

## **What ‘European Dream’?**

*-A comparative analysis of the grassroots protests  
(2013-2014) in Turkey and Ukraine and their  
implications on EU relations-*

### **Abstract**

In the years of 2013 and 2014, large-scale grassroots protests erupted at the EU borders, in Turkey and Ukraine, contesting their country's government. The almost simultaneous eruption of the protests, in two countries that have both expressed interest in closer cooperation with the EU, makes them interesting case studies to compare and analyse in the wider debate on EU enlargement and the search for a European identity. How do the protests relate to these countries' 'European Dream'? Are protesters necessarily more pro-European than their counterparts? Is there a positive correlation between protesters' involvement and their sense of European identity? If so, what does the EU actually represent for them? To answer these questions, the paper will compare protesters' views on the EU in both countries, by using qualitative and quantitative methods. A survey was conducted between April and July 2014 on about 400 Turkish and Ukrainian protesters.

## Acknowledgments

Thank you to all the protesters in Ukraine and Turkey, the page 'EuromaidanPR' on *Facebook* and the website *Research Turkey* who have accepted to complete the surveys and/or to share its link on their webpage, Dr. Umit Sonmez for the interview, and M. Mathieu Nickels (Nickels Consulting) for his help with the analysis of quantitative data from the surveys.

# Table of contents

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### LIST OF FIGURES

### INTRODUCTION

RESEARCH QUESTION

STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION

### LITERATURE REVIEW AND POLICY CONTEXT

THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY PERSPECTIVE ON UKRAINE/TURKEY-EU RELATIONS

UKRAINE/TURKEY-EU RELATIONS FROM AN ENLARGEMENT AND CONDITIONALITY PERSPECTIVE

A SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF THE PROTESTS

RELEVANCE OF OUR DISCUSSION

### RESEARCH PROJECT

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

PRESENTATION OF THE RESPONDENTS

PRESENTATION OF THE FILTERED RESULTS

Causes of the protests

Perception of the future

Views on the EU

### CONCLUSIONS

DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

CONCLUSION

### REFERENCES

### APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

APPENDIX 2

APPENDIX 3

APPENDIX 4

APPENDIX 5

APPENDIX 6

# List of Figures

[Survey chart 1:Age](#)

[Survey chart 2:Gender](#)

[Survey chart 3: Where do you live ?](#)

[Survey chart 4:How often do you protest](#)

[Survey chart 5:Main reason for protest](#)

[Survey chart 6:Do you feel your demands have been achieved](#)

[Survey chart 7: Meaning of the EU](#)

[Survey chart 8: Feeling European](#)

[Survey chart 9:How do you consider yourself](#)

[Survey chart 10: Do you want your country to join the EU](#)

# Introduction

In 2013 the streets of Istanbul, centred on Taksim square, became the theatre of the biggest grassroots protests ever seen in Turkey. Why? The government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced the destruction of Gezi Park, to be replaced by a shopping mall. The main reason for destroying the park was that it was known for being a place of hangouts and flirts; and was seen by the traditional Sunni Muslims, who constitute Erdogan's main electorate, as corrupting the youth. Therefore, the opposition movement saw in that policy the undermining of liberal values in Turkey and a threat to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's secularism. After months of protest and a government crackdown, the park was finally saved from destruction. However, events are far from being settled, which shows that the social malaise was much more profound. A corruption scandal involving the prime minister in March 2014 reignited the tensions between the protesters and the government. Prime Minister Erdogan has curtailed freedom of speech and tried to impose a ban on *Twitter* and *Youtube*. Then, on 13 May 2014, the Prime Minister's handling of a mine disaster in Soma has shocked many, who went down into the streets again. And finally, the death of Berkin Elvan, a 15-year-old teenager who was beaten up by the police forces during the Gezi demonstrations, has been received with outrage. Moreover, some 29 protesters are facing prosecutions in the 'Twitter case' (Anderson 2014; Gardner 2014). But, unlike the fate of its Ukrainian counterpart, Erdogan's party, the AKP, has won the last legislative elections in March 2014, and Erdogan won the first direct presidential elections on August 10<sup>th</sup> 2014 by absolute majority (52.3%). It means that he could be in power until 2023. His strategy is to make constitutional amendments to create a presidential system. He would then have a quasi-monopoly of power (Sonmez 2014; Paul 2014).

Several months after the Gezi events, Maidan square in Kyiv took on the same central role in the Ukrainian protest movement as its Turkish counterpart. Initially, the reason for the Ukrainian protests was President Viktor Yanukovych's refusal to sign a EU free-trade agreement

and his plan to sign the Russian free trade agreement instead, under Russian pressure (Wolczuk 2013). This agreement was seen as highly symbolic as it paved the way for a new era in Ukrainian history, shifting away from Russian domination and the Soviet past. The police also fired tear gas on the protesters. As of today, Yanukovych has stepped down, and a new government has been elected, led by President Petro Poroshenko, the latter having finally signed the EU agreement, presented as a 'civilizational choice' (Knott 2014). As a reaction to the movement, Russia has annexed Crimea, the Southern region bordering the Black Sea, with a majority of ethnic Russians, with a referendum deemed illegal by the international community. Pro-Russian separatists have taken over some cities in Eastern Ukraine with an important concentration of ethnic Russians, shooting military planes, and allegedly being responsible for the shooting down of the Malaysian Airlines civilian plane. An OSCE mission has been deployed, and an investigation is unfolding to determine who was responsible. As of August 2014, events continue to evolve rapidly and seem to be deteriorating.

Grassroots protests to overthrow a government or contest a regime is a worldwide and contagious phenomenon. Indeed, 'these days not a week goes by without news that a massive crowd has amassed in the streets of another of the world's big cities [...] to include repudiation of the government, or its head, or more general denunciations of corruption and economic inequality' (Naim 2014). Therefore, many cross-country analyses would be possible. However, we choose to compare Turkey and Ukraine because of their direct link with the EU, and the comparable divisions within both countries on this topic. Indeed, the Ukrainian and Turkish states of affairs, very different in nature and causes, share some unexpected similarities, which make them interesting case studies to compare. Both countries are Black Sea states, located on the Eastern and South-eastern borders of Europe, and at the crossroads between Europe and three civilizations or continents: Russia, Asia and the Middle East.

As famous historian Eric Hobsbawm said, 'geographically, as everyone knows, Europe has no eastern borders and the continent therefore exists exclusively as an intellectual construct' (Rehn 2007). The permeability of the Eastern borders means that both countries have at times been considered European (e.g. Holy Roman Empire under Constantine the Great), and at others times they were pitted against Europe, like Turkey was under the Ottoman Empire, or Ukraine under the Soviet Union (Davies 1996: 101, 331). The indeterminacy of their European status is well illustrated by the Slavic word 'Ukraine' which means 'borderland' or 'on the edge' (Plokhy 2007: 8). Moreover, cultural syncretism came as a result of shifting borders. Strong similarities exist between Ukraine and Eastern European and Baltic countries because of their shared Communist fate; and strong similarities between Turkey and Balkan countries still exist, as Turkish minorities represent the largest ethnic minority by far in countries like Bulgaria (Aksu 2012: 4-5). Then, in the 19th century, following the Enlightenment and the industrial revolution the elites in both countries began to view Europe as a champion of human rights, democracy as well as the land of prosperity and modernity. This change came at a time of relative decline for both the Ottoman and Russian Empires. Due to the decline of the old order the choice to engage in Europeanization was driven by a need to modernize and compete. Champions of modernization include the founding fathers of respective modern Ukrainian state and modern Turkish state, Mykhailo Hrushevsky in Ukraine and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Turkey (Plokhy 2007: 19; Riabchuk 2007: 70; Grigoriadis 2008).

