the directly manipulative or the openly cynical and Orwellian terminology.

Theoretically, it is of no small interest that the world-historical turn that determined the emergence of the Three Societies Structure in 1989 ultimately took place *under the sign of anti-totalitarianism*. It tried to abolish the duality of anti-fascism and anti-communism, in which construction, however, the right and left positions were deliberately not easy to distinguish from one other. The anti-totalitarianism articulated here also contributed to increasing the growing incomprehensibility in the use of the left/right distinction.

The positive genesis of the three-societies structure can probably be traced back to the world-historical turn of 1989, but it's really striking crystallization can be associated with the crisis of the years 2007-2008.

At the most general level, this development appears to be the result of a *global response. It is about the reaction of the 1989 new beginning to the world crisis of 2007 and 2008.* Most of its provisions are associated with this comprehensive response. It is about the inseparable unity of a world-historical victory and its crisis. *However, while the world society (as well as its component individual societies) was able to experience the world-historical victory uniformly and at the same time positively, it is no longer the case with its crisis.* All societies, all groups and even all individuals, experience the crisis differently, so that the consequences of the crisis would have to be reconstructed much more laboriously than those of the world-historical victory. [2] One of the difficulties at this point may stem from the fact that numerous dimensions of global transformation are associated with the very serious component of the political institution alone. In this case, too, identity cannot be reduced to the single dimension of the political system. Because until now we have had to talk in detail about the attraction of life under the sign of values or about the sometimes millenarian hope for a finally good society.

When we talk about the further social embedding of these Three Societies, the *phenomenon of public debt appears* to be one of the most relevant constitutive factors of our society in the plan. *The correlations are more than clear*. The *third* society suggests to the *first* society that the deeply indebted state is not a really relevant social fact. It also suggests that today's world economy is the realm of normality, in which only the bad and undisciplined policies of individual governments, the coincidence of the economy or the oil price are the real movers. Since then, the third society has had it even easier. After the *Great Depression*, the *climate crisis* dominated the room, then came the migration crisis in 2015, then Covid in 2020 and now the *war*. Who could or should sue the realities of social or economic life from the *third society* (the elite)? Who could have the legitimacy to do so? The *third* society also suggests with great energy that the decline in the importance of the state is a liberating act ("States are always on the way to totalitarianism anyway"). It suggests that today's individual is swimming in a permanent stream of ever more far-reaching liberation and emancipation, now the individual can already change his gender in kindergarten or think about sexuality in addition to the Brothers Grimm's *folk* girls.

At the same time, and indeed, the *second* society is the clear loser of the increasing indebtedness of the state. For the elites that emerged in 1989 (which are essentially identical to the *third* society), however, the drastic weakening of the public sphere caused by the debt may have been more of an advantage, if not a *particular* advantage. These advantages are *"relative",* which could then be converted into *"absolute"* advantages without any visible difficulties.

The phenomena of differences in social *benefits* is a phenomenon that can, quite easily, be compared with differences in *income* and subsequent wealth. Just as one of the weakest points of today's neoliberal world is the gigantic differences in income and wealth, so it is the same with "relative" and "absolute" social advantages. For this degree of difference is, of itself, the institution of the irreversibility of differences. From a theoretical standpoint, it is enough to think of the entire *privatization transformation* in the shadow of the national debt; everything from all dimensions of education to health care, from the private army to a nuclear reactor in personal possession, can become private property. The international press recently reported that behind a particular aid operation stand private individuals of American provenance (who, of course, have the right not to reveal their names publicly for confidentiality reasons). At this point, we must also briefly address the fact that some goods, among them the common human, the culturally sacred or the commonly acceptable, should not become private property as is the case with a car, based solely on the profoundest reason of principle. Of course, the mass of value of these goods is the problem that comes to the fore, not only the differences in wealth and of wealth, but rather the new embedding of these "new" private owners, which in the foreseeable future make it practically impossible to think of reversing this process. The inequality, as well as all the qualitative problems of privatization, thus appear to be *practically irreversible.* And of course, justice and ethics also come up: Neither democratic non-liberal visions should have thought of irreversible inequality on an extreme scale. It goes without saying that the term "privatization" or "private property" can have very different meanings depending on individual historical contexts. To a large extent, the starting position already determines the discussion. Depending on how the economic relations are embedded in a state, the connotations of this term are also different. But also, very different phenomena and very different "goods" are impacted by this process. There are even decidedly problematic, if not scandalous, phenomena and goods among them, even those that are theoretically not secured at all in the context of privatization. The simple fact that the media of mass communication is in private hands cannot legitimize a single philosophy or political theory. However, this connection is not only relevant for us in general, but also in the context of the Three Societies. In the coordinated interaction of the *first* and the *third society*, the *second* society appears as a constant opponent of the other two societies.