Today, these countries still follow parallel trajectories, and face some comparable challenges in terms of human rights and democratic governance. Both Ukraine and Turkey are divided between a (secular) pro-European population and a conservative population looking eastward, toward Russia, or toward the Middle East and Asia, and supporting authoritative leadership, embodied by Putin and Erdogan. Ukraine's domestic upheavals cannot be studied independently from Russia: EuroMaidan protesters were contesting the Yanukovych government for his affiliation with Russia. The comparison between Ukraine and Turkey involves comparing

Erdogan with Putin as they both represent the authoritarianism or illiberal governance that protesters want to fight against. Indeed, the leaders of Russia and Turkey do not hide their nostalgia of the time of the Ottoman, Russian or Soviet Empires and display an imperial agenda, while playing with the democratic rules (BBC UK 2013; Paul 2014). Even if they may have been some vote-rigging in the case of Russia, evidence shows that both leaders are still highly popular in some regions, a popularity that also benefits from these leaders' firm control on the media. They use this popularity as the primary source of legitimacy of their rule (Semeniy 2007: 124; Erdogan 2014). Despite the recent protests, the AKP won the local elections by far in March 2014 (see Appendix 3). What is more, both leaders bypass the democratic restrictions on the number of successive terms a prime minister or president can serve, and alternate between both positions. They both manipulate the media in order to undermine the protesters' actions by calling them 'terrorists' or 'conspirators', using Cold War tactics (Paul 2014; Sonmez 2014; Dagan 2013). Because of the political, social, and human rights situation in both countries, they are considered as 'partly free' by Freedom House, in which Ukraine scores better than Turkey for the civil liberties ranking, when Turkey scores better than Ukraine for the political liberties ranking. Freedom House warns of a downgrading for Turkey because of Erdogan's handling of the protests, also criticized by NGOs such as Amnesty International (Freedom House 2014; Anderson 2014; Gardner 2014). The respective and almost simultaneous nature of the protests epitomizes these divisions, tearing the two countries apart.

On top of Turkey and Ukraine's structural similarities, and geographical and cultural proximity with the EU, both countries have signalled in various ways strong political and economic interests in the EU. Indeed, Turkey's application to join the EU was made in 1987; which means that its European status was accepted. It was recognized as an official candidate country in 1999 and negotiations have opened in 2002. Even if Ukraine is not yet an EU candidate (and its European status has not been officially recognized), its recent EU deal is a first step in the (long) road toward EU candidacy, and the protests defending it, waving the European flags, have proved

the existence of a strong and increasing EU interest in Ukraine. In that way, Ukraine and Turkey's fates are bound by the fact that 'the EU has an important role to play in supporting the democratisation and modernisation processes of both states.' (Paul and Seyrek 2014).

## Research question

As we have seen, Turkish protests had, at first sight, nothing to do with support for the EU, while Ukraine's EuroMaidan was directly linked with its Association Agreement with the EU. But we want to show the similarities between the demands made by protesters in Turkey and Ukraine, and their aspiration to join the EU; the 'European Dream'. What are their main motivations? What ideals are they defending? And what does the EU actually mean for them? In other words, what is their European dream and to what extent do these protests contribute to its realization? How do the protests affect these countries' relationship with the EU?

## Structure of the dissertation

To answer these questions, we will analyse the current demonstrations, using qualitative and quantitative methods. To collect voices of protesters in Turkey and Ukraine, I have created two comparable surveys (inspired by Eurobarometers) conveyed through social media to the target groups (protesters in both countries). In the second part of the dissertation, I will analyse the results and try to identify how the protesters' demands are related to their European Dream.

# Literature review and policy context

In the literature, the relationship between Ukraine, Turkey and the EU or Europe has been treated from two main perspectives: a European identity perspective and a EU enlargement/conditionality perspective. In parallel, literature on the protests unfolding in Turkey and Ukraine has tried to capture the spirit of the movements, the socio-demographic profile of the demonstrators and their main motivations. However, both topics (EU relations and social movements) have been treated independently.

## The European identity perspective on Ukraine/Turkey-EU relations

The European identity perspective asks the following question: do these countries belong to Europe's cultural/civilizational space? The question of Europe's eastern borders has been debated over time (Davies 1996: 397; Flockart 2010; Plokhy 2007: 9). Historically, the exclusion of Ukraine and Turkey from Europe's civilization responded to the need to define Europe in opposition to 'Others'. Indeed, Muslim Ottoman Empire and Orthodox Russia were pitted against Western Europe and contributed to the self-realization of a European identity (Davies 1996: 397; Flockart 2010; Plokhy 2007: 9; Mazower 1998). The question of Turkey and Ukraine's 'Europeanism' invites Europe to think about its own identity, which is why it is so divisive (Aksu 2012: 57; McCormick 2010). The criterion of Christendom would deny Turkey's membership and would exclude the 20 million Muslims living in the EU. The criterion of Western Christendom would exclude Ukraine, but also Romania, Bulgaria and Greece, which are already EU members (Plokhy 2007: 7).

The European identity literature also analyses the issue of EU integration from a grassroots perspective, derived from opinion polls. If a European identity can emerge out of history and culture, the rationale assumes that no European identity can truly exist without being felt by the so-called Europeans. How do Europeans feel about Turkey and Ukraine's place in Europe? Would

they be in favour of a future accession to the EU? Opinions polls, such as the last 04/2008 Eurobarometer on enlargement, suggest that Europeans are more sympathetic to Ukraine's accession to the EU than to Turkey's, as there are about as many people (40%) in favour than people against it, when there is a clear majority (55%) of Europeans against Turkey's accession (see Appendixes 1 and 2). People from the Baltic States that used to be part of the Soviet Union, and the most recent acceding countries are much more sympathetic to Ukraine's accession to the EU than the average (between 58 and 68% of people polled are in favour in these states), which highlights the contrast in perceptions due to cultural similarities and geographical proximity. Similarly, there is a contrast in the general perception of Western European countries and that of countries that used to be part of the Ottoman Empire, and who share cultural similarities with Turkey due to their shared history. In the same 04/2008 Eurobarometer, answering the question on whether people were in favour or not of Turkey becoming part of the EU in the future, about 30% of Europeans said that they were in favour. In contrast, an absolute majority of Romanians and Croatians, and about 42-43% of Bulgarians and Hungarians were in favour (see Appendix 2).

From the outsider's perspective, do Turkish and Ukrainian citizens support the EU and feel European? Opinion polls show that populations in both countries are highly divided on the topic of EU accession. The countries are profoundly heterogeneous, which makes generalizations difficult. Indeed, 'anyone who visits the extreme eastern and western parts of Ukraine and Turkey, for example, Donetsk and Lviv in Ukraine or Istanbul and Van in Turkey, will inevitably feel the profound differences between the two regions and might even think they belonged to two different countries and civilizations' (Riabchuk 2007: 78; Pamuk 2005). Turkish Nobel Laureate Orhan Pamuk's autobiographical *Istanbul: Memories and the City* captures the complexity of its cultural entanglement: the melancholy of a former imperial capital, the richness of Christian and Muslim cultural heritage, the presence of the Kurdish minority, and the contemporary tensions between Kemalist secularism, political Islam and Western liberalism, are the ingredients for an explosive mix. In Ukraine, events unfolding at the moment in the Donetsk region, with pro-Russian

separatist groups challenging the Ukrainian government, are clearly confirming the existence of entrenched cultural divisions. Russian allegiance can be explained in part by the influence of Russian media, with the presence of approximately 1000 Russian-language newspapers and magazines in Donetsk, against only one Ukrainian language newspaper in the Donetsk region (Velychenko 2007: 8). If these cultural and political differences have led some to conclude that a split is necessary, none can draw the lines between the different parts (Riabchuk 2007: 79). The reality is that a majority of people are undecided and cannot seem to choose between Russia and the West, the Middle East and Europe. Since the end of the Cold War, Ukraine's foreign policy has been torn between the two. Some commentators were even talking of 'post-soviet schizophrenia' (Semeniy 2007). In Turkey, the 'no problem with neighbours' policy is comparable. Therefore, the countries are not so much divided geographically, but rather ideologically, between two irreconcilable and incompatible projects (Riabchuk 2007: 85; Kuzio 2002). Moreover, the results of the 2014 local elections in Turkey highlight the existence of a cultural divide between Anatolia, central mainland, and the Kurdish regions in Turkey (see Appendix 3).

These ideological stances and cultural divides cut across many areas of public life, including support of or opposition to the EU project. If we look at the demographics of pro-European populations in both countries, previous studies have found that 'committed Ukrainians', who are the most pro-European, as opposed to pro-Russian, represent 25-33% of the population (Riabchuk 2007: 75; White et al. 2002:196). More recent studies suggest that the Ukrainian population favours Europe over Russia, overall (Appendixes 4 and 5). 40% of people polled favour the EU over the Russian customs union, against 30% who think otherwise (Razumkov Center 2013). 56% of people feel more loyal to Europe than Russia, against 19% who feel more loyal to Russia (Greene 2014). In both studies, 25% of people are undecided (they want neither one nor the other or do not know). In Turkey, the latest Eurobarometer (11/2012) which asks Turkish citizens whether they think that membership to the EU would be a good thing or a bad thing for their country shows that about the same percentage (33%) of 'committed pro-Europeans' exists in Turkey

(Appendix 6). But there is the same amount of people who oppose EU integration, whereas ‘committed pro-Russians’ – mostly the ethnic Russian population – only represent 15-20% of the people in Ukraine, including Crimea (Riabchuk 2007: 75; Wilson 2002; Korostelova & White 2006). Support for membership has declined significantly over the years, to reach its lowest level ever in 11/2012. Indeed, in the 2004 Eurobarometer, only 14 % of Turks were opposing EU accession, against 58% in favour. Different data also account for this loss of popularity. According to Transatlantic Trend, only 44 % of Turkish people polled claimed to be in favour of EU membership – a large drop from the 73% in-favour response of 2004. Today, every third Turkish citizen is against EU accession, while 10 years ago this figure was just 9 % (German Marshall Fund 2013; Sokollu 2014). This weakening of commitment can be explained by the stagnation and open-ended nature of the negotiation process, a growing climate of Islamophobia in Europe, and the economic crisis that has hit Europe, with Turkey faring better economically (Ugur 2010; Noutcheva and Aydin-Duzgit 2012; Idiz 2014). In his tribute ‘the souring of Turkey’s European Dream’, Pamuk accounts for the growing unpopularity of the EU in Turkey: ‘when looking at the landscape of Europe from Istanbul or beyond, the first thing one sees is that Europe (like the EU) is confused about its internal problems’ (2010). However, the increasing authoritarianism of Erdogan might lead to a renewed pro-EU sentiment, as Turkish democrats, secularists, liberals, will see in the EU the sole viable alternative (Ezizoglu 2014). In an interview, Umit Sonmez explained to us that, with EU public officials condemning Erdogan’s handling of the Gezi Park protests, the EU has started to regain the hearts of Turks (2014).

As we have seen, describing them as pro-European countries would overlook the complexity of Ukraine and Turkey’s multiple identities. In the case of Ukraine, ‘the picture of a nation that almost universally aspires to closer links with Europe [...] is at best an inadequate caricature of political dynamics, and at worst a dangerous misconception that can only harm Ukraine in the long term by delaying a much-needed national dialogue about Ukraine’s political, economic and cultural aspirations’ (Peisakhin 2013). Ukraine’s history has been shaped by Austrian and Russian

empires in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, by Communism in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and the political identities created are still defining Ukraine's political arena and create divisions from foreign policy, economic preferences to perceptions of the past and prospects for the future (Peisakhin 2013; Shulman 2005). Similarly, Turkey's history was shaped by the Holy Christian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, Kemalism and now Islamic conservatism. Notwithstanding these cultural differences, a large segment of Ukraine and Turkey's populations feel European, support EU accession, and can only see their future as a European one, fearing the alternative.

## **Ukraine/Turkey-EU relations from an enlargement and conditionality perspective**

According to the Treaty on the EU, any European country can qualify as a EU candidate. Therefore, thinking about these countries' legitimacy to apply also invites us to go back to the first perspective on European identity. These countries have a claim to join the EU provided their European status has been acknowledged. Once this prerequisite has been checked, we can then move to the issue of conditionality and Europeanization: when can these countries be deemed ready? The literature on EU conditionality is dominated by the External Incentives Model, which presents a set of criteria under which EU conditionality can work, and its critiques (Schimmelfenning & Sedelmeier 2005; Schimmelfenning & Trauner 2009; Noutcheva 2011; Grabbe 2006; Dyson 2007). However, this model does not provide a sufficient explanation as issues of moving targets and higher thresholds have been widely recognized (Hughes et al. 2005). Therefore, the focus has shifted from conditionality with mutual duties both from the EU and the candidate countries to one-way conditionality where the EU calls the shots. What is the EU approach to these countries? Why was Ukraine included in the Neighbourhood Policy and Turkey considered as a EU candidate?

In 1963, when the Ankara agreement was signed to allow Turkey to apply for membership to the EU, there was no doubt on whether Turkey was European, while countries such as Morocco

were never allowed to make such a bid for EU candidacy (Aksu 2012: 8). In 1999, the Helsinki summit gave Turkey the status of candidate country (Aksu 2012: 13). The EU enlargement policy toward Turkey stands in stark contrast with its approach to Ukraine, because of Ukraine's recent past as a Soviet republic. Initially, the EU approach to former Soviet republics was to offer partnerships, and not membership (Semeniy 2007: 126). Until recently, 'the EU never took Ukraine seriously as a potential member' (Plokhly 2007: 30; Semeniy 2007: 126-127). Since the end of the Cold War, the EU policy was that of trying to avoid upsetting Russia because of energy dependency and nuclear disarmament. Therefore, Ukraine's independence was traded off as part of a peace deal with Russia in the aftermaths of the dissolution of the Soviet bloc (Plokhly 2007: 34). An Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the EU and Ukraine was signed in 1994. Then, Ukraine requested an associate membership and received 'no' as an answer (Plokhly 2007: 32; Semeniy 2007: 126). Even after the Orange revolution, when the Orange government tried to put their country on a fast track to membership in the EU, Brussels was more than reluctant. It rejected Ukraine's bid to candidacy on the grounds that the EU has a right to ignore the application from a non-European state (Plokhly 2007: 5; Krushelnycky 2006). After the 2004 enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe and the Orange revolution, Ukraine was still treated as countries like Israel and Morocco, as part of the European Commission Neighbourhood Policy (Semeniy 2007: 127). The fact that the EU opened negotiations with Turkey, a country culturally closer to most of the states included in the Neighbourhood Policy from the Middle East and North Africa, while still being reluctant to recognize Ukraine's European status, was upsetting for the Ukrainian pro-European population and leaders (Plokhly 2007: 36).

In contrast, the question on whether Turkey is European or not, and can legitimately qualify as a EU candidate only arose recently, in the 2000s. The AKP's rise to power gave a final push in Turkey's Europeanization, as many reforms were undertaken in the 'golden years' of 2002 and 2005, especially in relation to the independence of the military and minority rights (Onis 2010). However, it has been widely recognized that the AKP is not trying to modernize to get Turkey into

the EU but to get rid of military presence and Kemalist control over secularism, as to advance its own interests, and more specifically to push the 'Islamisation' of society forward (Aksu 2012: 14; Ugur 2010). As of now, negotiations have stalled due to the conflict with Cyprus and the refusal of Turkey to abide by the Ankara agreement. Therefore, new conditions have been added to the traditional conditionality package. Paradoxically, it is after Turkey became an official candidate in 1999 and once negotiations actually started in 2002 that European countries started to question the legitimacy of the accession process. Countries like France, Germany and Austria have deep reservations about EU membership, and have said that they would bypass the enlargement process by putting the issue to a referendum, knowing their population's reluctance to see a Muslim-dominated state join the EU.