The *third* society, with or without reason, cannot imagine that the *second* society will truly endure its gradual lockout, its gradually deteriorating social situation, its increasingly virtual social and other rights, its impoverishment or its deprivation without any resistance. The *indescribable* passivity was indeed the case even if the multiple reasons, can also make this somewhat understandable. The "*third"* society cannot believe that the suffering is suffered

silently. *In the case of Gorbachev's perestroika, it is similar.* This *perestroika* provided the decisive condition of being (the true *condition humaine*!). In the normal state of East/West conflict, a process appeared before the public consciousness, which was at the same time also a world-historical turn. This turn was not only a very positive change for the origins of this third society, it was simply a miracle, the origins of this *third society* were the elites of that time and these elites suddenly received everything they were fighting for, moreover, they achieved everything unexpectedly and without much suffering and effort, and this turn of events made the same elites and their values even more popular and loved by all.

This mental state, which can be called a specific fear, motivates the third society. This is a specific type of "*politische Angst*"(political fears), which occurs in large numbers and in the various forms of terminology in the individual mass psychological conceptions, without them having been systematically processed as the subject of self-sufficient research. Assuming that the *third* society, as usual, proceeds from its own ideas and anticipates the behavior of the other groups according to the pattern of its own behavior, it must actually think that it is rather impossible for the majority (the *second* society in our terminology) to accept a situation in which it (the *second* society) had to renounce its long-cherished historical achievements in favor of an indistinct conglomerate of promises from which practically nothing concrete could be realized (see as evidence the NATO problem as a promise).

It must be firmly assumed that the *third* society should have become aware of this enormous victory and this huge increase in its own powers, at least to the extent that the *second* society has become aware of its *fundamental losses*. At the same time, the *first* society has little choice but to fully believe the interpretation of the *second* society by the *third society*.

Every single new society, but also its sum, the society of the "Three Societies" lives in a new and hitherto unknown world of mediatization. The situation of the Three Societies can therefore be read quite instructively from their relationship with this mediatization. The *third* society is in every respect owned by the entire media world. *McLuhan's* paradox also comes into its own here. The third society uses this terrible media superiority to keep the *first* society in its enthusiasm for 1989, in other words, in its happy self-identification with this event and thus also with the *third* society. Its media world is professional (it has probably read much more McLuhan and media psychology than the students or the learned intellectuals themselves). This media world acts consciously in the extreme. The situation is similar to media in politics. Capital accumulated in advance is necessary to enter politics and by extension the media world. In the cosmos of the Three Societies world; and this is again a theoretically relevant move, the state and private capital sets coincide completely. It must be remembered that it cannot be possible in any other hemisphere in the world. The resulting media conglomerate (again a new and interesting move!) does not at all consider the real existing *second* society as its target group. It treats the *second* society as a secret adversary or as a hidden danger, according to the motto of *Franz*

Werfel, "Not the murder, the victim is to blame." But it also does so because, for no particular reason, it does not think that the *second* society does not necessarily rave about the whole existing social order. In summary, the media conglomerate ultimately treats as *non-existent*, and in global politics, that there are subjects that are practically non-existent, that are not named, and their interests do not exist.

By speaking earlier of a colossal media superiority in favor of the *third* society, however, we did not ignore the equally colossal rise of social media. These media have become a reality today and have already proven to be a very effective weapon in the hands of the *second* society. This new media complex arose very directly (it is a pity that McLuhan didn't talk about this media development *from below*). From the beginning you could still experience how living language and communication have left their mark on social media and it is why social media remain in close interaction with the current processes that dynamically shape the identity of the *second* society. This complex gains its unique significance as an alternative to those *main-stream* media whose lost popularity, with its close connection with the great turn of 1989 or in other words, was linked to the *third* society. How this group (or the *mainstream*) of the once particularly glaring, even "beloved" media lost its unique position is a concrete story, precisely because of their unique and real existing credibility and love, they were bought up step by step and their original focal points were also reversed step by step. There is no doubt that social media represent a great alternative, but they cannot take over all the relevant functions of the *mainstream* media, because for many different reasons they cannot always develop the discussion processes to exactly address the last points. It is quite visible in the current military conflict in Ukraine. Although all media take on the other forms of the social medium, the possibilities of a truly social medium remain far behind the non-social or the only seemingly social media. But it really does not mean that they are ineffective because of this.