The concept of 'asymmetry of power' helps understand the EU strategy toward its bordering states (Shiu 2012: 54). Indeed, 'Brussels is the market maker, its preference to nominate other players as only partners, candidates, or finally members can be decided on its own, arbitrarily sometimes, but would also depend on its counterparts' own leverage' (Kutlay 2011). In the case of Ukraine, the counterpart is Russia and 'Russia is a factor too big for Brussels to ignore' (Shiu 2012: 56). Both Russia and Turkey are essential regional players, while Ukraine's assets are seen by the EU as weaker (Shiu 2012: 54). That is the reason why the 'integration without membership' model seemed to be privileged for Ukraine (Shiu 2012: 52). Moreover, when Turkey gained the candidate status in 1999, 'it was perceived as a cunning American policy to use Turkey to reach the former Soviet Union Republic's rich energy resources' (Aksu 2012: 13). The EU's improved relationship with Turkey was seen as a way to bypass Russia. This helps explain why Turkey could and Ukraine could not qualify for membership to the EU. But with the recent developments, the EU strategy is arguably shifting.

After having presented the debates regarding Turkey/Ukraine-EU relations from a historical and political perspective, we will now turn to more recent literature on the protests that we will analyse in the second section, in relation to the EU.

## **A socio-demographic analysis of the protests**

Recent literature has shed some light on the 2013-2014 protest movements in both countries. Fieldwork has been conducted by researchers and polling agencies to identify the socio-economic profile and motivations of demonstrators, even if they make up diverse cross-cleavage groups.

The first difference between Turkey and Ukraine is that the average protester in Turkey is younger than in Ukraine, where protesters seem to be more diverse in ages and motivations. The average age of the Turkish demonstrator is 28, whereas it is 36-37 years old in Ukraine (Bilgin 2013; Onuch 2013). 33% of the protesters in Ukraine are between 18 and 29, according to *Ilko Koutcheriv (IK)* (38% for the 15-29 generation according to *Democratic Initiatives (DI)*), 56% between 30 and 54 (49% according to DI), and 12% are more than 55. In contrast, the most important segment of the Gezi protesters was born in the 1990s (Atay 2013: 42, 45). Not surprisingly, the lowest ratio of AKP votes – and the highest ratio of opposition parties' votes – comes from the 'Gezi generation' (18-28 group of age) (Sener 2014).

Second, most of the protesters are highly educated in both countries. 49% of protesters in Maidan have a higher education diploma (62.7% according to DI) and the majority is employed. Entrepreneurs represent 17% of protesters, workers 15%, students 10%, the retired 11%, civil servants 4%, members of the army 3%, rural workers 3%, and the unemployed account for 13% (Onuch 2014; Boukevitch 2014). In Turkey, demonstrators tend to be more educated than the national average, either employed or students (Bilgin 2013). High school and university graduates

are underrepresented among AKP voters. On the other hand, the electorates of opposition parties, overrepresented in the protests, have educational backgrounds above the average (Sener 2014).

In both countries, the majority of demonstrators had already taken part in protests before Gezi or EuroMaidan. Indeed, 62% of protesters in Ukraine and 55% in Turkey were not first time participants and had protested before, for the Orange revolution of 2004 or the 2007 Turkish protests, for example (Boukevitch 2014; Bilgin 2013). Moreover, in both countries, protesters are apolitical. If a majority of Turkish protesters were politically affiliated to the secular Kemalist CHP, few of them said that they were politically motivated to protest. Therefore, culture is prior to ideological, economic or even political concerns, and protesters can be qualified as 'atypical CHP voters' (Atay 2013: 45; Tastan 2013). As Sonmez explains, 'the opposition parties (CHP, MHP, HDP, BDP) all failed to provide credible alternative to AKP, which is why the Gezi movement was not affiliated to any party' (2014). The lack of genuine political competition and trustworthy political alternative explains why the protests have not translated into political gains (Sener 2014). In Ukraine, only 1% of the demonstrators were supporting the opposition parties and 6% wanted the opposition to step in power. The absolute majority of protesters belonged to no political party (Boukevitch 2014).

Finally, the main causes identified in Ukraine are the brutality of the repression (61% according to IK, 69.6% according to DI), the desire for a social change/to change the way of life (IK: 51%; DI: 49,9%), the EU deal (IK: 47%; DI: 53,5%), and new regime/desire to change the authorities (IK: 46%; DI: 39.1%). The reasons to protest vary according to the groups: 'the students and youth under 30 use a more media savvy language of 'EU accession', 'global human rights' and employ abstract concepts such as 'freedom'. Older respondents used the language of 'anti-corruption' or 'democracy' (Onuch 2014). In Turkey, 'the majority of Gezi Park protesters cite restrictions on liberties, government interference in their daily lives, and the Prime Minister's authoritarian rule as reasons for joining the protests' (Tastan 2013: 7). Indeed, 'the driving force behind the

demonstrations, which turned into an extensive social outburst, is cultural and rooted in the worries of the secular people of the country about the shrinking ground of their lifestyle as a result of government pressures' (Atay 2013: 39). 90% expressed that 'they were disturbed by and unhappy with the authoritarian discourse and attitude of Prime Minister Erdogan<sup>2</sup>', 85 % said that there was 'increasing interference of the government in people's lives' (Atay 2013: 45). Commentators have described the 'Gezi generation' as a disenchanted post-modern youth who believes that both socialism and capitalism have failed or hit their limits. The left/right political cleavages do not mean anything to them. They embrace liberal democracy values and believe in global values such as human rights and justice (Sonmez 2014; Basar 2013; Dogan 2013).

Finally, the refusal to sign the EU trade agreement and the destruction of Gezi Park were triggers rather than causes of the protests. Only 10 % of the protesters said they were in Gezi Park for the trees. As Tastan puts it for the case of Turkey, 'environmental concerns triggered the demonstrations but lost their original significance within the broader set of goals and requests' (2013: 8).

## Relevance of our discussion

If the literature has discussed the respective relationships between Ukraine and Europe, and Turkey and Europe, from a historical perspective and from EU enlargement, conditionality and neighbourhood policy perspectives, there seems to lack academic literature comparing Ukraine and Turkey's respective claims to join the EU, and analysing the pro-EU sentiment in these countries from a grassroots perspective. The topics have been treated independently, which is why our paper will attempt to connect the dots and fill the gap in the literature, as to provide a complete overview of the dynamics of EU, Ukraine and Turkey relations, up until the recent protests. The questions we will ask is not only whether these people want to join the EU, but why? What is the meaning of the EU for them? We always assume that populations are divided on pro-EU/against-EU lines; but what about the protesters who are against their government,

support human rights and democracy, but do not have a pro-EU sentiment? In the next section, we will analyse the complexity of these grassroots movements and draw policy implications for the EU.

# Research project

## Methodology and research design

In order to compare the aspirations of protesters in both countries, I have used survey methodology, which is ‘one of the most commonly used methods in the social sciences to understand the way societies work and to test theories of behaviour’ and ‘to gain understanding of a social problem’ (Groves 2009: 3-4). As I have targeted a specific population, I used a sample survey, which describes or makes inferences to a well-defined population (Groves 2009: 69). The target population, defined as ‘the group of elements for which the survey investigator wants to make inferences by using the sample statistics’ (Groves 2009: 69) will be protesters in Ukraine and Turkey. Indeed, this target population responds to all the criteria for them to be observable: protesters are finite in size (at least theoretically, they can be counted), they have some time restrictions (they exist within a specified time frame), and they are observable (they can be accessed) (Groves 2009: 70).

The timeframe is 2013-2014. The protesters we target are those who have participated in the protests of this period, and more precisely to the EuroMaidan in Ukraine, the Gezi Park movement and the following May Day 2014, Soma, Berkin Elvan and anti-corruption protests in Turkey. In order to reach out to this target population, I have used sampling frames through the

creation of two separate yet very similar and thus comparable online surveys in English, containing 10 questions each. Consequently, the sample population will necessarily have access to computers and social media. I have used the graph search functionality from *Facebook*, to obtain a representative sample of the targeted population in Ukraine and Turkey involved in the protests. Then, I sent a personalized message to each of them, asking them to fill out the survey and share it on their social media profiles. The sample N is big enough, as I have gathered 196 answers for Turkey and 204 for Ukraine, between April 7<sup>th</sup>, 2014 and July 20<sup>th</sup>, 2014. I used a survey question to make sure that people I would analyse fit within the target group defined above: I asked them if they were Ukrainians or Turkish, and how often they were protesting ('often', 'sometimes' or 'never' as options). In that way, I was able to remove answers from non-Ukrainians or non-Turks who had come across the survey. As I am interested to hear the views of protesters, I have also isolated the people who answered 'never' to the question 'how often do you protest?' In total I had about 300 answers remaining.

The limit of this method is of course the self-selection of the sample population reached, which may bias the results. In that way, we assume that the sample population belongs to a subset of the target population, although the latter does not restrict itself to it (some protesters may not have access to social media or be able to complete a survey in English). However, this shall not be a problem, since the result I am interested in finding is the perception of the EU by the population found to be the most interested in the EU, namely the tech-savvy youth (Onuch 2014). As we have seen in the literature review, using data from existing surveys and academic sources, this population is not necessarily representative of the whole contestation movement, which is more middle-aged in Ukraine, and we do not assume the protest movement to be representative of the whole countries, respectively. In that way, we do not claim to analyse the countries in their entirety, nor are we trying to analyse the protesters as a whole. But we are studying a particular segment of the target population, which is the allegedly pro-European tech-savvy youth. This population is supposed to be the most inclined to feel pro-European, as it comes from a post-Cold

War generation in Ukraine and a Europeanized generation in Turkey. That is why it would be interesting to see in what terms they talk about the EU and if contesting their government increases their pro-EU tendency.


Another limitation of the method is the phrasing of the Eurobarometers' questions that can be misleading, leading to some contradictory answers. Indeed, some people answered that they felt 'always' European but that they considered themselves as 'only national'. It may be that they feel only national because they are not formal European citizens but that they feel European in the heart and would want their country to join the EU. Also, some people may have ticked that they felt 'national and European' but would not have mentioned 'European' had the question been open-ended. That is why a lot of respondents ticked 'Other' and explained that their identities were much more complex and were not restricted to these two options.

## Findings and analysis

### Presentation of the respondents


First, I have identified the respondents along socio-demographic criteria, to make sure that they are a representative sample. The first questions relate to their age, gender, and place of residence. As expected, the majority of the respondents are young: 80% of the Ukrainian respondents and 70% of the Turkish respondents are between 17 and 29 (Survey chart 1:Age). As we have seen, the average protester in Ukraine is older, so we do not assume this sample to be completely representative.

Survey chart 1:Age




Second, gender was well distributed: 55% and 45% of men in Turkey and Ukraine respectively, against 45% and 55% of women in Turkey and Ukraine (Survey chart 2:Gender).

Survey chart 2:Gender




We have also identified the location of the protesters polled (survey chart 3). Most of them (57-58%) lived in the main protest sites (Istanbul/Kyiv). An important amount (19-20%) was expatriate. We have tested whether being an expatriate increases the feeling of Europeanness, and found that expatriates did not feel particularly more European than non-expatriates. The variation was less than 1%.

*Survey chart 3: Where do you live?*



Then, to make sure that the population was representative of our target population (protesters in Turkey and Ukraine), we have asked them how frequently they were protesting, as to be able to filter the 'Never' responses. Among the people polled, a wide majority of protesters said that they were protesting 'sometimes' (including once), and 24% and 21% in Turkey and Ukraine said that they were protesting 'often'. We only had 17% and 13% in the countries respectively who said that they were never protesting (Survey chart 4). As we had promoted the survey to people who would be the most likely to be protesting, these results are not surprising. Therefore, in our analysis, we will filter the responses only with those who have ticked 'often' and 'sometimes' to this question.

*Survey chart 4:How often do you protest*




## Presentation of the filtered results

### Causes of the protests

As we have seen, the EU deal and Gezi Park were already identified as triggers more than causes to the protests. Our survey also confirms the secondary nature of the EU deal/Gezi Park. We have asked to the people to list the order of importance for each cause of the protest (Survey chart 5 and 6). 52% of Turkish protesters said that they were primarily protesting for ‘democracy, freedom, and justice’ (first choice), against 30% of Ukrainian protesters. In contrast, 25% of Ukrainian protesters said that they were protesting ‘for better governance/to fight corruption, cronyism’ (second choice), against only 10% in Turkey. The brutality of the police forces was the third major cause cited in Ukraine, and the second one in Turkey. Then, the least cited causes were ‘to oust government’, ‘to protect Gezi Park/EU Deal’ and ‘for a better economic future’. Therefore, our study confirms that Gezi Park and the EU deal were only triggers but not primary causes to the protests (Survey chart 5).


Survey chart 5: Main reason to protest



If we look at the cumulative average of each of the causes, ‘democracy, freedom & justice’ also has the highest score among Turkish protesters (Survey chart 6). However, ‘for a better governance/against corruption’ scores more than 10% higher among Ukrainian protesters, which shows that the number one fight is really the fight against corruption, which is even more important than freedoms or democracy. In Turkey, the second best choice is ‘against the repression’, 7% higher than ‘for a better governance/against corruption’. It is clear that Turkish protesters are fighting for their freedom and against the government’s crackdown and authoritarian tendencies. In Ukraine, it is more about corruption seen as an obstacle to Ukraine’s independence from Russia. Therefore, the most notable difference in the demands/causes is that corruption does not seem to be a determining factor in Turkey, whereas it is an essential part of EuroMaidan’s demands. If corruption exists, and the videotape showing Erdogan talking about money laundering has spurred outrage, it is not of the same scale and nature as in Ukraine: Turkey scores 53, against 144 for Ukraine in the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International

2013). According to Sonmez, 'it is not about corruption. People hate politics and despise politicians, and corruption is seen as a matter of fact. People are only asking for one single thing, and it is the respect of basic human rights and liberties. Politics should not interfere with society and people's basic rights and lifestyles' (2014).

*Survey chart 6: reasons to protest (cumulative average)<sup>1</sup>*




### Perception of the future

When polled, Ukrainian protesters are much more optimistic than their Turkish counterparts (Survey chart 6). 70% of Ukrainian protesters said that they were 'satisfied' with the protests but that 'there was still a lot to be done', against only 20% in Turkey. In contrast, 52% of Turks said that they were not satisfied but that they will keep protesting. 21% are much more pessimistic, saying that 'protests have not achieved anything', when only 5% of Ukrainian protesters think that way. The structural context of the countries helps understand this difference. Even if the situation in Ukraine is far from being settled and armed conflict is ongoing in the eastern regions, Ukrainians have at least the theoretical possibility of a future freed from Russia.

<sup>1</sup> The cumulative average (y axis) was obtained by calculating the average 'score' for each of the causes. The score scale by each votant could go from 0 to 6: as first choice it scores 6, as second choice 5, and so on, 1 as choice 6 and 0 if not mentioned.

They can envision an independent Ukraine, close to the EU. On the other hand, Turks do not have the same possibility. The threat that they are facing is from the inside, not the outside. Traditional Islamic conservatism is well entrenched in Turkey, and levels of education are lower in Turkey than Ukraine, which is why Ukraine scores better overall in the HDI (2014). In Turkey the protesters are now facing prosecution, the AKP has won the local elections and Erdogan is most likely to remain president until 2023 (Paul 2014). This important difference helps to explain Turkish protesters' pessimism and Ukrainians' optimism. Moreover, the Ukrainians have managed to kick Yanukovich out of Ukraine, and have elected a new government that reflect their demands. Gezi Park has been preserved; but it is only a small victory in comparison to Ukrainians' achievements.