During the years around 1989, the media (which were also open to the left) were the leading carriers of the great political openings, the constant good news, the realization of liberating steps that were not only thought previously impossible, but also should not have been considered possible, because the essence and the singularity of the transition consisted precisely in a *drastic* change of direction; in this 180 degree descriptive *zig-zag*, which made it tangibly impossible that one could even think of such a possibility in advance. It was, of course, a cognitive impossibility to foresee this development. A reality that embodies the exact opposite of what currently exists cannot be anticipated. I'm not talking about those who may have secretly known this or that part of this diametrical change for any reason (a self-contained question that you have to consider, of course). One should also not believe those who, in retrospect, want to relativize this mutation, this absolute difference, because their goal is clear, they want to force this unique and not even cognitively predictable turn in retrospect into the *Procrustic bed* of *realpolitik* and into the *language of normality*. Moreover, they are fighting against the *memory of* this event; but they are again fighting for this goal for their own interests, because the forgotten appeal to the great possibilities of this turn deprives a possible reclaim of the lost possibilities of its substance.

Thus, the press around 1989 were the carriers of a unique historical time. If one considers the great moment of the modern liberal press in the current sense of the word, one should start the research with the 1960s, initially stronger left, and intellectually/politically equally creative. Then came the low points of the 1970s, an "*unschärfe*" relation (á la Heisenberg), many color photos with impoverishment of content. In addition to the mentality of the intellectuals, the interested young managers appear among the readers, some of whom still take the intellectuals as a model. However, this concrete flattening changes abruptly as the increasingly strong impulses of neoliberalism conquer the space. Neoliberalism is more likely to become anti-totalitarianism and hopeful democracy, much less the national debt, the withdrawal of social achievements or privatization in the first place thematically. The whole history of the international victory of neoliberalism, which promised everyone only good, again changed these media as if with a magic blow. The positives of this transition also *refined* the media, they brought daily experiences of joy to the readers and the viewers, and even more, from this unifying positive mood of the rapid growth of long-missed values such as understanding, peace, security, emancipation, human rights, etc., the media itself also gained an otherwise hardly experienced *authority* and *authenticity*. One loved the privileged media, in whose medium the great processes were realized, even more, one also developed a practically *limitless trust* in them. Incidentally, this moment was the decisive source of the emergence of the *first* society, this almost limitless trust was instilled in the *do-gooders of* numerous population groups.

Our description seems to be literary, although one accurately reflects the content of the historical process. Methodologically, it is not irrelevant that only a small section (we deliberately did not want to say "fraction") of society is capable and able *to consider the eternal simultaneity of comprehensive mediatization historically*. The eternal presence of the media plays strange games with the audience. The emergence and reemergence of media takes time. It takes a long time for the good reputation of a medium to spread. No wonder many promising media ventures cannot survive this long moratorium. But if a medium becomes truly successful in the good sense of the word, this "high" time also takes a very long time (perhaps even longer than the period of moving on the way up). Many "bad" years must come before the same audience, step by step, irreversibly perceives that the content and messages of the celebrated medium are no longer so glaring. The results of these reflections could be reflected in the reflection of those concrete questions that were associated with the unique recognition, even "love" towards those media that were related to the world-historical turn of the year 1989. This confirms once again that media and mediatization are by no means simple carriers of political messages and activities, they are themselves part of these processes from the very beginning.

Therefore, it was about the decisive change in the credibility of the media. On the way between 1989 and today, the elites used this special popularity, if not "love", for the media particularly incorrectly. It even seems that they have already realized these mistakes, but because of a delayed perception, they seem to be adhering to the original decision. And this is again a new

train of the *first* society and the *three-societies theory.* Mistakes are not admitted, the consequences of a bad decision continue, blame is on the opponent, who always seems to be dragged into the totalitarian corner. Cautious changes of course never reach the level of self-criticism!

Not only the media theory pointed in this direction. Without a doubt both the professionals and the "only" interested may have learned from their own experience how viable political help for the *first* society has prepared this not only well-practiced, but also *still more populous* media world for them. This media world has largely personified itself; the credibility of the beloved media has been transferred to individual loved ones and *vice versa*. A very erratic sign of this transition was that relevant *news programs are gradually being moderated more and more by a single person*; one person becomes the center of attention. Today, such phenomena are hardly noticeable, although the question remains no less relevant today, how a single person in an entire program can appear equally competent in each sphere of questions. *Larry King* interviewed a different celebrity *every day*.

Nevertheless, the essence of this development is that this media orchestra has learned to adequately *hide* the increasingly individual and selfish interests of the elites and thus automatically trivialize them, and thereby develop an intimate relationship with the elites, which quickly led to the protagonists of these media experiencing and defining themselves as part of these elites. For an attentive viewer, such phenomena were by no means closed, but these were also very often the subject of media criticism ("lying press", Lügenpresse). However, it was hardly less relevant that the majority of the population, which loved the turnaround in 1989 from the beginning and identified with it, experienced these media very positively and therefore largely diminished the critical potential of this majority and thus its ability to control. So, it was not at all difficult to discover *in this large group the primordial phenomenon of the later do-gooder.*