*Survey chart 7: Do you feel your demands have been achieved*




### Views on the EU

To test the European feeling among the protesters, we have compared our results with the results of the Eurobarometer (11/2013) available for Turkey and the EU28 (Survey Chart 7). The differences are striking and prove the high correlation between protesting in these countries and feeling European. Protesters are having much more positive feelings toward the EU than EU citizens themselves: 85% of Ukrainian protesters and 78% of Turkish protesters see in the EU

‘freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU’, against 42% of Europeans and 38% of Turks. 75% of Ukrainian protesters and 60% of Turkish protesters associate the EU with ‘democracy’, against 30% of Turks and 20% of Europeans. About 50% of protesters in both countries associate the EU with ‘social protection’ and ‘cultural diversity’, against 20% of Europeans and Turks for ‘cultural diversity’ and 10% and 25% respectively for ‘social protection’. 62% of Ukrainian protesters view in the EU a land of ‘economic prosperity’ despite the economic crisis, against 30-32% of Turks and Turkish protesters, and only 11% of Europeans. In reverse, much more Europeans associate the EU with negative values such as ‘waste of money’ (28%), ‘bureaucracy’ (25%), ‘more crime’ (11%) which have almost never been ticked by the protesters. Almost 20% of Europeans and Turks see in the EU ‘unemployment’ against only 5% of the protesters in Ukraine and Turkey. It is also worth noting that an important amount of Ukrainian protesters spontaneously commented that they associated Europe with ‘not Russia’. It may be the first characteristic that Ukrainians actually associate with the EU, and which includes all the other positive characteristics listed.


Therefore, the protesters are much more positive about the EU than Turkish and European citizens. It is also worth noting that Turks in general are still more positive about the EU than EU citizens themselves, but more dubious than protesters are. Ukrainian protesters are the most positive about the EU on every topic, whereas Turkish protesters are less enthusiastic about the state of the economy in the EU. This can be explained by the fact that Turkey is much more prosperous economically than Ukraine and the economic crisis is partly responsible for the loss of popularity of the EU among the Turks, as we had noted in our previous analysis. On values such as democracy, social protection and cultural diversity, Europeans seem to take these notions for granted, and do not see them as particularly linked with the EU. Protesters and Turkish citizens, who have known authoritarian regimes, are much more sensitive about these values.

Survey chart 8: Meaning of the EU



Then, we have compared the responses to the question ‘Do you feel European?’ with the Eurobarometer of 2006, as there was not any more recent data (see Survey chart 8). Therefore, the comparison is imperfect as the EU did not have Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia as members, and had not experienced its recession yet. But it gives an overall picture. Ukrainian protesters are by far those who feel the most European. More than 50% always feel European and more than 30% often feel European. Then, 40% of Turkish protesters often or always feel European, against less than 9% in Turkey and 15% in the EU25. However, Turkish citizens in general are those who feel the least European with almost 70% who claim to never feel European. A majority of Turkish protesters feel ‘sometimes’ European; which indicates that the protests are less linked to the pro-EU sentiment in Turkey than it is in Ukraine.

*Survey chart 9: Feeling European*




We have also compared our data with the Eurobarometer results on ‘Do you see yourself in the future as...’ (Survey chart 9). The EU average comes from the 06/2014 recent wave. Data for Turkey comes from the 2005 wave. But, as we have seen, the European feeling has declined

significantly in Turkey, so we can imagine that no more people would have ticked 'only European', 'European and national' or 'national and European' to this question. The graph illustrates the fact that very few people, protesters included, feel 'only European' or 'European and national'. But among the Turkish protesters who feel European, we can see that they tend to be even more committed than their Ukrainian counterparts as there is more than 10% of Turkish protesters who feel 'European and national', against 5% of Europeans and smaller figures for Ukrainian protesters and Turkish people in general. It is rather surprising since we had noted that Ukrainians seemed to be more enthusiastic about the EU than Turks. This can be explained by the fact that Turks' Europeanization can be traced back to the time of Atatürk. Therefore, the European feeling is much more profound for those who are indeed secular, Europeanized, mostly concentrated in Anatolia. In Ukraine, the European sentiment is tightly linked to the presence of an external threat from Russia. Therefore, it seems more instrumental, and is used to ensure the safeguard of Ukraine's territorial and political integrity. Also, the deteriorating situation in Ukraine, on the brinks of a civil war, means that Ukrainians are united around the flag and their nationalistic feeling is boosted. This could explain the fact that the wide majority of Ukrainian protesters associate the European feeling with a national one. Almost 20% of Turkish protesters feel more European than Turkish, against less than 10% of Ukrainian protesters. In Turkey, the secular youth is worried about Islamic fundamentalism and thus, some of them may feel more European than Turkish because Erdogan is trying to shift the Turkish identity away from Kemalist secularism, toward Islamic conservatism.

More than 70% of Ukrainian protesters feel 'national and European', against 40% of Turkish protesters and 50% of Europeans. Therefore, Ukrainian protesters feel more European than Europeans themselves, even if the European feeling comes after the national feeling. However, Europeans still feel more European than Turkish protesters. In contrast, more than 70% of Turkish citizens feel 'only national', which highlights the existence of deep divisions. It is worth noting that even among Turkish and Ukrainian protesters, supposed to be feeling the most European

according to our assumption, about 20% feel 'only national'. Finally, 20% of Turkish protesters have said that they felt neither European nor national and ticked the box 'Other'. Among those, 13% identified with universal categories and spontaneously commented that they felt 'human', 'cosmopolitan', etc. A lot of them also said that they had multiple identities, identifying with other nationalities, ethnicities or religions. These results shed some light on the difference between Turkish and Ukrainian protesters in their demands. The Turkish demands are much more linked with universal values, not necessarily associated with the EU. On the other hand, Ukrainians also fight for these universal values, but see them as tightly linked with the EU, which is why they seem much more enthusiastic about the EU.


*Survey chart 10: How do you consider yourself*



Our last result seems to confirm our previous analysis. Ukrainian protesters are more enthusiastic about the EU, with almost 70% of them who would like to see their country join the EU, against 50% of Turkish protesters (Survey chart 10). It is worth noting that an important percentage (25-30%) in both countries is undecided. A lot people spontaneously commented that

they wanted their country to join the EU but knew that it will not happen realistically, or at least not in the near future. Others said that they wanted their country to join but not under Prime Minister Erdogan. Some provocatively commented that they would not mind that the EU joins Turkey instead, demonstrating national pride. Finally, 20% of Turkish protesters answered 'No', against 5% in Ukraine. Therefore, those who are the most vindictive against their government in Turkey are not necessarily pro-European.

*Survey chart 11: Do you want your country to join the EU*



From our analysis of survey data, we can conclude that protesters tend to feel more pro-European than national or European averages. In Ukraine, the correlation is very high, as Ukraine sees its relationship with Europe as the only viable alternative to Russia. Europe is seen in highly positive and idealized terms. In Turkey, the situation is quite different. Turkey is a more advanced economy, with a longer history of independence, and with a pivotal role in the region. Therefore, protesters who are challenging their government's increasingly authoritarian rule do not necessarily see themselves as European or do not see EU integration as the only alternative to Erdogan's Turkey. The EU crisis has hit the EU's reputation in Turkey dramatically and Turkish people have a sense of pride that their country is faring better economically than stagnating EU

economies (Pamuk 2010; Sonmez 2014). However, the EU support to the protesters also means that the 'European Dream' could be revived. It will depend on the EU strategy in the future.

# Conclusions

## Discussion and policy implications

The policy implications of Ukraine and Turkey's uprisings are huge for the EU: 'considering the activism and values of the younger generations, and seeing Gezi Park and EuroMaidan with their supporters, numbers and influence, these two countries have clear grassroots support for democracy and European values which needs to be harnessed by the EU' (Paul & Seyrek 2014). Even if the EU has been positively engaged with Ukraine, efforts must be continued in the long term. If the EU does not change its policy approach toward Ukraine, and does not send a signal that Ukraine could, one day, be a candidate to join the EU, it will be difficult for Ukraine to free itself from Russia's grip. 'The EU's division over Ukraine weakens pro EU advocates in Ukraine and reinforces the prevailing image of the country as part of Russia' (Velychenko 2007: 18). Moreover, 'if a democratic national Ukraine enters the global economy as an EU member it will pose no threat to Russia and it and the EU will both have stable borders' (Velychenko 2007: 21).