Still within the brave new world of the "Three Societies", it will be essential for us to deal with the new concept of *the precariat*. First of all, it should be noted that this new concept arose in the age of the "Three Societies". More precise times are very difficult to determine from either side. The present basis of the concept of the Three Societies existed just as relative long before the birth of the term ("Three Societies") as well as the phenomenon of the precariat was also perceptible earlier than the birth of the term. If you go one step further, it becomes clear that both terms reflect at least partially the same processes. The "*second*" society is certainly also "precar" and *vice versa*, in the broader concept of the precariat, large and summarizing formations of the *second* society are abolished. If one goes one step further, one can see that the term "*second* society" has its structural context between the "first" and the "third" society, while "precariat" *without prehistory, theoretical justification and ethical, anthropological and normative dimension* floats completely in the social air and only fixes the very problematic and yet noble

existence of this layer. It then becomes apparent that the "second" society has its concrete *relations* and possible *alternative*, even its inner *teleology*, while all this cannot be said about in the case of the precariat. The category of the "*second society*" is also new, is general and by no means analytically determined in every respect, but self-explanatory analytical hypotheses can be based on it, whereas in the case of the precariat it is not possible to have an intellectual starting point, because, to address only one possibility, one should first clarify social science, socio-politically, politically or sociologically what "precariat" is and these discussions will be long. Until then, however, there should be no institution that deals with it, if only because at the moment no institution is obliged to deal seriously with a phenomenon that has not yet been defined. This is also because the "*second* society" already radiates a strong semantic message in its current form. As far as the original semantic message of the precariat is concerned, it can equate it with the *zero,* at the moment this term is a somewhat empty sign of an intention to describe the new political and social reality euphemistically and pseudo-scientifically.

THIRD MOVEMENT

When is a world war not called war

On February 24,2022 the Russia/Ukrainian war began, which continues daily to escalate step by step. From the very beginning, the war was under propagandistic pressure, which has not been known since the true Cold War. From the beginning, the war had a total character, in which not just the vocabulary, but the whole dictionary in advance finished there. The neoliberal culture of political correctness turned dialectically into its opposite. It became totalitarian. One side emphasizes the current border crossing of the other side, the other side emphasizes the long series of previous consistent border crossings of the other side. Both are right, the democratic public consciousness is expected to take a stand for one border crossing against the other. This constellation is a deliberate attempt to take back the achievements of globalization with a claim to finality (again in the sense of Thomas *Mann*'s withdrawal of the *Ninth Symphony*".

On the historical concept of the West

In general, you can think a lot about the West and in fact we have thought a lot about it. In the shadow of the "downfall(s) of the West" (Untergang des Abendlandes) praising modernity, it has become clear that the "West" was indeed the *key concept* of the twentieth century that replaced the earlier key concepts such as *modernity* or *socialism* or *Europe*. After 1989, the West was the potentized center of the world. The best of all worlds, the greatest result and the eternal goal of other non-Westerners. *The West was the real utopia*. The West was democracy, prosperity and the highest culture with, at the same time, the guarantee that democracy, prosperity and culture would still rise higher and become accessible to all under favorable circumstances.

No doubt, this West was perfect *mythology* that had nothing to do with rational reality. However, mythology did not arise *without reason*. It was already mythology in the sense of everyday language. But it was also mythology in the sense of *Georges Sorel*, exactly in the sense that the *mass strike* by *Sorel* was a mythology. It is a myth that certainly did not arise in a random way, but this does not change its mythical character. This myth does not originate in any epoch from the self-sufficient image of a positive West, *but rather from a comparison with the Real East*. Some differences between the Real East and the Real West have been transferred or transferred to the West as a myth. This West was the clear product *of a false consciousness.* This false consciousness itself proved to be a repository of true facts, personal experiences, historical prescriptions and unpleasant longings. In a more "understanding functioning" of our interest in knowledge, we do not ask directly about the "status" of the West in our consciousness, in understanding we ask what the reasons for these ideas were. In fact, there are many reasons. The business of "understanding" proves to be productive. One understands everything first "cognitively" or "intellectually", then one understands everything possibly psychologically and/or even emotionally. One can understand everything, but understanding is not *just* a logical and *only* cognitive category. More and more, more and more deeply we understand something that is wrong, the more empathy we have for wrong attitudes, the more tragic and thus also more insoluble the concrete situation itself becomes. *It is important not to confuse empathy with judgment under any circumstances.*

And the West actually behaved resembling a myth. After 1989, but above all after 2003/2004, it acted and broke its own incommensurable identity. The historical concept of the West ceased to exist. Long and complex investigations will be necessary to examine even the truth of this historical concept. The concept of the West was not based directly on Western reality. It was based on the art of the West, i.e., on the aesthetic and on the even greater barbarism of the non-Western regions. These were the two real moments that distinguished the West, so it was on the one hand the *aesthetic refinement* that aroused admiration in others and on the other hand the actual *perception of a difference* in the danger of physical and political life. *What was not "West" was considered barbaric.*

However, a *painful picture of* history opens up here before us. This historical overall picture is composed of two life situations. What was not "West" *usually* lived better and, above all, more *peacefully* and *happily* than the West, hence the countless nostalgic memories of all the peripheries of the western center *of Czernowicz to Agadir*. However, their peace was always at risk, these peoples and regions could suddenly face the greatest catastrophes almost without transition. *The true paradigm*, then, was this: that much of the periphery lived more peacefully and happily than the Western center, but their existence was in fact threatened in greater proportions without a transition to life and death, while the existence of the West was spared from these types of upheavals, although it could never live in such peaceful and happy harmony as the periphery during normal times. *Thus, the concrete civilizational difference in favor of the*

West is true and false at the same time. The true reality was divided quite asymmetrically, which could also contribute to the consolidation of ideological images and prejudices. *The periphery* (the Eastern man) lived well when peace was given to him, only he often lost this peace and then suddenly he had to confront the worst. *The center* (the Western man) always lived hard, had to fight more, but was usually not forced to look such annihilations in the eye. After all, the *East-West divide* that dominated the twentieth century is anything but a thoroughly researched object. In general, a very vague and ill-defined opposition can also be perceived: the West several times felt strong enough to attack the East directly and enslave it in any way, while the East never, in a clear way, had these inclinations. At this high level, the East certainly did not want to militarily destroy the West as often as the cultural west wanted to destroy the East. The ideological images and prejudices, however, proclaimed with great determination the direct opposite of this reality. To this day, the West should always be afraid of Eastern barbarism, which has not prevented it from actually attacking the East with all its powers. The East was supposed to honor and love the West, and it never occurred to it that it was destroying the real West. In practice, it was a double victory for the West, its constant aggression was rewarded by the reverent veneration of the East. Therefore, you can see how *masculine* and *unfounded* even the most important "ruling ideas" in this debate are.

As I said, the current war abolishes the historical concept of the West. That is the reality. However, we do not know what the tenor of the ideological images and prejudices will be. After all, we follow the maxim that one must first believe one's own eyes, which in poisonous and obscene enemy image formation of today's propaganda is not only becoming more and more difficult, but also sometimes a privilege or even a luxury. The terror of opinion wafts every day, the pressure on the Westerner wafts, he slowly needs courage to believe his own eyes.

There was once a West, there is no West today. The West "no longer sets" (Spengler), there is no sunset, there is a perpetuated solar eclipse. Maybe even the night. The West is not reborn, the analysis says. However, what remains of the West as a prop, memory or other virtual form of existence is not known. One cannot rule out that a virtual West with *Mona Lisa* and *Jean Jacques Rousseau* can enchant a few more generations and then in the concentrated processing of the media industry and by virtue of Aldous *Huxley's* bliss pills, they will actually think that the West still exists and that they live in this West.

But people who believe their own eyes will know that the West is no longer emerging.

Recently, the traits of *Hermann Broch's* "happy apocalypse" have not been missing. Some features of the *dancing Titanic* also appeared. However, *the really essential thing was actually completely new.* After 1989, the West fell into the hands of an anti-communist – neoliberal elite (the *first* society, in the spirit of the second part of our experiment). It could be sure of its

political power, and even more so, it was also widely publicly recognized for a long time. In this extremely consolidated situation, the evil psychological motivations of this elite gradually took over. A certain amorality ("*who else exists but us*?") began to become characteristic of them. It went so far that the political goals of this elite often corresponded to their own concrete (sometimes "personal") economic interests.

Don't be afraid of your own population

Also, this visible (let's not forget: "visible to those who can muster the courage to trust their own eyes") gravitational direction of the new elites (the *first* society) draws attention to the fact that this new elite *is no longer afraid of its own population*, presumably it no longer needs to listen to it. The unprecedentedly irrational and self-destructive attitude for migrants against their own society speaks its own language. And perhaps the new elite can afford to stop being afraid of their own poor, oppressed and offended. For the identification with this elite around 1989, the do-gooders, the language regulations, the loss not only of intellectual, but also of the practical and political alternatives, the new windowlessness of today's masses, the pampering through enjoyment, light drugs, mass communication, the growing problems of this population in the survival of daily worries, the new fears and so on, are all elements of a constellation, which made this predominant position of power possible. The end result, however, is clear (though not understandable): the new elite after 1989 had no reason, in a traditional sense, to be afraid of their own population, i.e., of their own people. *And it ultimately explains everything that could not be explained in other ways*. A prime example is that in the first weeks of the military conflicts it was assumed, with conviction, that the Russian people would rebel against Putin. However, it has not yet been said that the "Western" populations could rebel not only against this war, but also against the lack of energy. After 1989, the individual in the West can no longer be found. He thanks for the question of his well-being, he is doing well, but he is doing well even when he is not well. The kings passed over such peoples, for he will be well under all circumstances. *Bertolt Brecht* was wrong when he assumed that power cannot replace the people; it can do so. On the one hand, power, as in the political elite, has gained a great deal. On the other hand, however, the same power also collected the greatest imaginable danger. *Without the reactions of the people, it loses the possibility of correcting an incorrect political line.* And indeed, one cannot currently imagine at all that a Western political line could be publicly uncorrected. Later historians who talked about this military conflict with their Ph.D. must also think about this element.