In parallel, the EU needs to face the issue of Turkey's growing authoritarianism in the context of EU enlargement. Suspending the negotiations, without any realistic condition foreseen, will harm EU-Turkey relations. Conditionality has been a powerful tool to improve democracy in Turkey. Rather than criticizing Turkey regarding the independence of the judiciary, the justice system and fundamental rights, the EU should open negotiation chapters 23 (Judiciary & Fundamental Rights) and 24 (Justice, Freedom & Security) in order to give the government incentives to reform (Paul & Seyrek 2014; Ezikoglu 2014). As Paul and Seyrek put it, 'to have no vision for the future of Turkey and Ukraine would not only be a strategic and historical mistake, it would also be a failure in terms of the values supported by the EU.' Indeed, protesters challenging

their state's corruption, breach of the rule of law, attack on liberties need EU support. Moreover, Ukraine and Turkey both have a great economic potential in the long run, and closer cooperation will be in the interest of the EU. 'Although Turkey is clearly more advanced in terms of economic development, democratic culture, the level of integration with the EU and civil society, both countries need to go through comprehensive reform processes. Considering the activism and values of young generations, both countries have this potential and it should not be ignored' (Paul & Seyrek 2014).

Needless to say, both countries have to undergo many important reforms in order to be integrated as EU members. Ukraine has to stabilize its situation in the Eastern border with Russia, and solve its sovereignty issue regarding the loss of Crimea. Turkey has to keep increasing recognition and autonomy for its Kurdish minority, and engage in diplomatic dialogues with Cyprus. Both have to undertake reforms in the areas of independence of the judiciary, civil liberties, freedom of the press, as recent reports by Freedom House, or Amnesty International have stated (Gardner 2014; Freedom House 2014). However, in the case of Ukraine, 'even the prospect of EU membership creates incentives to pursue these reforms' (Vachudova 2005; Velychenko 2007: 20; Solonenko 2007). In both cases, 'this stand-off cannot go on forever and both parties must clearly define mutual objectives and fulfil mutually agreed obligations (Chaly 2005: vol.1: 91; Semeniuk 2007: 124).

## Conclusion

Ukraine and Turkey have been on the journey to Europe for centuries. The European model attracted their most prominent intellectuals and the fathers of their modern nation, because it represented values of freedom, equality and democracy. The spirit of the Enlightenment had brought about the industrial revolution, economic prosperity, and modernity. In order for Ukraine and Turkey to become modern industrial states, they both chose to emulate the European model.

However, competing ideologies have put a halt to these countries' journeys. Russia, under the Russian empire, the Soviet Union and still today under Putin, is trying to maintain Ukraine within its sphere of influence. Prime Minister Erdogan is also pulling Turkey away from the EU and the cherished and idealized values that people used to associate with it. Turkey is becoming increasingly authoritarian and Islamic conservatism is competing with the liberal regimes of Europe and the West. These tensions, and the existential threat posed by Putin's Russia and Erdogan government have ignited the protests, led by people who do not want to see their 'European Dream' shattered.

We have asked these people what was their idea of the EU, and tried to test the assumption that protesters would feel more European than Europeans themselves. Our research has confirmed that hypothesis: Ukrainian and to a lesser extent Turkish protesters see in the EU the same values for which they are fighting for in the streets: democracy, freedom, social protection. Not only does the EU embody these values, but it is also seen as the only viable political and economic alternative to the threat of authoritarianism and imperialism that Putin and Erdogan are both posing. Moreover, in a time of growing Euroscepticism, a trend confirmed by the results in the latest European Parliament elections, where people are questioning the legitimacy of the EU, the power of such 'Eurooptimism' cannot be underestimated. Under this climate, the EU has to play a very strong role in its Eastern vicinities and support these protesters, use its conditionality to shape democratization, to give these countries incentives to reform. This entails providing both countries with a realistic prospect of future membership.

# References

Aksu, K. (2012), 'A historical background to Turkey-Europe relations' in *Turkey-EU relations: power, politics and the future*. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Anderson, L. (11 July 2014), 'Tweet now for student facing jail after Twitter use in Turkey'. *Amnesty International*,  
<http://livewire.amnesty.org/2014/07/11/tweet-now-for-turkish-student-facing-jail-for-twitter-use/>

Atay, T. (2013), 'The clash of "nations" in Turkey: Reflections on the Gezi park incident'. *Insight Turkey*, 15(3), 39-44.

Başar, B. (June 2013), 'Letters from the Resisters, No. 3: Greetings from Gezi Park', Vol. II, Issue 4, pp.74-77, *Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey)*, London, Research Turkey,  
<http://researchturkey.org/letters-from-the-resisters-no-3-greetings-from-gezi-park/>

BBC UK (September 2013), 'Turkey, the New Ottomans',  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p01fgk7h>

BBC Ukraine (10 December 2013), 'Les sociologues ont publié le portrait de l'Euromaidan', translated in *Perspectives ukrainiennes*.  
<http://www.perspectives-ukrainiennes.org/article-les-sociologues-ont-publie-le-portrait-de-l-euro-maidan-121651657.html>

Bilgin, F. (July 2013), 'Turkey: Politics of the Gezi Protests'. *Rethink Institute*: Washington DC,  
<http://www.rethinkinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Bilgin-Gezi-Protests.pdf>

Boutkevitch, B. (March 13, 2014), 'Maidan: la révolution des classes moyennes'. *Oukraïnsky Tyden*, translated in *Courrier International*,  
<http://www.courrierinternational.com/article/2014/03/13/maidan-la-revolution-des-classes-moyennes>

Chaly, V. (January 2005), 'Zwischen Baer und Elefant'. *Internationale Politik*, pp.91-92

Davies, N. (1996), *Europe, A History*. Oxford University Press.

*Democratic Initiatives* (December 2013), 'EuroMaidan stats',  
[http://www.dif.org.ua/en/mass\\_media/obliktiv-v-infografici.htm](http://www.dif.org.ua/en/mass_media/obliktiv-v-infografici.htm)

Doğan, A. (June, 2013), 'You Give Democracy 'A Bad Name'! / Who Really are the Gezi Resisters in Turkey?', Vol. II, Issue 4, pp.67-70, *Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey)*, London, Research Turkey.  
<http://researchturkey.org/letters-from-the-resisters-no-2-you-give-democracy-a-bad-name-who-really-are-the-gezi-resisters-in-turkey/>

Dyson, K. (2007). 'Euro area entry in East-Central Europe: paradoxical Europeanisation and clustered convergence', *West European Politics*, 30:3, 417-442.

Erdogan, T.R. (June 2014), 'Erdogan en premiere ligne,' *Paris Match*.

<http://www.parismatch.com/Actu/International/Erdogan-en-premiere-ligne-570195>

Ezikoglu, C. (13 February 2014), 'Turkish human rights and EU accession: the Gezi Park protests'.

<http://www.opendemocracy.net/caglar-ezikoglu/turkish-human-rights-and-eu-accession-gezi-park-protests>

Flockhart, T. (2010), 'Europeanization or EU-ization?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 48, 4, pp 787-810

Freedom House (2014), 'Freedom in the World report',

<http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Freedom%20in%20the%20World%202014%20Booklet.pdf>

Gardner, A. (23 April 2013), 'The IzmirTwitterCase: ludicrous and baseless, yet set to continue'. *Amnesty International*.

<http://livewire.amnesty.org/2014/04/23/the-izmirtwittercase-ludicrous-and-baseless-yet-set-to-continue/>

The German Marshall Fund of the United States (2013), 'Transatlantic trends',

<http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2013/09/TTrends-2013-Key-Findings-Report.pdf> pp.45-47

Grabbe, H. (2006), 'The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization Through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe', Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Greene, R (14 May 2014), 'Ukraine favours Europe over Russia'. *CNN*.