Niklas Luhmann as a basis – die Menschenrchte as the superstructure (Überbau), or in the finality of the West (West Europa)

It should now be made clear that what Western Europe is today, how it is organized, what hypocrisy potential it has and whether, as Western Europe, it even has its own goals.

When reconstructing the goal problem, one must always concentrate on the basic essentials. On paper, Western Europe has many "ideal" goals. However, it does not have an ideal goal in the sense that it would have to do something for this goal every day, so that this achievement is not one hundred percent identical to its own current interests. By "interests" we mean decidedly "particular", i.e., egoistic interests. *The real goal of Western Europe does not exist.* The real goal remains to take advantage of the real situation and the real situation is aimlessness. Western Europe will soon be a bridge to Russia and will soon want to destroy it. *Soon it dies for Schäuble's "black zero"; soon it shoots the money for everyone and in all directions. Soon it fights for the pure energy of the nuclear reactors; soon it destroys them in one day because a certain politician has changed their mind. Soon it kisses all the migrants; soon it increases the pressure on them. Soon it will be "Rhenish" (proud!); soon "neoliberal" (also proud!). Soon it works out a system of new elections of the leading administrators; soon it chooses the leading person in a completely different way (Weber, Timmermans and Schulz could sing their songs about it). Soon a party system will work; soon it won't (if a populist just gets a little stronger).* The only thing that is stable is permanent instability.

At this point, we need to briefly specify the context in which we have so far been talking about the European finality. We now had the steely context that Europe is currently acting against its own values, which until now have been so generously associated with it (it is now a secondary question that *Habeck-Baebock-Greens* do this with explicit references to European values, it is undoubtedly interesting, but is contingent in its absurdity). Europe's finality, or the multiple shortcomings of this finality may then be discussed individually (assuming that a "deficiency" can be called many times at all). In fact, Europe did not announce any million-dollar goals and its Luhmannian functionality actually excludes such goals. The situation is hardly different with the "practical" goals. Luhmann's functioning of Europe is based on optimality, which cannot always be adhered to because of the various political deals. "Goals" are generated, in general, from the ambiguities that always arise from the political double structure and are completely unavoidable, which the press then presents in a very abbreviated manner and serves up not as a structural reality, but as a personal deviance, which must be disciplined in the spirit of European liberality. Europe's failed debt policy against Greece went through, Greece proved to be a deviance that had to be punished. This example is simply the crisis itself. The part of bad European politics (with its many secret interest components) is simply forgotten. The pretense being that Greece is a black sheep that must be disciplined by its good aunt in its own best interests!

Europe's aimless functioning is also a movement, even if it takes place in a vacuum. Every movement gets into different positions. There are opportunities (!) that you want to exploit embarrassingly and pettishly. Only very briefly do we look over into that other dimension that is Europe, in this functionalist machine-like nature, is deeply bitter, even those for whom it was

created and who still really want to elevate it and definitely save it. Such actors are the creative entrepreneurs, the creative people, the workers and all those who demand transparent relationships and consistency. Thus, after the macabre *Brexit,* there are also many other articulations of leaving the Union.

We asked the question of the finality of the European Union (EU) in a very specific concrete context. We did not want to raise the holistic historical and theoretical question: the Union arose in a different concrete historical context in the spirit of *Niklas Luhmann's* functionalist system theory with very strictly prescribed conditions. The finality of the Union during this period is now secondary, because during the entire subsequent development following 1989, the Union, largely, did not comply with the conditions it had conceived and prescribed for itself. Should the question of finality be asked at all under such circumstances? If, of course, the EU had a finality before 1989 and gave it up after 1989, it is almost misleading to ask the question of a finality at all. Thus, bypassing a history of several decades (such as the history of the introduction of the Euro), we have no choice but to discuss the fact that the EU could more or less adhere to the original principles internally (internally, i.e. in the direction of its own institutions), while it did not simply compromise externally (i.e. in the direction of the other major powers and institutions in globalization), but did not even declare itself as a global player. However, all this barely contributed to the creation of a true finale. Thus, the West fell into a veritable web of ambivalence. It concealed its real powerlessness behind a super-identification led, *ad absurdum,* with both the American goals and the American *world view* (which, of course, no longer had much to do with European goals finals). Nonetheless the downfall of the West also includes a certain egoism, one can hardly call it otherwise. In the absence of finality, and in the renunciation of its own identity, the West (a part of the West that pretended to be the whole EU and the whole West) wanted to get certain expectations of concrete economic and other advantages out of this concrete and subordinate situation *(green industry as "big business"!).* We talked about "outside" and "inside" earlier in such a way that we imagined Europe. However, this includes the fact that long before *Brexit*, the "domestic European greats" did not only not give up their own nation-state interests, but also consciously expanded these interests (*Siemens*, for example, forgot at the time that China is communist and does not belong to the EU; England made countless woundable films about English history in all probability from EU funds).

From the downfall also two?

Much can be said about the year 1989, under one. From a specific point of view, however, it was in any case *unprecedented and an unprecedented event*. In the stream of a dissolving two-pole world, the West remained alone on the stage of power. It was left alone, it was free; it was free to shape freedom and it was correspondingly free to unfold in the further unfolding of the deeper threads of its history.

In analyzing the behavior of the West in this extremely singular situation, however, we are immediately confronted with a methodological question. That the West *is divided* (not without history, but it is not so relevant at the moment). The division proved to be a crucial fact, but it remained not only essentially unknown until the end, but equally ambivalent.

The year 1989 led America and Western Europe into a single camp. It was not only a strategic necessity, but also the *inertia* effect of the past that had just come to an end. The West, as one unit, remained alone on stage after Gorbachev withdrew all that constituted the Soviet Union, Real Socialism and the bipolar world.

The West, which acts as a unit, also has the opportunity to act and act uniformly. In many ways it actually did, in many ways it did not. It can be said that the non-implementation of a new order of international politics is also the *focus* from which one can understand everything later. In fact, this unthought-through project was already the fruit of this strange division of the West.

After 1989, this West had one significant extreme advantage. It appeared "together" against the remnants of the East and the Third World, spreading a long-serving legend for the other parts of the world. At the beginning of the 1990s, the author of these lines experienced a situation in Hungary in which it manifested itself clearly. A well-behaved economist, who regularly dealt with strategic issues and was correspondingly more populous, gave an exposé from which it was clear that he considered the USA and the EU to be a single and common subject.

So, was there a West? Or two? In fact, this question has another set of strategic consequences that could be exploited very productively and have had many effects.

At this point, we would highlight a single dimension. The "first" downfall of the West applies in the literal sense of the word. If one understands Western Europe by "Occident", then the game is over. This Occident perished; Big Brother swallowed it before our days in the wake of the Ukraine war directed by Zelenskiy in *franchise*.

But it is by no means the only downfall. The "second" downfall is currently befalling the USA. In part, certainly not only because of this war, but because of the comically misguided policy since the Iraq war in 2002/2004. It would mean that it was (*W*.) *Bush* himself who carried out this assassination attempt on the US West. In this thesis one can finally calm down: appearances are not deceiving! The hypothesis that this man (in two terms of government) would put the US in the grave, was not only plausible, but it also proved to be correct. Among other things, he directed the expansion of NATO alongside *Condoleezza Rice*. The "second" (and it coincides

with the "first") downfall of the West is therefore in plain language: the downfall of the former only superpower in the world. This "second downfall" has been proved many times, here we would only point out the *internal situation* of the country, as well as the nature of its warfare. We know that it is not a complete analysis, but its clue to character must also be obvious.

The signs and facts of the permanent demise of the West are filling the media as planned. News agencies such as *Amnesty International* apologizing because one of its reports had negatively commented on Ukraine is hardly noticeable. This is precisely the new, the amusing and the dangerous. *Everyone apologizes to Zelensky.* And the talented artist, who has spent his entire life on stage, knows exactly how to decipher this situation and exploit it effectively (even if you don't think he's alone and only in the spotlight because of his talent). Zelensky realized that the West, to put it more precisely, *Western society* is no longer capable of acting (also a "downfall" from the many, added by the way). *You can do whatever you want with this Western society with its peacemakers, free-thinking intellectuals, former leftists (in the majority). And Zelensky does.* He plays with this Western society like a cat with the mouse, he becomes linguistically brutal, arrogant, he sometimes uses the clear language of obscene *contempt.* For a moralist, it is very instructive to think from time to time about whether Russian society will not rebel against Putin. However, we have not yet been able to find a press release that has thought about the fact that Western society could rebel against the events. Another sign of doom. Another press agency experiences it as its duty to add a propagandistic "red tail" to a thoroughly clear information. It was about the alleged North Korean troops who would willingly fight alongside the Russians. The performance-savvy press agency adds in all concrete terms that one should not believe that these North Koreans are real volunteers, *because they are not really voluntary.* Who is told that? Was there a single person who had regulated North Korean military formations for volunteers? Why use this empty tautology of propaganda to print some juicy, negative judgments about the opponent? Did you lose all the standards of reality? By the way, the loss of reality is much clearer in small things than in the big ones, because the big ones always enjoy the advantages of the comprehensive position that cannot be controlled by anyone. Or is the truth actually different here? Do the editors think, for example, that people should already be mentally diminished to such an extent that some spontaneously think that these volunteers are truly volunteers? Well, as far as the reduction of the mental abilities of the broader population groups is concerned, everything is again possible…