<http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/12/world/europe/ukraine-cnn-poll/>

Grigoriadis, I. N. (2008), 'Trials of Europeanization: Turkish Political Culture and the European Union'. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapters 6 & 7

Groves, R. (2009), *Survey Methodology*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Wiley.

HDI data

<http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi>

Hughes, J, Sasse, G. and Gordon, C (2004), 'Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU's Eastward Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. The Myth of Conditionality', Basingstoke: Palgrave, introduction and chapter 1.

Idiz, S. (3 April 2014), 'Adieu a l'Europe.' *Hurriyet*, translated in *Courrier International*

'Maidan 2013' (December 10, 2013), *Kiev International Institute of Sociology*.

<http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=216&page=1>

Knott, E. (27 June 2014), 'Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine's signing of EU co-operation agreements marks their transition from "post-Soviet" to "European" states'. *EUROPP in LSE Blogs*

<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euoppblog/2014/06/30/georgia-moldova-and-ukraines-signing-of-eu-co-operation-agreements-marks-their-transition-from-post-soviet-to-european-states/>

Krushelnysky, A. (2006), *An Orange Revolution. A Personal Journey Through Ukrainian History*. Harvill Secker: London.

Kutlay, M. (15 January 2011), 'Economy as the "Practical Hand" of "New Turkish Foreign Policy": A Political Economy Explanation'. *Insight Turkey* (13: 1), pp. 67-88

Kuzio, T. (April 2002), 'Between Totalitarianism and Democracy: Assessing Regime Type in Ukraine,' in *Ukraine: Challenges of a Country in Transition*, University of Freiburg

Korostelova, J and White, S. (June 2006), "'Feeling European": the view from Belarus, Russia and Ukraine,' *Contemporary Politics* (12: 2)

Mazower, M. (1998), *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century*. Penguin

McCormick, J. (2010), *Europeanism*. Oxford University Press. Chapter 7

Naim, M. (April 4, 2014), 'Why Streets Protests Don't Work.' Carnegie Endowment.  
<http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/04/07/why-street-protests-don-t-work/h7d2>

Noutcheva, G. and Aydin-Duzgit, S. (2012), 'Lost in Europeanisation: The Western Balkans and Turkey', *West European Politics* (35:1), PP. 59-78

Noutcheva G. (2011), 'Fake, partial and imposed compliance: the limits of the EU's normative power in the Western Balkans', *Journal of European Public Policy* (16: 7), PP. 1065-1084.

Onis, Z. (2009), 'Conservative Globalists versus Defensive Nationalists: Political Parties and Paradoxes of Europeanisation in Turkey', in Verney S. and Ifantis K., *Turkey's Road to European Union Membership: National Identity and Political Change*, Abingdon, New York: Routledge. Chapters 3-5

Onuch, Olga (2 January 2014), 'Social networks and social media in Ukrainian 'Euromaidan' protests', Monkey Cage in *Washington Post*.  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/02/social-networks-and-social-media-in-ukrainian-euromaidan-protests-2/>

Pamuk, O. (2005), *Istanbul: Memories and the City*. Faber & Faber Ltd: London  
----- (23 December 2010), 'The souring of Turkey's European Dream'. *The Guardian*.  
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/dec/23/turkey-european-dream-migrants-minorities>

Paul, A. (2014a), 'Ukraine: trying to build a future beyond the past', *European Policy Centre*  
[http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub\\_4500\\_ukraine\\_-\\_trying\\_to\\_build\\_a\\_future\\_beyond\\_the\\_past.pdf](http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_4500_ukraine_-_trying_to_build_a_future_beyond_the_past.pdf)

----- (2014b), 'President Erdogan: a foregone conclusion', *European Policy Centre*  
[http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub\\_4630\\_president\\_erdogan\\_-\\_a\\_foregone\\_conclusion.pdf](http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_4630_president_erdogan_-_a_foregone_conclusion.pdf)

Paul, A. & Seyrek, D. (2014), 'Why Turkey and Ukraine need the EU', *Euractiv*.  
<http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/why-turkey-and-ukraine-need-eu-302237>

- Peisakhin, L. (19 December 2013), 'Why are people protesting in Ukraine? Providing historical context,' *Monkey Cage in Washington Post*.  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2013/12/19/why-are-people-protesting-in-ukraine-providing-historical-context/>
- Plokhly, S. (2007), *Ukraine's quest for Europe. Borders, Cultures, Identities*. Heritage Press: Canada.
- Poroshenko, P. (June 27, 2014), 'This is the Rubicon,' *CNN*  
<http://edition.cnn.com/video/data/2.0/video/world/2014/06/27/intv-amanpour.cnn.html>
- Riabchuk, M. (2007), 'Ambivalence or Ambiguity? Why Ukraine is Trapped Between East and West', in *Ukraine, the EU and Russia. History, Culture and International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan: NY.
- Rehn, O. (25 January 2007), 'Ask the expert: EU enlargement'. *Financial Times*.  
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/8791fc0e-aa3b-11db-83b0-0000779e2340.html#axzz37AEqFp00>
- Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2005), *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Schimmelfennig F and Trauner F (eds.) (2009), 'Post-accession compliance in the EU's member states', *European Integration Online Papers* (13:2).
- Semeniy, O. (2007), 'Ukraine's European Policy as an Alternative Choice – Achievements, Mistakes and Prospects' in *Ukraine, the EU and Russia. History, Culture and International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan: NY.
- Şener, A. (May, 2014), 'The Analysis of 2014 Local Elections of Turkey' (3-5), pp.19-37, *Centre for Policy Analysis and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey)*, London
- Shiu, I. (2012), 'Clash of civilizations or the empire strikes back? The EU's response to the ethnic crises over Cyprus, Kosovo and Georgia' in *Turkey-EU relations: power, politics and the future*. Cambridge Scholars Publishing
- Shulman, S. (2005), 'National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine,' *Slavic Review*, (64:1), pp.59-87
- Solonenko, I. (2007), 'The EU's Impact on Democratic Transformation in Ukraine' in *Ukraine, the EU and Russia. History, Culture and International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan: NY.
- Sokollu, S. (7 March 2014), 'Turkey losing faith in the European Dream'. *Deutsche Welle*.  
<http://www.dw.de/turkey-losing-faith-in-the-european-dream/a-17547346>
- Sonmez, U. (13 June 2014), 'A discussion on contemporary issues in Turkey'. Interview by author. (available on request)
- Tastan, C. (2013), 'The Gezi park protests in Turkey: A qualitative field research'. *Insight Turkey*, (15:3), pp. 27-38.
- Transparency International (2013), 'Corruption Perception Index,'  
<http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/>

Ugur, M. (2010), 'Open-Ended Membership Prospect and Commitment Credibility: Explaining the Deadlock in EU-Turkey Accession Negotiations'. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, (48: 4), pp.967-991

Vachudova (2005), *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration After Communism*. Oxford University Press

Velychenko, S. (2007), 'Introduction. Ukraine: EU member or a second Belarus?' in *Ukraine, the EU and Russia. History, Culture and International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan: NY.

White, S., McAllister, I., Light, M. and Loewenhardt, J. (2002), 'A European or a Slavic Choice? Foreign Policy and Public Attitudes in Post-Soviet Europe,' *Europe-Asia Studies*, (54:2), pp.181-202


Wilson, A (2002), 'Elements of a Theory of Ukrainian Ethno-national Identities,' *Nations and Nationalism* (8:1), pp.31-54

Wolczuk, K. and Wolczuk, R. (Dec. 9, 2013), 'What you need to know about the causes of the Ukrainian protests,' Monkey Cage in *Washington Post*.  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2013/12/09/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-causes-of-the-ukrainian-protests/>


Please note: documentation for raw data of surveys can be provided on request.

# Appendices


## Appendix 1



## Appendix 2




## Appendix 3




Source: Rethink Institute, Washington DC.  
<http://www.rethinkinstitute.org/turkish-elections/>

## Appendix 4



## Appendix 5



## Appendix 6