Doom follows doom. The incumbent President of Germany is undesirable, he apologizes and is also well-behaved. The incumbent chancellor of Germany is called "liver sausage", which he takes as true criticism dressed in humor and excuses himself, of course. Many consider in themselves, it is not so completely wrong... after all, *everyone apologizes to Zelensky*.

This permanent demise does not distort the language and semantics to such an extent, that a year ago you could not have imagined something like this physically or cognitively. Feelings and

emotions also move, inhibitions of civilization are dismantled, classic and bloody "blood laments" fly in the air. The complete annihilation of the other comes into the dictionary. One proposes to make the other disappear from the map and to exclude it from all institutions and contacts in which it is only possible. The good fights with the evil, the individual parties criminalize each other already at the beginning of each action. The good fights against evil, these labels spread like wildfire in no time, the language control reaches new totalitarian heights. Individuals from the other side are even treated as criminals (a good question for philosophers and moralists about how this extreme political label relates to reality - who is really a criminal and who is not). Possessions are confiscated (it seems to us that even in World War II this didn't happen, but we may also be wrong).

This situation is really unique, one would like to say "priceless". No one sympathized with the Soviet-post-Soviet oligarchy that bought thick portions from the state (and social) common property of the former Soviet Union to the West and from one point onward considered his own portion to be his own fortune. But now it will also be possible to illegally defend against these oligarchs, but that is "dialectics at the highest level", or, as Marx was called, "expropriators are expropriated".

From the Ukrainian side, there are always new proposals as to who else should be criminalized. These noises are simply inexhaustible in the creativity of hatred. During the *bombardments*, they point their finger at peoples or ethnic groups that should be excluded from the cycle of civilization once and for all. And they may know that our "Western world" with human rights and Grotius usually follow these monological cues. The political perversion and obscenity break through all dams, the drug consumption of the soldiers rises far beyond the threshold of dutifully prescribed doubt. Not only do "blood lamentations" fly back and forth, politicians also do it (i.e., they also fly), those who consciously or unconsciously, even if only once, oppose the prescribed opinion. A meritorious former chancellor is mercilessly and mercilessly marginalized by teenage activists and their correct rhetoric. The breath of the former conceptual processes runs through the room because the verdict of the trial cannot be questioned here either. Not only does something like this happen in the West, *it also happens in the declared name of the West*, which in the last five decades has stylized itself as a universe of free expression, of criticism, of plurality, of consideration for all contingent trifles of insignificant everyday life.

The possibilities of semantics are running out. Doom still means a process, but what is at stake here is no longer a process. It is something that seems to have already reached its stable endpoint, at the bottom. How this perversion of language and this corruption of feelings can once again be made good in the future is difficult to envisage, except in the case of simply saying: "We can do it!" and there will certainly be some who will actually believe it.

The overall situation can hardly be uniformly characterized, because the distance to these events is still extremely small. To talk today about the possible reasons is still very problematic because propaganda summarizes these reasons in its own way. Other voices are not publicly possible and theories from globalization to the self-destructive society or from the three-class society to the profit heights of the arms industry do not explain how far this *Manichaean war of annihilation* could break out with forcibly prescribed passion.

Of course, we are not giving it up, despite the fact is that this war was planned *for a long time*. We know that a world-historical change took place between 2001 and 2003/2004. Even all this knowledge, however, is not enough to explain this black reality, which in all important features is not only the Negative, but also the clear "withdrawal" of the true spirit of 1989, withdrawal in the sense that in Thomas Mann's *Doctor Faustus* Beethoven's *Ninth Symphony* was withdrawn. No wonder that not only the party of the present war and its intellectuals, but also a portion of *mainstream* intellectuals, are very reluctant to hear if the spirit of 1989 is still loudly and publicly mentioned and thus removed from oblivion. *The real spirit of 1989, the millenial optimism of an entire planet, is the silent but powerful alternative of this black war.*

Footnotes

[1] As we could say a little cynically, this is possible because getting acquainted with *some* of the new traits of the political sphere (das Politische) is quite a big success alone, while there is practically not much hope for getting acquainted with *all* of the new traits altogether. And as a partial adaptation of political practice to the new relations has already taken place, a total reconstruction of the theoretical relations of globalization is not necessary to reveal these relations.

[2] At this point, further field of work opens up, in how far the world society (and the individual societies of the world) would have been the same in 2007-2008 as they were in 1989.